Contents
Contents
In the China Medical Technologies investor-fund diversion case, the criminal indictment charged that the former chief executive and chief financial officer misrepresented how approximately $426 million in investments through two note offerings would be used and transferred the money to entities they controlled or were affiliated with. The Justice Department’s account of the criminal indictment connects the offering promises to insider-controlled recipients and allegedly near-worthless intellectual property. If you work in treasury or acquisition accounting, the useful connection may be one you already understand: what the company said it was buying, who approved the payment, and who ultimately received it.
China Medical was a NASDAQ-listed medical device company, according to the announcement. This page follows the alleged diversion of its note proceeds through the acquisition story and recipient accounts. Our broader treatment of securities offering fraud follows the mismatch between what investors are promised and how their money is used.
The indictment alleged that the former chief executive and former chief financial officer used misleading offering statements to obtain investor funds and move them to connected entities. The Justice Department described the alleged scheme as running from January 2005 to November 2012. On March 20, 2017, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York and the FBI’s New York Field Office announced the charges.
According to the Justice Department’s indictment account, the offering memoranda for the notes issued in August 2008 and December 2010, due in 2013 and 2016 respectively, described general corporate purposes, acquisitions of businesses, products and technologies, and repurchases of outstanding convertible notes. Prosecutors alleged that most of the money raised through those offerings eventually went to entities controlled by the officers and their co-conspirators.
The announcement described approximately $576 million raised across all three note offerings, including an earlier offering in November 2006. As an example of the alleged transfers, it reported that approximately $303.75 million went to an entity owned by an associate of the officers, with approximately $202 million subsequently transferred to bank accounts controlled by the chief executive.
For someone who handled the payments, the first recipient and the ultimate account holder can be different parts of the same story. A transfer instruction may explain where the company sent the money, while ownership and account records explain whose interests that payment served. We examine those connections alongside the offering promise and the transaction recorded in the books.
The Justice Department’s account of the indictment alleged that the intellectual property behind the note offerings was approximately 20 years old, off-patent and worth very little. That allegation reaches into the acquisition work itself: what the company acquired, what supported the price, and what investors were told their money would purchase. We see acquisition money allegedly ending up in the chief executive’s bank accounts. Some acquisition.
For an acquisition accountant, the agreement, valuation assumptions and description of the acquired technology belong beside the payment. A file showing what rights were purchased can answer a different question from a spreadsheet assigning those rights a value. We connect both to the recipient’s ownership and to the description in the offering memorandum.
The 2019 review Accounting Fraud: A Literature Review, published in Risk Governance and Control: Financial Markets & Institutions, describes forensic accounting as a combination of accounting and investigative knowledge. Its discussion brings together financial-statement analysis, asset misappropriation, electronic banking, accounting systems and internal controls. Applied to an acquisition story like this one, that approach means following both the asset recorded and the money paid for it.
An employee who knows the technology may understand an assumption that looks routine to someone reading only the financial statements. An employee who knows the counterparty may recognize a relationship that the acquisition description leaves out. Those are distinct contributions to the same comparison between the promised purchase and the actual transaction.
For alleged diversion of note proceeds, the useful securities fraud evidence connects the offering promise to the bank destination and the accounting entry. We work with an insider’s firsthand account to understand how those records fit together. A treasury employee may know who directed a transfer, while an acquisition accountant may know what the entry was supposed to represent.
We compare the acquisition agreement and valuation work with the payment and its approval history. A person involved in the accounting or disclosure review may be able to explain why a public description differs from the transaction underneath it. The important detail may be a changed valuation input or a version of a disclosure that describes the same payment differently.
Ownership deserves particular attention. In its action against Woodbridge Group of Companies, the SEC alleged that promised returns supposedly came from independent borrowers, while most borrowers were actually controlled by the founder and lacked the income to pay. It alleged that new investor money funded payments to earlier investors. The useful parallel is the relationship behind the recipient’s name: a supposedly outside business may lead back to the people who raised the money.
For someone who knows the counterparty, that relationship can make sense of an otherwise ordinary-looking payment. We examine the agreement and account records together with what you know about who controlled the recipient. The company name on a transfer is the beginning of that inquiry.
The Justice Department’s account of the criminal indictment alleged that the officers caused China Medical’s independent director and outside auditor to resign. It also alleged that they stopped public disclosures of material events affecting the securities’ value and stopped paying interest on the notes. Those allegations connect the movement of investor funds to the information investors could see afterward.
For a treasury or reporting employee, interest-payment records and disclosure versions may show another part of the same conduct. We examine what the company knew about its payments and assets when it prepared, changed or stopped its public account. The acquisition entry, the cash movement and the investor communication need to be understood together.
The Justice Department’s account of the indictment alleged transfers to entities in China controlled by the officers. An insider’s view may sit with the issuer’s accounts, the acquired technology or the recipient business.
If your information is outside the United States, we assess the U.S. securities-market connection and the records abroad with you. The offering, issuer reporting and transaction records give that discussion its substance.
A treasury or acquisition accountant can connect a number in an offering document with the people, instructions and records behind the payment. That contribution is especially useful where senior officers direct both the transaction and its explanation. In the China Medical indictment account, the allegations reached the chief executive, the chief financial officer, connected recipients and the information released to investors.
The 2018 study The Significance of Whistleblowing as an Anti-Fraud Measure, published in the Journal of Forensic & Investigative Accounting, examined occupational-fraud survey data. Among the 4,943 frauds with complete data, whistleblowers were the detection source in 35.9 percent, compared with 21.4 percent for internal controls. The study also found that whistleblowing was more likely to be the principal detection method when more people participated in a scheme.
That finding gives weight to the person who can explain a relationship or instruction the accounts leave obscure. Your knowledge may concern only one acquisition or payment. We work with you to establish what it shows and how it connects to the investor-facing account.
The SEC whistleblower program can pay eligible whistleblowers a share of sanctions collected through successful enforcement. We assess the information and your potential SEC tip with you, including the significance of your role and how you learned what happened.
For fraud involving government money, a whistleblower case under the False Claims Act can pay 15% to 30% of what the government recovers. We examine that separate government-money connection where it arises, alongside the securities offering and investor records.
If you know why an acquisition payment went to an insider-connected account, speak with our whistleblower experts about the transaction. We build the case with you around the offering promise, the money movement and the ownership links, and bring in securities fraud whistleblower lawyers who understand cross-border transactions. We stay beside you as that knowledge becomes a case the authorities can investigate.