Contents
Contents
In the Ramapo Local Development Corporation securities enforcement case, the Securities and Exchange Commission alleged that officials hid financial trouble behind false receivables, missing bills and misleading stadium revenue claims. The complaint followed land that never sold, invoices that never reached bookkeeping, and Town money sent to the development corporation so it could reimburse the Town.
The SEC’s complaint concerning Ramapo covered 16 municipal securities offerings between September 2010 and September 2015. It alleged that the Town raised more than $300 million during that period, about $85 million of it new money, using false representations about its financial health. This page follows those accounting entries into the bond documents; our municipal bond and public finance fraud page covers the broader issuer and underwriting patterns.
The Securities and Exchange Commission charged both the Town of Ramapo and Ramapo Local Development Corporation, along with four officials, on April 14, 2016. Ramapo is a municipal government in Rockland County, New York. The development corporation was a nonprofit corporation established in 2008 to undertake development projects within the Town, operating independently while remaining a component unit of the Town.
The roles overlapped. The Town supervisor was also its director of finance and president of the development corporation, while the development corporation’s executive director also served as an assistant Town attorney. The complaint alleged that the supervisor directed the accounting scheme and that the executive director certified misleading offering documents. The Town attorney and deputy finance director were also charged, with their alleged involvement reaching audit assurances, unpaid bills and transfers between funds.
The General Fund was the Town’s primary operating fund, and its condition mattered to both bond investors and the credit rating agency. The SEC alleged that the Town reported positive balances between $1.4 million and $4.2 million over a six-year period while hiding deficits as high as nearly $14 million.
The complaint explains that governmental fund statements focus on money available for near-term spending. A receivable that would never produce cash could therefore change the picture of what the Town had available to meet its obligations.
That financing motive has a wider accounting counterpart. The 2019 review Accounting Fraud: A Literature Review, published in Risk Governance and Control: Financial Markets & Institutions, identifies obtaining more favorable financing or avoiding debt obligations as recurring reasons for manipulating financial statements. In Ramapo, the Securities and Exchange Commission alleged that the accounting changes concealed deterioration in the General Fund to facilitate bond financing.
The complaint alleged that the Town recorded a $3,080,000 receivable for selling the Hamlets property to the development corporation even though title never transferred. Both entities’ financial statements reflected the supposed sale. When auditors said the failure to close required removing the receivable, the supervisor, with the Town attorney’s assistance and the deputy finance director’s assent, allegedly matched the amount to different land near Elm Street.
That land had already been donated to the development corporation for the Ramapo Commons housing project. According to the complaint, the agreement offered to support the receivable did not mention its amount, postponed payment until an uncertain future point, allowed services instead of cash and contemplated waiving repayment if the development corporation could not pay. We call that keeping the number and replacing the reason.
The complaint alleged that officials repeatedly assured auditors that payment was coming, although the development corporation paid nothing toward the receivable through 2013. An employee of the development corporation had told a junior auditor there was no intention to pay in the near future. Later classifying the receivable as nonspendable still left the total fund balance overstated, the complaint said, because the original sale had never occurred.
A separate $3,663,547 receivable appeared in unaudited results sent to the rating agency and in the Stadium Bonds’ offering statements. The complaint alleged that officials attributed it to a land transfer even though the only relevant transfer was a donation for the stadium, with no payment obligation. The complaint said this figure never entered the Town’s books or its audited financial statements. Someone comparing only audited accounts would miss the number bond buyers had been shown. The complaint also described a receivable for an unfinished sale to the Rockland County Sewer District that inflated the balance shown in offering documents.
The complaint alleged that improper transfers from the Ambulance Fund inflated the General Fund, with a cumulative effect exceeding $12 million by fiscal 2014. The funds had different tax bases: certain clergy residences were included in the Ambulance Fund’s base but excluded from the General Fund’s. Finance employees questioned the transfers, while the supervisor allegedly told auditors that the tax bases were the same.
Some transfers were recorded before the Ambulance Fund could supply the cash. The complaint alleged that the supervisor and deputy finance director directed staff to record anticipated receipts as amounts due from that fund, even though it owed no corresponding obligation. A plan to move cash had become an asset on the receiving fund’s balance sheet.
Unpaid bills supplied another way to improve the reported numbers. The complaint alleged that the General Fund’s financial statements omitted at least $767,224 owed to the stadium engineer, while the Town attorney held the invoices without forwarding them to bookkeeping. An accountant raised the unpaid invoices with the deputy finance director, but the accounting records remained uncorrected.
The development corporation’s financial statements separately omitted stadium legal fees in fiscal 2010, according to the complaint, and continued omitting certain legal liabilities in later years. Those statements were incorporated into the Town’s financial statements in summary form. For a finance employee, the missing invoice and the unanswered warning connect the published balance to a decision inside the office.
