Contents
Contents
The Tamimi Global LOGCAP resolution included a $7.4 million civil settlement over allegations that the company paid kickbacks for favorable treatment on Army support subcontracts. In a separate criminal agreement, Tamimi admitted that employees used a phantom business deal to explain wire transfers carrying kickbacks to a KBR subcontract manager. For someone inside purchasing or accounts, the story turns on the connection between the work awarded, the money transferred and the explanation attached to it.
The Justice Department announced the resolution on September 16, 2011. Tamimi Global Company Ltd, based in Saudi Arabia, supplied services for Army operations in Iraq and Kuwait through subcontracts with KBR. Its civil settlement covered dining facilities and other logistical support, while its criminal admissions also described money and an apartment provided to an Army sergeant.
LOGCAP III was KBR’s prime contract with the Army for logistical support during overseas conflicts. KBR performed much of that work through subcontractors such as Tamimi. The LOGCAP subcontracting chain put purchasing decisions inside a private company between the Army and the businesses delivering its services.
Food service was part of a much wider support business. LOGCAP purchased food, laundry, housing, construction and theater preparation, according to GAO’s contracting review. Tamimi’s civil settlement reached beyond dining facilities to smaller assignments that included temporary personal services, tent pads and a shower/laundry unit.
The Army’s December 2001 LOGCAP award to KBR used cost-plus-award-fee pricing. That arrangement reimburses allowable costs and includes an award amount tied to performance. Subcontract purchasing therefore mattered to the government’s costs as well as to the supplier winning the work: the person selecting a vendor was making a decision inside a taxpayer-funded supply chain.
Under its deferred prosecution agreement, Tamimi admitted conspiring to pay a former KBR subcontract manager for favorable treatment in awarding and performing the Camp Arifjan dining-services subcontract in Kuwait. The conspiracy ran from October 2002 to March 2006. In his guilty plea, the KBR manager admitted accepting $60,500 in kickbacks from Tamimi’s former operations director in Kuwait for awarding the Camp Arifjan subcontract.
Tamimi also admitted in that criminal agreement that its employees made false statements to federal investigators about a phantom business deal. The deal served as a cover for wire transfers transmitting the kickbacks to the KBR manager. We see a food-service contractor inventing a second deal to disguise what it was paying for: favorable treatment.
That false explanation matters to an insider who knows how the business actually buys and pays for services. The transfer identifies a recipient, while the supposed business purpose supplies a story that someone in operations or accounting may recognize as invented.
Tamimi’s criminal agreement also admitted responsibility for employees who conspired to provide illegal gratuities to an Army sergeant. They gave him money and the use of an apartment in Kuwait for official acts he performed or would perform at Camps Doha and Arifjan.
The sergeant was responsible for Army food services at those camps in 2002 and 2003. His role connected the private benefits to the government’s food-service operations, while the KBR manager’s role connected the kickbacks to subcontract purchasing.
The separate civil settlement resolved allegations of kickbacks for favorable treatment in the award and performance of the Camp Arifjan subcontract, the Baghdad Palace dining-facilities subcontract and five smaller subcontracts in Iraq. The United States alleged violations of the False Claims Act and the Anti-Kickback Act.
The government’s account put performance alongside award. An insider may know how a subcontract was handled after it was awarded, not only why the supplier won it. We look at the benefit, the recipient’s authority and the treatment the supplier received together.
A prime contractor’s invoice can leave an important question unanswered: which businesses and people sit behind the subcontracted services? Transparency International Defence and Security’s 2022 report, Hidden Costs: US Private Military and Security Companies and the Risks of Corruption and Conflict, argues for bringing that information into view:
Prime contractors should be required to report on all subcontracting when submitting invoices.
The report recommends identifying subcontractors beyond the first and second tiers, who ultimately owns them and the itemized value of their services. Tamimi’s admissions show why those relationships matter: the subcontractor paid for favorable treatment from a manager inside the prime. Someone who knows the supplier and its transactions may see a relationship that the prime’s invoice does not explain.
The civil settlement with Eyak Technology and Eyak Services supplies a parallel involving Army Corps of Engineers work. The Justice Department alleged that a contracts director steered subcontracts in return for kickbacks, and that invoices to the Army Corps included subcontract work that had not been performed. It also alleged deficient internal controls.
The shared point is the purchasing authority someone sells for a private benefit. In Tamimi’s admissions, that meant favorable treatment for a dining-services subcontract and a fabricated explanation for transfers. In the Eyak allegations, the account also followed the subcontracts into government bills for unperformed work. Connecting the award to what happened afterward gives an insider’s knowledge its importance.
The Justice Department’s Civil Division handled the civil case, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Central District of Illinois handled the criminal case. The participating investigative agencies included the Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation Division, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, the Army Criminal Investigation Command and the FBI.
For a kickback case like this, useful proof connects the private benefit to the person who influenced the subcontract and the treatment the supplier received. Tamimi’s admissions identify particularly concrete connections: the Camp Arifjan award, favorable treatment during performance, wire transfers and the false business explanation used to cover them. Those are the links we examine when evaluating evidence of defense contractor fraud.
An employee handling subcontract awards may understand the purchasing decision, while someone handling accounts may understand the payment and its stated purpose. Our work with an insider brings those views together around the government-funded work. A whistleblower case under the False Claims Act can pay 15% to 30% of what the government recovers.
If you saw a supplier reward the person controlling its Army work, or a business explanation invented for a transfer, talk with our whistleblower experts. We connect your knowledge of the subcontract to the decisions and payments behind it, and bring in defense contractor fraud whistleblower lawyers suited to that case. We stay beside you from the first call to build your strongest defense contractor whistleblower case.