Contents
Contents
The SEC publishes enforcement statistics by year and case type, separating standalone actions from follow-on proceedings and delinquent-filing actions. Those counts show what the agency brought. If you know the books, trades or investor promises, your records can show what happened inside the business.
These tables cover fiscal 2015 through fiscal 2025, including case types and the money ordered, collected and returned to investors. Our page on reporting securities fraud to the SEC addresses the different question of turning your knowledge into a whistleblower matter.
An enforcement action is a proceeding brought by the SEC, and the annual total includes several kinds. The SEC’s explanation of its annual results separates them this way:
An action count is not a count of unique schemes or defendants. A follow-on proceeding can concern conduct already addressed elsewhere, so treating every action as a newly uncovered fraud inflates what the headline appears to say. The tables use SEC fiscal years ending September 30.
The all-action series includes each of those proceeding types. The standalone column is the total the case-type tables below break down.
| Fiscal Year | Standalone | Follow-On | Delinquent Filings | All Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2015 | 507 | 168 | 132 | 807 |
| 2016 | 548 | 195 | 125 | 868 |
| 2017 | 446 | 196 | 112 | 754 |
| 2018 | 490 | 210 | 121 | 821 |
| 2019 | 526 | 210 | 126 | 862 |
| 2020 | 405 | 180 | 130 | 715 |
| 2021 | 434 | 143 | 120 | 697 |
| 2022 | 462 | 169 | 129 | 760 |
| 2023 | 501 | 162 | 121 | 784 |
| 2024 | 431 | 93 | 59 | 583 |
| 2025 | 303 | 69 | 84 | 456 |
Securities offerings were the largest standalone enforcement category in fiscal 2025, followed by investment advisers and investment companies. That answers which categories appeared most often in that year’s enforcement table; it does not rank all securities misconduct, including conduct nobody has detected.
The categories describe different parts of the securities business. An offering raises money for an issuer or fund. An adviser manages investments and charges fees, while a broker handles recommendations and trades. Issuer reporting reaches the financial statements and disclosures investors rely on.
For someone inside the business, the category becomes useful when it points back to a transaction. Offering records connect promised uses of investor money with where the money went. Advisory agreements can be compared with actual fees and expense allocations, and accounting entries with the results reported to investors. We work from those connections, not just the label on an annual table.
These are primary classifications: an action receives a category even when its conduct overlaps other subjects. The counts cover civil and standalone administrative actions, with follow-on and delinquent-filing proceedings counted separately above.
| Case Type | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Broker-Dealer | 40 | 61 | 53 | 63 | 38 | 40 |
| Investment Adviser / Investment Company | 76 | 98 | 82 | 108 | 191 | 87 |
| Issuer Reporting / Audit and Accounting | 114 | 93 | 95 | 79 | 92 | 62 |
| Securities Offering | 91 | 90 | 94 | 121 | 108 | 130 |
| Insider Trading | 38 | 45 | 41 | 51 | 30 | 33 |
| Market Manipulation | 40 | 30 | 41 | 32 | 30 | 22 |
| Public Finance | 80 | 97 | 17 | 15 | 14 | 12 |
| Foreign Corrupt Practices Act | 13 | 21 | 13 | 13 | 18 | 10 |
| Miscellaneous | 9 | 9 | 7 | 3 | 1 | 5 |
| Credit-Rating Organization | 4 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 3 |
| Self-Regulatory Organization / Exchange | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 0 |
| Transfer Agent | 1 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| All Standalone Actions | 507 | 548 | 446 | 490 | 526 | 405 |
| Case Type | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Broker-Dealer | 36 | 46 | 60 | 61 | 39 |
| Investment Adviser / Investment Company | 120 | 119 | 86 | 97 | 72 |
| Issuer Reporting / Audit and Accounting | 53 | 76 | 86 | 49 | 36 |
| Securities Offering | 142 | 106 | 164 | 94 | 88 |
| Insider Trading | 28 | 43 | 32 | 34 | 31 |
| Market Manipulation | 26 | 32 | 22 | 17 | 15 |
| Public Finance | 12 | 19 | 6 | 14 | 6 |
| Foreign Corrupt Practices Act | 5 | 6 | 11 | 2 | 6 |
| Miscellaneous | 7 | 6 | 22 | 55 | 9 |
| Credit-Rating Organization | 2 | 1 | 4 | 6 | 0 |
| Self-Regulatory Organization / Exchange | 1 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 0 |
| Transfer Agent | 2 | 7 | 3 | 1 | 1 |
| All Standalone Actions | 434 | 462 | 501 | 431 | 303 |
Different totals can reflect different proceedings, a later revision or a special enforcement initiative. The distinction matters to an insider comparing the agency’s activity in the area where they work: a larger column can reflect a concentrated initiative rather than a wider change across the industry.
