Tungsten Heavy Powder: The Origin Claims Behind Israel’s Orders

In the Tungsten Heavy Powder settlement, the company agreed to pay $5,641,114 to resolve allegations that it falsely certified U.S. material sourcing and manufacturing for U.S.-financed Israeli defense purchases. The government alleged Chinese tungsten and manufacturing in Mexico behind those certifications. If you worked with the suppliers, production orders or financing paperwork, that is the split you would recognize: where the goods came from and what the government was told.

The Justice Department announced the settlement on April 29, 2021. Tungsten Heavy Powder, based in San Diego and also doing business as Tungsten Heavy Powder & Parts, manufactures and supplies tungsten products used in military applications and munitions. Its business included supplying weapons-system manufacturing articles and services to U.S. defense agencies and the Israeli government.

What Did Tungsten Heavy Powder Certify?

Tungsten Heavy Powder allegedly certified that the tungsten came from the United States and that manufacturing took place there. The government challenged both statements: it alleged that the tungsten actually came from China and that the company contracted with a Mexican maquiladora for manufacturing. The allegations concerned seven Israeli government purchase orders.

Those are distinct promises about the same goods. The material-source claim concerns the tungsten going into the product. The manufacturing claim concerns where the work happened. A purchasing employee could recognize the first discrepancy, while someone handling outsourced production could recognize the second. Both connect the production work to the allegedly false statement sent to the United States.

The Justice Department said the grant funds supporting these purchases required materials sourced and manufactured in the United States by domestic companies, to promote American manufacturing. We see the absurdity in the allegations: money meant to promote American manufacturing allegedly paid for Chinese tungsten and work in Mexico. American production, on paper. The domestic supplier competing for that work would have had to meet the sourcing promise that Tungsten allegedly broke.

How U.S. Financing Paid for Israeli Orders

Foreign Military Financing put U.S. grant money behind Israel’s purchases through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Tungsten’s alleged false certifications went to the United States, tying the origin claims to the financing. Israel was the buyer, but American taxpayers supplied the money at issue.

The broader foreign military sales and financing cases show why the purchaser and the funder both matter. We follow that connection from the purchase to the sourcing promise and the records of actual production.

A Foreign Customer in the Lockheed Martin Case

Lockheed Martin’s LANTIRN case ended in a $37.9 million civil settlement over pricing and cost-charging allegations. The Justice Department’s August 2003 announcement described an Air Force procurement for resale to Saudi Arabia, Greece and Bahrain. The government alleged that management inflated a proposal to generate profit to cover overruns on another Air Force contract.

That case involved a U.S. procurement for foreign customers, while Tungsten’s involved American financing of foreign orders. For an export-business insider, the parallel is the American money behind the foreign customer: a false sourcing certificate or an inflated price can reach a U.S. agency through that transaction.

Who Brought the Case and Who Investigated It?

A former Tungsten Heavy Powder employee and Global Tungsten & Powders Corporation brought the qui tam case under the False Claims Act. The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of California investigated through its civil enforcement unit, coordinating with the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division Command and Defense Security Cooperation Agency personnel.

The Production Records Behind the Origin Claim

The useful evidence of defense contractor fraud connects the representation to the goods and the government money. For an origin claim like this one, the comparison runs through the purchase order, supplier and material records, manufacturing records and certification. Each answers a different part of the same question: what did the company promise, and what did it actually buy and produce?

Supply-chain visibility is a documented problem beyond this case. In its July 2025 report on foreign suppliers, the Government Accountability Office found that nearly all the active F-35-related contracts it identified listed U.S. origin. Looking beneath those contract entries told a different story.

In April 2025, the F-35 SCREEn system held country-of-origin information for first- and second-tier suppliers for 30,000 of approximately 40,000 parts. Officials estimated that this collection effort covered less than 10 percent of all suppliers contributing components and raw materials for those parts. The report identified missing requirements for origin information from suppliers further down the chain.

A prime contractor’s country-of-origin entry cannot tell a purchasing employee where every component or raw material came from. A part can have an identified immediate supplier while the manufacturers behind that supplier remain out of view. For someone who works with those manufacturers, the sourcing trail reaches further than the contract entry.

For a purchasing or production insider, the relevance is concrete: the company named on an order and the companies supplying its materials can tell different stories about origin. Tungsten’s case puts that distinction into a specific allegation, with Chinese material and Mexican manufacturing behind U.S. certifications. The supplier records matter because they describe the work beneath the promise.

Our starting point with you is the discrepancy you know from the business. Someone who handles material purchases may know the source. Someone coordinating production may know the outside factory, and someone working on financing may know which representation reached the government. We connect those accounts to the financed purchase and the company’s decisions about what it certified.

The Whistleblower Share of the Settlement

The Justice Department said the former employee and Global Tungsten & Powders Corporation would receive 17% of the settlement proceeds. A whistleblower case under the False Claims Act can pay 15% to 30% of what the government recovers. We build a defense contractor whistleblower claim around what the company told the government, what you saw and whose money paid.

You Know Where the Tungsten Came From

If the sourcing certificate contradicts the material or manufacturing records you know, speak to one of our Whistleblower Experts about where the tungsten really came from. We work beside you to build the case around that contradiction and bring in defense contractor fraud whistleblower lawyers who understand origin certifications and foreign military financing. Your knowledge of the supply chain belongs at the center of that work, from our first conversation through the case.