Contents
In the Kilgore Flares and ESM Group settlements, the companies agreed to pay $8 million to resolve allegations involving Chinese magnesium in Army countermeasure flares and ESM’s alleged evasion of customs duties. The government’s account followed the powder from importation through a supplier’s sale into the finished military product. Someone who knew where that powder came from could see a problem that the flare manufacturer’s American address would never explain.
The Justice Department announced the civil settlements on March 28, 2016. Kilgore Flares, based in Tennessee, manufactured electronics and energetic products for the military. New York-based ESM Group manufactured magnesium powder for the chemical, welding and pyrotechnics industries and supplied powder to Kilgore.
Infrared countermeasure flares divert heat-seeking missiles away from military aircraft. Ultrafine magnesium powder is a primary component: combined with other materials, it provides ignition and helps the flare burn at temperatures and rates that mimic an aircraft engine.
The government alleged that ESM knowingly misrepresented the content of ultrafine magnesium powder imported from China from July 2003 through May 2005 to avoid antidumping duties. It separately alleged that Kilgore used illegally imported Chinese powder purchased from ESM in countermeasure flares sold to the Army from March 2005 through August 2006. According to the Justice Department, the Chinese powder allegedly violated both the contracts’ domestic-source requirement and their engineering specifications.
Chinese ultrafine magnesium powder carried a 305% antidumping duty at the time of the alleged imports. The Justice Department described those duties as protecting domestic businesses against foreign products sold below cost. Avoiding that bill was the financial purpose the government attributed to ESM’s alleged misrepresentation.
The Army’s sourcing requirement served a separate purpose. Kilgore’s contracts prohibited magnesium powder from foreign countries except Canada to maintain domestic manufacturing capability in the interest of national defense. The requirement reached the powder inside the flare, beyond the location of the company selling the finished product.
We see the government shortchanged at both ends of the alleged chain. Duties intended to protect domestic production allegedly went unpaid, while the Army allegedly bought flares containing Chinese powder under contracts intended to preserve domestic manufacturing capability.
Origin shows in the material’s production and supply records, and we trace them with you. In this case, the relevant chain runs from the imported powder through ESM’s sale to Kilgore and into the flares sold to the Army. We examine how the origin information traveled with the material and what the buyer was told about it.
The broader defense industry has a visibility problem below the main contractor. In its report on dependence on foreign suppliers, the Government Accountability Office reported that, as of April 2025, officials estimated they had origin information for less than 10% of suppliers contributing components and raw materials to the tracked F-35 parts. Knowing who sold the finished product does not tell you where its raw materials came from. Purchase orders, traceability records and the representation supporting acceptance or payment are the kinds of records we examine together, following the material into the government sale.
Kilgore agreed to pay $6 million, and ESM agreed to pay $2 million to resolve the government’s allegations. The Justice Department attributed the alleged use of the powder in Army flares to Kilgore and the alleged evasion of import duties to ESM. The Defense Contract Audit Agency, Army Criminal Investigation Command and U.S. Customs and Border Protection participated in the joint investigation, alongside other civil and investigative offices.
According to the Justice Department’s announcement, five former ESM employees and agents pleaded guilty in the related criminal proceedings before the civil settlements. They included ESM’s former president, and their offenses concerned the magnesium importation scheme.
Reade Manufacturing Company, a domestic magnesium-powder producer, brought the False Claims Act qui tam case resolved by ESM’s settlement. The Justice Department reported that Reade received a share of that settlement. The whistleblower in this case was a business in the magnesium industry, with its own place in the market the antidumping duty was intended to protect.
A whistleblower case under the False Claims Act can pay 15% to 30% of what the government recovers. As the Justice Department explained in its account of ESM’s settlement, the law also reaches those who avoid paying money owed to the government. In this case, the government’s financial interest included the duty bill at the border as well as its purchase of military equipment.
ATK Launch Systems faced a separate flare case involving a required ten-foot drop test. The government alleged that its illuminating para-flares could not survive that drop without ignition or explosion, as the specifications required. Its settlement of nearly $37 million combined cash and services to repair flares.
The common thread is the government’s purchase of a product against a particular promise. An insider’s knowledge of the material or the required test can explain the gap between what the contract demanded and what the government allegedly received.
We work out with you what proof connects the material to the contract, the government and what the company knew. We examine those connections with you through the records behind the product and the payment. The magnesium allegations show why the origin record and the engineering requirement need to stay attached to the same material and government sale.
An employee handling supplier purchases may understand the origin discrepancy; someone in quality may understand the specification it contradicts. Contract and billing personnel may see the representation that accompanies the finished product. We bring those views together around the transaction, including what the company knew when it described the product to the government. Your knowledge of the powder’s path can give meaning to a purchase order or product record that says little on its own.
If you saw imported powder sold against a domestic-source promise or a material substitution that contradicted military specifications, speak to one of our whistleblower experts about how that powder reached the Army. We build your case around the sourcing decisions, the product requirements and the government money, and bring in defense contractor fraud whistleblower lawyers who understand origin and engineering disputes. We stay with you through the case, keeping the material you knew and the promise made to the Army at its center.