Contents
Contents
In 1986, the SEC obtained a $100 million consent judgment against an arbitrageur in the takeover-arbitrage insider-trading network case. The SEC alleged that investment bankers supplied confidential takeover information and that entities he controlled traded on it. If you worked beside the trader, processed the orders or reviewed the accounts, you know how a conversation can connect to a position.
This page follows the historical network’s deal information, payments and securities transfers. Our broader account of insider trading explains how confidential information reaches a trade. Here, the SEC’s allegations show what those connections looked like inside investment banking and risk arbitrage.
The SEC alleged that an arbitrageur caused entities he controlled to trade using confidential information about tender offers, mergers and other major corporate transactions. Its annual report for 1987 identified an investment banker as a source of that information.
That source allegedly ran his own trading operation. The SEC’s annual report for 1986 described his alleged use of confidential deal information, Panamanian companies under his control and a broker handling trades through a Bahamian subsidiary of a Swiss bank. Information obtained in investment banking could reach accounts well beyond the employer’s desk.
A separate SEC action alleged that another investment banker supplied the arbitrageur with confidential information obtained through his employment. The SEC alleged that this banker knew the recipient would cause trading entities to use the information, and received approximately $700,000 in return. In the SEC’s allegation, the banker’s access came with a price tag.
Proving insider trading depends on connecting the information available inside the business, the person who received it and the account that traded. In the banker allegation, the SEC expressly connected employment access, disclosure, expected trading and payment. For someone who knows the desk, those are different events with different records behind them.
An order timestamp places a trade in sequence. A communication can explain the instruction behind it, while account records connect the position to the person directing the money. The corporate records behind a securities fraud case become more useful when the employee can explain how they fit together. We compare that account with the transaction itself, including who controlled the position and who stood to receive its gains or bear its losses.
An arbitrage-desk assistant may recognize the instruction that changed an order. A compliance analyst may understand the access restriction or review that applied to it. The case’s account-control allegations show why they matter: the apparent holder of securities and the person carrying their economic risk could be different.
At Kidder Peabody & Co., the banker accused of selling information worked as a senior mergers-and-acquisitions professional and also participated in risk arbitrage. In its case against the firm, the SEC alleged that an investment-bank arbitrageur supplied confidential transaction information through this banker to Kidder Peabody’s risk-arbitrage account. The firm allegedly bought and sold securities and options using information about tender offers, mergers, leveraged buyouts and other business combinations.
For a person inside the firm, that overlap between deal work and trading is concrete. The same professional could be involved in confidential corporate transactions and in the account buying or selling securities. The SEC’s allegation follows information through that overlap, from its source to the professional to the firm’s trading account.
The resolution also reached the desk’s procedures. In a separate administrative proceeding, Kidder Peabody agreed to retain a consultant to review its policies and to keep its already terminated risk-arbitrage trading suspended until it adopted recommended procedures and special compliance procedures for that trading. Someone responsible for trading controls would recognize the issue: what had to change before the desk could trade again.
The SEC separately alleged that Kidder Peabody held securities for Seemala Corporation, a broker-dealer controlled by the arbitrageur. Under the alleged arrangement, Seemala would repurchase the securities shortly afterward and remain responsible for all profits and losses. The SEC called this securities parking.
That arrangement allegedly helped Seemala conceal its inability to maintain the minimum net capital required of broker-dealers. A transfer on the books could therefore obscure who remained responsible for the position. For an employee handling confirmations, account entries or repurchase arrangements, the promise behind the transfer could explain more than the entry showing a sale. In the SEC’s account, the securities changed hands while the risk stayed put.
The same annual report described a related SEC case involving Jefferies & Co., where the firm’s owner allegedly agreed to park stock for Seemala. The SEC alleged that those securities fell substantially in value, leaving Jefferies & Co. with an approximate $3.6 million loss when it sold them back. The arbitrageur then allegedly paid Jefferies & Co. $3 million under a false invoice for purported investment advisory and corporate financial services.
That allegation gives an accounting employee a different view of the network. In the SEC’s account, we see a trading loss dressed up as an advisory bill. The bill had a job even if the service did not.
The arbitrageur’s civil settlement included $50 million in cash returned as trading profits and a penalty paid in securities with an estimated aggregate value of $50 million. The banker accused of selling information separately agreed to return approximately $4.25 million in cash or cash equivalents, as well as ownership interests in his then-employer’s securities and its sponsored partnerships.
Kidder Peabody was ordered to pay $25,294,775 in returned profits and a civil penalty. The SEC later described proposed coordinated distribution plans covering more than $56 million previously disgorged by the arbitrageur, the banker and Kidder Peabody. Those plans proposed payments to investors and other securities-litigation claimants in the Southern District of New York.
The value of early access sits inside the process that prepares information for the market. The Wisconsin Law Review’s 2018 paper Insider Trading and the Integrity of Mandatory Disclosure argues that insider trading can undermine that process, particularly when significant information is deliberately held back for analysis and verification. It states the public purpose plainly:
Such disclosure is meant to benefit all investors and should not be exploited by a few.
Insider Trading and the Integrity of Mandatory Disclosure, Wisconsin Law Review, 2018
The paper connects tender-offer information to the disclosure protections intended for investors in those transactions. In this network, the SEC alleged that information about proposed corporate deals traveled through bankers to trading accounts. That is why the employee who understands the source of a trading instruction can add something the market’s price history leaves out: how confidential work became someone else’s trading advantage.
Yes, and our whistleblower experts help you connect what you know to what the SEC can investigate. If you recognize a paid source, a deal-sensitive order or a repurchase promise behind an apparent sale, our whistleblower experts work with you on reporting securities fraud to the SEC. The conversation starts with the part of the business you know firsthand.
For a compliance analyst, how your work brought the information to you belongs in that conversation too. We address the role-specific questions with you and securities fraud whistleblower lawyers, alongside the evidence connecting access, communications and trades. The SEC has its own whistleblower award program for information that contributes to successful enforcement.
If your knowledge also concerns false claims against the government, that is a separate issue we assess with you. A whistleblower case under the False Claims Act can pay 15% to 30% of what the government recovers.
If you know where the deal information came from or why an account carried somebody else’s risk, speak to one of our Whistleblower Experts about the trading you saw. We connect your knowledge of the desk to the communications, accounts and payments that can make the case clear, and bring in securities fraud whistleblower lawyers who understand those connections. We stay beside you as we build your strongest insider trading whistleblower case.