The complaint alleged that the supervisor told a rating agency the General Fund had a stable balance while internal analyses projected a substantial deficit. A finance employee had already warned that her records contradicted the estimates supplied to the agency. The complaint quoted the supervisor’s instructions immediately after the January 2013 rating call:
We need to do this [upcoming] refinancing of the short term debt as fast as possible, because . . . we’re going to have to all be magicians to get to some of those numbers.
The SEC’s next allegation concerned disaster reimbursements. When a placement agent requested unaudited results, the supervisor created a $3,145,503 receivable described as FEMA reimbursements for expenses from Hurricanes Sandy and Irene. The Town’s internal tracking sheet anticipated less than $800,000. Other employees had warned that a substantial portion concerned claims not yet submitted or potentially never approved.
The mismatch also involved which fund incurred the expenses and when. The complaint alleged that much of the amount concerned a different fiscal year or a different fund, and that the Town’s accounting required collection within 90 days after year-end before recognizing revenue. The auditors could not provide assurance about the newly supplied numbers. The placement memorandum nevertheless presented the FEMA receivable as money to be received. According to the complaint, a later reduction still left the fund overstated because the Town counted revenue it had not collected within that window.
The development corporation issued the Stadium Bonds, and the Town served as guarantor, paying principal and interest directly to bondholders. Under that arrangement, the development corporation was expected to reimburse the Town from stadium operations and Ramapo Commons housing revenues. The complaint alleged that concealing the development corporation’s revenue shortfall also concealed the likely burden on the General Fund.
Voters had rejected a proposal for the Town to back long-term stadium bonds. The Town Board subsequently approved Town backing for bonds with a shorter maturity schedule that avoided the referendum requirement. According to the complaint, the supervisor nevertheless continued representing that the development corporation’s debt would support itself.
The SEC alleged that the offering statements implied a total project cost of no more than $39 million, although officials had information showing substantially higher construction costs. According to the complaint, land, site and construction ultimately cost at least approximately $60 million, with most of the additional cost financed through Town-issued general obligation bonds.
The revenue forecast moved away from the adviser’s work, too. The complaint alleged that draft projections showed insufficient revenue to reimburse annual debt service, but the supervisor withheld those projections from the rating agency and instead supplied an annual stadium revenue expectation of $3.4 million. According to the complaint, first-year gross revenue had been about $768,107. The internal forecast and the version sent outside described different prospects for paying the same debt.
The SEC alleged that the development corporation first drew on a line of credit to reimburse the Town, and later relied on a round-trip transfer: the Town sent more than $500,000 to the development corporation, which used those funds to reimburse the Town for a $411,250 interest payment. Later offering documents nevertheless described reimbursements as funded by operating revenue. The money had made the trip. The stadium had not earned it.
The complaint alleged that the pattern continued after refinancing. One reimbursement came from a one-time land sale but was described as housing-project revenue. Another depended on a Town transfer intended to subsidize legal fees. Instead of paying those fees, the development corporation used the funds toward a debt-service payment to the Town, while later offering statements again credited housing revenues.
For these municipal financing allegations, the evidence connects what investors were told to the transaction, obligation or cash receipt behind it. The records behind a securities fraud allegation include the offering statement alongside the title record, reimbursement agreement, unpaid invoice, internal forecast or bank transfer that tests its claims. In Ramapo, the complaint repeatedly paired those documents with signed closing certificates and assurances that the offering contained no significant misstatement or omission.
The employee’s knowledge explains how the difference arose. The SEC described staff questioning transfers, identifying missing bills and warning that internal results contradicted the rating-agency presentation. If you know which forecast was withheld or why an invoice never reached the ledger, that account gives the figures a history the final offering document does not show.
Our work on reporting securities fraud to the SEC starts with that connection between the representation and what you know. Under the Securities Exchange Act, eligible whistleblowers can share 10% to 30% of qualifying sanctions collected when an SEC action exceeds $1 million in monetary sanctions. We assess the evidence and the reporting questions with you and securities fraud whistleblower lawyers.
If your work on municipal reimbursements also reveals false claims for government payment, we assess that separate conduct with you. A whistleblower case under the False Claims Act can pay 15% to 30% of what the government recovers.
If you worked on municipal accounts, development financing or bond disclosures and know why the figures sent outside differed from the books, speak to one of our whistleblower experts about where they diverged. We build the case with you and bring in securities fraud whistleblower lawyers who understand municipal financing and accounting evidence. You have us beside you from the first explanation of that discrepancy through the pursuit of a whistleblower award.