Contents
Contents
In Minnesota Ponzi scheme cases, investors funded supposed merchandise purchases, currency trading and real estate financing while their money paid earlier investors. Criminal trial evidence showed that Petters Company’s merchandise purchases did not happen. In his criminal plea, Crossfire Trading’s operator admitted showing investors a statement for a brokerage account the company did not have. If you handled the payments, prepared the statements or knew the supposed customer, you may recognize the gap between the business investors were sold and the business behind the accounts.
This page follows Minnesota businesses and operators through the investment promises, bank records and internal decisions described in their cases. Our broader explanation of Ponzi schemes covers the shared payment mechanism. Here, the local connections matter too. Alternative Wealth Solutions operated in Oakdale, for example, while the investors identified in the SEC’s complaint lived in Wisconsin.
| Operation | Minnesota Connection | Account of the Conduct |
|---|---|---|
| Petters Company | Minnesota corporation; Petters Group Worldwide headquartered in Minnetonka | SEC complaint and criminal trial evidence |
| Oxford and Universal Currency Program | Shared Minneapolis offices | SEC complaint |
| Alternative Wealth Solutions | Oakdale business; West Lakeland operator | SEC complaint against the operator |
| Hennessey Financial | Participants in Hopkins and Apple Valley | Criminal superseding indictment |
| Crossfire Trading | Rosemount operator | Criminal plea agreement |
| Shakopee foreign currency operation | Shakopee operator | Criminal guilty plea and court documents |
Petters Company raised money to buy merchandise for resale to retailers, but the purchases never happened, according to the Justice Department’s account of the evidence at the criminal trial. Investors received fabricated purchase orders and financial statements. Some also received false records suggesting the company had put its own money into the transactions. The money instead paid investors, financed other businesses and supported personal spending.
The bank records exposed the missing customer. In its account of the criminal trial evidence, the Justice Department described approximately $35 billion wired into a company account from investors and purported vendors from January 2003 to September 2008. None of those deposits came from retailers. Vendor accounts sent money back to Petters Company, less a commission. We see plenty of customers in the paperwork. The bank account never saw their money.
A separate Securities and Exchange Commission complaint concerning Lancelot Investment Management alleged that more than $130 million owed to the Lancelot Funds was overdue by February 2008. The fund manager and the company allegedly concealed that shortfall through paired transfers. Employees wired money to Petters Company as a supposed new investment, and company employees sent nearly the same amount back as supposed repayment of old notes.
The SEC also alleged that Lancelot investors had been promised a controlled bank account into which retailers would pay directly. Repayments instead came from Petters Company. For someone working in treasury or fund administration, the identity of the payer explains more than an entry saying a note was paid. The same cash could return with a different explanation attached.
The Justice Department’s receivership account describes legitimate businesses and innocent employees within the Petters network. For someone inside a business receiving investor-funded transfers, the relationship between its real operations and the source of its financing can explain part of the scheme. Our page on receivers and trustees follows the work of recovering and accounting for those assets.
The Securities and Exchange Commission alleged that Oxford Private Client Group and its principal raised at least $47.3 million from at least 143 investors for a purported currency program. That fundraising formed part of a wider scheme that raised at least $194 million from nearly 1,000 investors, according to the SEC’s March 9, 2011 account.
Investors signed agreements with entities including Universal Brokerage FX Management, Oxford Global Advisors and Oxford Global Partners. The SEC complaint alleged that the shared Oxford name and association with a registered investment adviser helped sell the program. Investors were told their money would be held separately and used for foreign currency trading. The SEC alleged that funds were pooled, some paid earlier investors, and money sent for trading sustained substantial losses.
The complaint describes an employee preparing account statements under the principal’s direction by multiplying the investment by the promised return. The sentence that follows gets to the heart of these trading Ponzi schemes:
The exercise was pure arithmetic, and the “profits” existed only on paper.
Individual account numbers reinforced the appearance that each investor’s money sat in a separate account, the SEC alleged. An employee who knows how those numbers and returns were generated can explain what the statement actually measured.
The Securities and Exchange Commission’s November 24, 2014 complaint alleged that an operator based in West Lakeland raised at least $976,000 from six Wisconsin investors through supposed note investments and a unit investment trust. His businesses included Alternative Wealth Solutions in Oakdale and Gershwin Financial in Edina. The SEC alleged that none of the promised investments was made and that money went to personal spending, other ventures and Ponzi-like payments.
The complaint separates the companies named in the sales pitch from the person who took the money. Home Path Financial and GWG Life never received the investors’ funds or issued them the promised notes. The operator allegedly used blank Home Path forms to counterfeit notes and sometimes instructed a bank to identify Home Path as the sender of purported dividend checks drawn on accounts he controlled. In the SEC’s telling, the company’s name on the check helped sell the fiction.
