Contents
Contents
The Computer Associates extended-quarter sales case centered on the Securities and Exchange Commission’s allegation that the company kept its books open to count later-signed software contracts in quarters that had already closed. If you worked on the sale or recorded its revenue, you could know something investors could not see: when the customer and the company actually signed, and which quarter got the credit.
This page follows the contracts, signature dates and management decisions in the SEC’s account of Computer Associates. Our page on revenue recognition and premature sales explains the broader pattern of moving sales between reporting periods and concealing the effect from investors.
The SEC alleged that Computer Associates recorded over $3.3 billion in revenue from at least 363 software contracts before the company, its customer or both had executed them. Its account of the complaints places that conduct from at least January 1, 1998, through September 30, 2000. Executives allegedly kept the books open for several days after a quarter ended, admitting contracts that belonged to a later period.
The agency also broke the premature revenue down by reporting period: $2.2 billion in fiscal years 2000 and 2001, with more than $1.1 billion in earlier quarters. These were, the SEC alleged, sales dollars assigned to the wrong periods. The SEC said the resulting revenue and earnings statements misled investors in public filings and other company statements.
The point, the SEC alleged, was to meet Wall Street’s quarterly earnings estimates. According to the SEC, the added contracts inflated properly recorded revenue by approximately 25%, 53%, 46% and 22% in the successive quarters of fiscal year 2000.
A public company’s reported revenue passes through transaction records, accounting entries, the close and disclosure review. The contract and the published result sit at opposite ends of that process. At Computer Associates, the SEC alleged that management moved the cutoff between them to fit the result it wanted. We see a calendar taking instructions from an earnings target.
The Securities and Exchange Commission’s allegations describe senior executives directing and approving the late-contract practice. Its September 2004 announcement assigned different parts of the mechanism to the former chief executive, head of sales and general counsel. Those roles explain how a contract could pass through several departments and still reach the wrong quarter.
The former chief executive allegedly oversaw the extended quarters, signed annual Form 10-K and quarterly Form 10-Q reports with false revenue and earnings results, and signed backdated or misleadingly dated contracts. The SEC also alleged that he participated in obtaining other backdated contracts. The person signing the public result was, in the agency’s account, involved in producing the contract dates beneath it.
The head of sales allegedly instructed and allowed subordinates to negotiate and obtain contracts after quarter-end while knowing the revenue would land in the wrong quarter or recklessly ignoring that result. The SEC said he failed to tell Finance or Sales Accounting that salespeople were obtaining contracts with backdated signature dates. An accountant receiving those documents would be missing information the sales team held.
The former general counsel allegedly approved backdated contracts and drafted a contract with misleading dates. The SEC said he also allowed the legal department to approve contracts with false or misleading signature dates while knowing the revenue would go into the wrong quarter or recklessly ignoring that result. The agency also alleged that he signed a Form S-4 and an amendment containing false revenue and earnings information.
The SEC distinguished contracts the customer signed late from contracts Computer Associates signed late. It said the company substantially stopped prematurely recognizing contracts signed by customers after quarter-end during the first quarter of fiscal year 2001. Computer Associates then missed its earnings estimate, and its stock price dropped over 43% in a single day.
The agency said the company continued prematurely recognizing contracts that Computer Associates itself signed after quarter-end through the quarter ending September 30, 2000. A customer’s signature therefore answered only part of the timing question in this case. The company’s own execution date could still contradict the quarter in which the revenue appeared.
The Securities and Exchange Commission alleged that the same former executives interfered with its investigation into the accounting practices. Its account says the former chief executive made materially false or misleading statements in a session with the SEC and the United States Attorney’s Office. It says the former head of sales made false or misleading statements in sworn investigative testimony, and the former general counsel encouraged employees to make false or misleading statements to the SEC or the company’s outside counsel.
That allegation gives an insider’s account a second point of comparison: what happened during the close and what management later said happened. We examine those accounts alongside the contracts and accounting records. A person who handled the late signature may be able to explain a contradiction that the final financial statement cannot show.
In the announced company settlement, Computer Associates agreed to changes in corporate governance and financial accounting controls. Those commitments addressed the processes through which contracts became reported revenue, while the SEC separately pursued claims against the former executives.
For an extended-quarter sales concern, the useful evidence connects when a contract was actually executed with the quarter in which the company recorded its revenue. We work through the records behind the reported number with the person who understands the sale, the approval or the close. The Computer Associates allegations make that comparison specific:
| The Question | The Records We Compare |
|---|---|
| Had both sides signed by quarter-end? | The customer and company signatures, contract versions and dated communications about execution. |
| Which quarter received the revenue? | The contract’s accounting entry, close instructions and the reported results for that period. |
| Who approved the treatment? | Contract and close approvals, compared with the execution dates sales supplied to accounting. |
Sales operations and revenue accounting can supply different parts of the same explanation. Someone negotiating the contract may know that discussions continued after quarter-end. Someone booking the revenue may know which entry was approved and where it appeared in the reported result. We connect those perspectives without expecting either person to have seen every decision inside the company.
A 2019 literature review in Risk Governance and Control: Financial Markets & Institutions describes an accounting-manipulation model that uses sales growth, gross margins and days’ sales in receivables among its indicators. In a contract-timing case, we then get closer to the transaction: who signed, when they signed and which quarter the books claimed.
Under Armour’s settled SEC order addressed approximately $408 million in customer orders pulled forward from later periods. The SEC found that the company misleadingly explained its revenue growth and failed to disclose uncertainty about future revenue. Here the insider’s comparison concerns changes to customer orders and the explanation of growth that reached investors.
The order describes Under Armour agreeing to a 25% discount and an extra 30 days to pay to obtain an additional $6.7 million in pull-forwards. The customer terms reveal the effort behind the quarter’s result. Computer Associates’ alleged practice put late-executed contracts into earlier quarters. Under Armour’s disclosure case concerned accelerated orders and the effect concealed from investors. In each, the commercial record explains something the headline revenue number leaves out.
The prospect of whistleblowing can affect how companies report their numbers, according to Do Corporate Whistleblower Laws Deter Accounting Fraud?, a 2019 working paper hosted by MIT Sloan. The study examined companies held by state pension funds as states adopted False Claims Acts. Using financial-statement models to estimate fraud probability, it reported:
We find that firms’ exposure to FCAs and hence a higher risk of whistleblowing reduces the likelihood of accounting fraud by 5% to 9%.
Do Corporate Whistleblower Laws Deter Accounting Fraud?, working paper hosted by MIT Sloan, 2019
Changes in revenue and accrual-related measures drove much of the study’s result. For someone who knows a contract was signed late, it reinforces why information inside the business matters before an investor sees a corrected number.
Securities and Exchange Commission whistleblowers can share 10% to 30% of sanctions collected when the action involves more than $1 million in monetary sanctions. We assess how your account of the sales and accounting decisions could support reporting securities fraud to the SEC.
If your information also concerns false claims for government money, we assess that conduct with you as a separate part of the matter. A whistleblower case under the False Claims Act can pay 15% to 30% of what the government recovers.
If a sales instruction, contract date or close approval tells a different story from the quarter investors saw, speak to one of our Whistleblower Experts about the quarter that stayed open. We build the case with you and bring in securities fraud whistleblower lawyers who understand software contracts, revenue recognition and the decisions behind public filings. We stay beside you as your knowledge of the transaction becomes evidence the SEC can use.