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Equiniti Trust Company LLC agreed to pay an $850,000 civil penalty in a securities enforcement case over failures to protect client securities and funds against theft or misuse. The agreement settled charges brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The SEC described two separate intrusions into the transfer agent’s safeguards: a hijacked issuer email conversation and fake accounts linked to real shareholders’ holdings.
The Securities and Exchange Commission’s August 20, 2024 announcement identified Equiniti, formerly known as American Stock Transfer & Trust Company LLC, as a New York-based registered transfer agent. If you know how an instruction becomes a share issuance, a sale or a payment, you know the operational decisions at the center of this case.
According to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s account of its order, an unknown intruder hijacked an existing email chain between American Stock Transfer and a U.S. public-company client in September 2022. Posing as an employee of that company, the intruder instructed American Stock Transfer to issue millions of new shares, sell those shares and send the proceeds to an overseas bank.
The Securities and Exchange Commission said American Stock Transfer followed the instructions and transferred approximately $4.78 million to bank accounts in Hong Kong. American Stock Transfer recovered approximately $1 million from that incident.
For someone in issuer services, the starting point is the authority behind the request. The intruder entered correspondence already running between a public company and its transfer agent, then used that conversation to request an issuance and a sale.
The second intrusion reached securities that legitimate clients already held. In an unrelated incident around April 2023, the Securities and Exchange Commission said an unknown intruder used stolen Social Security numbers to create fake accounts at American Stock Transfer.
According to the SEC’s account of its order, the transfer agent automatically linked those fake accounts to real client accounts solely because the Social Security numbers matched. The names and other personal information did not match. The link nevertheless allowed the intruder to sell securities in the legitimate accounts and move the proceeds to external banks.
The SEC put those transfers at approximately $1.9 million and said American Stock Transfer recovered approximately $1.6 million. Here, the access came through account linking, while the earlier intrusion had used an issuer’s correspondence to obtain new shares.
In the Securities and Exchange Commission’s account, the system accepted the matching number despite the conflicting identity information. For an account-administration employee, the fields that disagreed may be as revealing as the field that agreed. The number got a match. The wrong person got the access.
The Securities and Exchange Commission’s announcement says its order found that Equiniti violated requirements to safeguard client securities and funds. Equiniti also agreed to an order to stop violating those requirements and a formal reprimand.
Across the two intrusions, the Securities and Exchange Commission reported more than $6.6 million in client losses. It said American Stock Transfer recovered approximately $2.6 million and fully reimbursed the clients for their losses.
The Securities and Exchange Commission’s San Francisco Regional Office conducted the investigation. The civil penalty was smaller than the losses from either intrusion. We’d call that a modest penalty.
The most useful securities fraud evidence connects the accepted instruction or account link to particular securities and payments. In Equiniti’s case, the SEC described different starting points for the two intrusions. We would examine each against the part of the transfer agent’s work that made the next transaction possible.
For the email incident, the correspondence can show what the supposed issuer employee requested. The issuance records can connect that request to the shares created, and the sale and payment records can connect those shares to the overseas proceeds. Someone who understands the issuer relationship may be able to explain why the request was accepted and which decision let it move forward.
For the account-linking incident, the important comparison is between the information supplied for the fake account and the information already attached to the legitimate holder. We would examine how the matching number created access despite the other fields disagreeing, then connect that access to the securities sold. An employee who understands account administration can explain what the system accepted and what the mismatch meant in practice.
The recovery and reimbursement records complete a different part of the story: what came back and how the clients were made whole. A reconciliation employee may understand those entries while an issuer-services colleague understands the original instruction. We work with the person who knows the relevant decision and connect that knowledge to the assets it affected.
The 2018 study The Significance of Whistleblowing as an Anti-Fraud Measure, published in the Journal of Forensic & Investigative Accounting, examined occupational-fraud survey data. Among 4,943 frauds with complete detection data, it found that whistleblowing detected 35.9%, compared with 21.4% detected through internal controls. In that comparison, whistleblowers caught more fraud than the controls did.
For a qualifying SEC action involving monetary sanctions exceeding $1 million, eligible whistleblowers can share 10% to 30% of qualifying sanctions collected. We work through reporting and award questions with you, beginning with the conduct and decisions you know.
If your information also concerns fraud against government money, we examine whether another whistleblower program applies. A whistleblower case under the False Claims Act can pay 15% to 30% of what the government recovers.
If you know why an issuer instruction passed or how an account gained access to someone else’s holdings, talk with our whistleblower experts about the safeguards you saw fail. We build your case around the operational decisions and client assets you can explain, and bring in securities fraud whistleblower lawyers who understand transfer-agent controls. We stay with you as partners through the case.