One transfer makes the mismatch concrete. The SEC alleged that after a $100,000 deposit into an Alternative Wealth Solutions account, approximately $80,000 went out over the next three days to the operator, Gershwin and other investors. The account statements later described assets invested in a unit investment trust. Someone handling the checks or statements can see both the promised destination and the actual recipients.
The criminal superseding indictment described by the Justice Department on April 15, 2015 charged that Hennessey Financial’s operator solicited money for commercial real estate financing while diverting funds to earlier investors and preexisting debts. The indictment alleged that investors were promised annual returns of between 10 and 20 percent. Company communications continued to describe positive investment values and expected returns even when the operator knew the business was failing.
The allegations also reached the explanation for the chief financial officer’s departure. The Justice Department said the operator told First Commercial Bank that the finance officer had been dismissed over limited working hours and family issues. According to the indictment and court documents, the officer had actually resigned over the company’s financial condition and its representations to investors. An insider who saw the financial reports and the later explanation can connect the warning to what investors and lenders were told.
The banking allegations concerned distinct roles. One participant chaired First Commercial Bank, which allegedly received false information supporting loans to keep Hennessey afloat. Tradition Capital Bank was separately alleged to have received false asset statements in connection with that participant’s personal loan. For an employee handling those loans, the financial statements and collateral records can explain how the investment operation kept finding money.
Crossfire Trading’s Rosemount operator admitted falsely portraying his futures trading as consistently profitable, according to the Justice Department’s April 15, 2009 account of his criminal plea agreement. He admitted diverting investor money to personal and other unauthorized uses and sending fraudulent monthly summaries. Court documents described new investor money paying earlier investors, and estimated investor losses at more than $20 million.
When investors asked about the trading, the operator claimed their funds were maintained at a registered brokerage firm in Chicago. He admitted showing several investors a statement reflecting a $37 million Crossfire account there, although Crossfire had no account with the firm. For a brokerage or accounting employee, whether the account existed was a more revealing question than how well it appeared to perform. The statement had a balance. The brokerage had no account.
The same Justice Department plea announcement identifies a parallel civil action by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission against Crossfire Trading and its operator. That futures-trading connection matters when we assess which whistleblower program fits the investment operation you know.
A Shakopee operator used supposed foreign currency investments to fund other entities he controlled and payments back to investors, according to the Justice Department’s account of his guilty plea and court documents. False reports described account balances and activity to encourage more investment and conceal the use of the money. The account identified approximately 100 victims in several states, including Minnesota, and $3,108,312 taken from them.
The admitted conduct connects the sales pitch to the recipient businesses. Investors were told their money would enter a currency investment program, while entities outside that plan received funds. Someone who processed those transfers or prepared the investor reports can explain how the business described the payments internally.
The Minnesota cases show why evidence connecting the agreement, the statement and the transfer can matter more than another copy of the promised return. At Petters Company, the missing retailer deposits contradicted the merchandise story. At Oxford, the complaint described a calculation supplying profits that trading had not earned. In the Alternative Wealth Solutions complaint, the name on a check could suggest a connection to a company that never received the investment. The useful knowledge may belong to the employee who knows who prepared a statement, supplied a payment instruction or questioned the explanation.
The 2018 study The Significance of Whistleblowing as an Anti-Fraud Measure, published in the Journal of Forensic & Investigative Accounting, compared detection methods across 4,943 frauds with complete data. Whistleblowers detected 35.9% of that study’s cases, compared with 21.4% detected through internal controls. That broader fraud research helps explain the value of people who can connect the records to the work that produced them.
Under the Securities Exchange Act’s whistleblower provision, the Securities and Exchange Commission whistleblower program can pay eligible whistleblowers 10% to 30% of qualifying money collected through enforcement. The program applies to qualifying SEC actions with more than $1 million in monetary sanctions. We assess how your information connects the investment promise, the accounts and the people directing the money, and which whistleblower program fits that evidence.
Where the evidence concerns false claims against government money, a whistleblower case under the False Claims Act can pay 15% to 30% of what the government recovers. We assess the government payments with you and bring in whistleblower lawyers whose experience fits the conduct you can explain.
If you worked with investor accounts, payment instructions or a business receiving money that was supposed to be invested elsewhere, speak to one of our securities fraud whistleblower experts. We build a case strategy around the transactions you can explain and connect you with securities fraud whistleblower lawyers who understand investment operations. We stay beside you from the first conversation through the work of building your strongest securities whistleblower case.