Raytheon Technologies and Hamilton Sundstrand: Romanian Goods Certified as Domestic

Raytheon Technologies and Hamilton Sundstrand paid $515,625 in a 2021 settlement over alleged false domestic-origin certifications for Romanian-made goods. The government said those goods reached it through direct sales and through another supplier. If you know the factory behind an origin certificate, the case shows why your view of the goods matters even when another business handles the government sale.

The Justice Department announced the civil False Claims Act settlement on January 11, 2021. It identified the settling companies as Raytheon Technologies Corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary, Hamilton Sundstrand Corporation, both defense contractors selling goods and services to the government and other defense contractors.

What the Government Alleged About the Romanian Goods

The government alleged that United Technologies Corporation, later renamed Raytheon Technologies Corporation, and Hamilton Sundstrand sold Romanian-manufactured goods under contracts requiring domestic preference, with certifications claiming domestic origin under the Buy American Act. The settlement covered conduct from 2006 through 2015.

The Buy American Act gives domestic products a preference in federal purchasing to protect U.S. businesses and labor. That is the promise at issue in Buy American fraud in defense contracts. We see a purchasing preference turned inside out in that allegation: Romanian-made goods sold on a domestic promise. The domestic supplier competing on that promise and the taxpayers funding it both lose when the certification is false.

The government’s account tied the origin statements to money. It contended that the certifications and invoices submitted to the government and the other supplier were false claims for payment.

How the Origin Claim Reached the Government

In the direct sales, the government alleged that United Technologies and Hamilton Sundstrand supplied the goods with improper domestic-origin certifications. In the indirect sales, it alleged that the companies made the same kind of certification to a third-party supplier purchasing the goods for resale to the government. The second route put another business between the origin representation and the final government customer.

That distinction matters inside a defense supply chain. A prime contractor sells directly to the government, while subcontractors can supply either the prime or other subcontractors. The federal acquisition definition includes suppliers, distributors and vendors as well as manufacturers. The employee who understands production can therefore work at a different business from the one whose name appears on the government’s order.

For a direct sale, we examine how the origin certification accompanies the contractor’s own invoice. For a sale through another supplier, we also examine what that supplier was told about the goods it bought for the government. Your knowledge may concern the assurance given to the next buyer, even if you never handled the final bill.

How Do You Prove Country of Origin?

Country-of-origin evidence links the goods’ manufacturing history to the domestic-origin representation made for a particular government purchase. In an allegation like this one, the useful comparison puts the factory and supplier records beside the certification, the contract requirement and the invoices for those goods. A purchasing employee may recognize the manufacturer behind a supplier’s trading name, while a production employee may know where the work actually took place.

The contract determines which manufacturing facts answer the origin question. Domestic-sourcing requirements can reach the finished product, its components or a particular material. Those distinctions matter when someone knows an assembly location but another part of the manufacturing history controls the representation.

We work through that connection with you, including the requirement governing the sale at the time. Keeping those facts together gives an insider a concrete comparison between what the business knew about production and what its customer was told.

What Are the Problems With the Defense Supply Chain?

One problem is the distance between the government’s purchasing records and the businesses actually supplying components and raw materials. Origin information can be visible for the prime contract while remaining incomplete further down the chain. A later Government Accountability Office review of foreign suppliers makes that gap measurable in the F-35 program.

The office identified 115 active F-35-related defense contracts for fiscal years 2020 through 2024, of which 114 listed U.S. country of origin. The contract records looked overwhelmingly domestic while the supplier picture remained largely incomplete.

In April 2025, the program’s supplier-information system held origin data for first- and second-tier suppliers for 30,000 of approximately 40,000 parts. Officials estimated that the available information covered less than 10 percent of the suppliers contributing components and raw materials for those parts. Knowing where a part came from did not mean knowing every supplier behind it.

For someone who knows a factory, that is a reason their knowledge can matter beyond the supplier’s sales office. The review describes a visibility problem across a weapons program. The Romanian-origin settlement concerns alleged false certifications in particular sales. Both point us toward the manufacturing history behind the statement the government sees.

The Investigation and a Parallel Army Case

The Defense Criminal Investigative Service, the U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service investigated the Romanian-origin case. Ossur Americas paid $500,000 in a separate settlement announced on March 26, 2014. The government alleged that it supplied the Army with hundreds of foreign-made prosthetic, bracing and support products while certifying U.S. manufacture. That case gives the origin problem a recognizable product: the supplier’s claim about manufacture could be compared with the medical products the Army bought.

What Proof Do You Need as a Whistleblower?

For an origin case, useful evidence connects the manufacturing facts to the government purchase. We assess those connections alongside the invoice and what the people making the representation knew.

You may know the Romanian production history, the domestic certification or the sale through another contractor. A whistleblower case under the False Claims Act can pay 15% to 30% of what the government recovers.

Tell Us What the Origin Certificate Left Out

If you saw a domestic-origin assurance travel with goods you knew were made elsewhere, speak to one of our whistleblower experts about the supplier, the certification and the government sale. We pursue those connections with you to build your strongest Buy American whistleblower case and bring in defense procurement whistleblower lawyers who understand domestic-sourcing cases. We stay beside you as your knowledge of the manufacturing becomes a case about the government’s money.