Fiscal 2016 is a concrete example. The SEC brought 84 actions through its Municipalities Continuing Disclosure Cooperation initiative, which addressed misstatements and omissions in municipal bond offering documents. Its following annual report also showed an adjusted comparison excluding that initiative: 464 standalone actions and 784 total actions. Both presentations describe the same year, but they count different populations.
The fiscal 2024 addendum revised fiscal 2022 to 463 standalone actions and 761 total actions after a venue change separated one party into another action. That changed the count without uncovering another scheme. The dollars changed too: the fiscal 2025 retrospective revised fiscal 2024 disgorgement to $6,144 million and total orders to $8,246 million.
Money ordered, money collected and money returned to investors measure different events. The SEC’s financial report records an amount due when the SEC is ordered to collect it, then records cash when it arrives. Disgorgement addresses gains from the misconduct, while the penalties column records civil penalties.
| Fiscal Year | Penalties Ordered, $ Millions | Disgorgement Ordered, $ Millions | Total Ordered, $ Millions | SEC Collections, $ Thousands | Returned to Investors, $ Millions |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2015 | 1,175 | 3,019 | 4,194 | 1,314,854 | 158 |
| 2016 | 1,273 | 2,809 | 4,083 | 1,710,192 | 140 |
| 2017 | 832 | 2,957 | 3,789 | 2,078,713 | 1,073 |
| 2018 | 1,439 | 2,506 | 3,945 | 1,028,554 | 794 |
| 2019 | 1,101 | 3,248 | 4,349 | 1,470,462 | 1,197 |
| 2020 | 1,091 | 3,588 | 4,680 | 2,158,203 | 602 |
| 2021 | 1,456 | 2,395 | 3,852 | 1,686,917 | 521 |
| 2022 | 4,194 | 2,245 | 6,439 | 1,635,806 | 937 |
| 2023 | 1,580 | 3,369 | 4,949 | 2,848,950 | 930 |
| 2024 | 2,102 | 6,092 | 8,194 | 1,696,453 | 345 |
| 2025 | 7,208 | 10,760 | 17,968 | 1,604,097 | 262 |
The fiscal 2025 addendum explains the exceptional scale of that year’s orders. Stanford International Bank accounted for $14.9 billion, and the SEC reported $3 billion with that action excluded. The largest annual headline was dominated by an older action.
The SEC’s collections can include money from earlier actions. Dividing collections by orders from the same year therefore does not give the collection rate for those cases.
For a whistleblower, the relevant reward measure is qualifying sanctions collected in the action. SEC whistleblower awards can total 10% to 30% of those collections when the action results in sanctions exceeding $1 million. We assess the connection between your information and the action with you, including the SEC award claim.
A whistleblower case under the False Claims Act can pay 15% to 30% of what the government recovers. The SEC operates a separate whistleblower program, and we work with you to identify the program that fits the conduct you know about.
Enforcement statistics begin with conduct that has come to the agency’s attention. A March 2019 working paper, Do Corporate Whistleblower Laws Deter Accounting Fraud?, available from MIT Sloan, examines companies held by state pension funds and their exposure to state whistleblower laws.
Thus, using detected (or ex post) fraud would not allow us to accurately quantify how a firm’s propensity to engage in accounting fraud changes in response to exposure to a whistleblower law.
Do Corporate Whistleblower Laws Deter Accounting Fraud?, working paper hosted by MIT Sloan, 2019
The paper treats deterrence and detection as different effects: whistleblower laws can discourage misconduct while also making it more likely to be exposed. We would not read a lower action count as reassurance about the books you know are wrong. Your knowledge of the agreement, transaction or accounting decision can explain what an annual classification cannot.
If privacy is part of your decision to speak, we work through anonymous SEC reporting with you. The conversation starts with the conduct you understand and the questions you need answered.
If you know why an investor promise, reported result or advisory charge differs from the underlying transaction, speak to one of our whistleblower experts about what the numbers conceal. We work beside you to build the strongest account of the conduct and bring in SEC whistleblower lawyers who understand the business and its records. You bring the knowledge behind the numbers; we bring the judgment and partnership to pursue it with you.