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Contents
Physician referral kickbacks can hide in rent, supervision fees or free staff supplied to a practice in exchange for patient referrals. The agreement describes an ordinary business expense. The payment calculation may tell a different story: rent falls when referrals fall, supervision pay follows the patients sent for scans, or free work gives the referring practice something it can bill. If you handle the schedules, invoices or reports, you may know what the practice actually supplied and why the money kept coming.
Gramercy Cardiac Diagnostic Services admitted that referral revenue helped determine what it paid for office space. The New York cardiac imaging practice admitted paying more than $11 million to physicians and practices that rented it office space; it and its owner agreed to pay $4,510,678 to the federal government in their settlement.
The rented space was usually one or two exam rooms available on specified days or hours each month. Gramercy sent contracted cardiologists there to see the practice’s patients, and those cardiologists referred patients onward for diagnostic tests, including PET and SPECT scans. Some were Medicare and Medicaid patients whose care Gramercy billed to those programs. The exam room placed the cardiologist inside the referring practice and connected that practice’s patients to Gramercy’s testing business.
The admissions explain what happened when the referrals disappointed. Gramercy compared the revenue generated by each practice’s patients with the rent paid to that practice. When the return fell below its threshold, the company often withheld rent, threatened to reduce it or ended the agreement. It also used expected referrals to calculate how many hours of space to rent. We find the bargain plain enough: the practice had to keep the patients coming to keep the rent coming.
Gramercy also admitted paying contracted cardiologists per test or procedure referred. Some contracts described that compensation as payment for administering and supervising scans, although in many cases those cardiologists did neither. They were paid based solely on the tests and procedures referred. The lease and the supervision contract were different pieces of the same referral chain.
For a practice manager, the telling comparison is the room and time purchased against the reason a payment changed. We examine the lease, the actual use of the space, the payment history and communications about referrals together. A demand for more patients before the next rent check is a very different explanation from a change in the space available.
Cardiac Imaging Inc. agreed to pay $75 million to resolve False Claims Act allegations over supervision fees of $500 or more per scanning hour paid to referring cardiologists. The mobile cardiac PET provider also agreed to additional payments tied to future revenue, according to the Justice Department’s settlement announcement. Its founder entered a separate settlement. The company case arose from a former billing manager’s qui tam case.
The government alleged that Cardiac Imaging paid for every hour spent scanning a referring cardiologist’s patients, overstating the supervision actually provided. Those payments allegedly included time when the physician was caring for other patients or was away from the site, as well as compensation for additional services that were never supplied. The consultant’s valuation, the government alleged, rested on descriptions of the work that the company knew were inaccurate. The consultant ultimately withdrew it.
The government’s complaint against the company’s former president adds the calculation behind the annual payment limits. It alleged that the medical services agreements differed according to the scanning business each practice was expected to send:
Because these annual fees were specific to each practice’s anticipated referrals, this was the only substantive way the MSAs were different from one another.
United States of America ex rel. Pinto v. Nassenstein, government complaint, paragraph 114
The complaint alleged that the valuation treated supervision as occupying the physician’s time and substantial practice resources. In practice, it alleged, physicians generally continued seeing other patients and running their offices. That difference matters to anyone who scheduled both activities: a payment calculated as though the physician had given up ordinary clinical work needs to be compared with what the physician actually did during those hours.
The supervision behind a physician’s billing identity also depends on the service, who pays for it, where it happens and when it was given. Medicare’s current supervision provisions allow physicians to supervise some services by live video. We match the particular service to the applicable requirement and the agreement’s promised work.
Free work can benefit a referring practice by covering an operating expense or supplying something the practice can bill. A practice can also receive value through free or below-market office space: the benefit is the rent it saves. Administrative help, a completed interpretation report and testing equipment put value into different parts of the business. BioTek reMEDys and Alliance Family of Companies show why those benefits belong in the same inquiry as a check.
BioTek, a specialty pharmacy offering drugs and infusion services, allegedly supplied gifts, dinners and free administrative and clinical support to induce physician referrals. The Justice Department’s announcement described a neurology practice whose physician allegedly solicited and accepted those benefits in exchange for referrals. That physician settled separately.
For an employee who handled that work, the relevant questions include who supplied the personnel, what they did and which business received the resulting referrals. Staffing schedules, vendor invoices and referral communications let us examine the benefit alongside the orders it allegedly encouraged.
Alliance agreed to pay $13.5 million to resolve allegations involving kickbacks and false billing for neurological testing. The government alleged that free EEG interpretation reports let referring primary care physicians bill as though they had interpreted the tests themselves. We see the absurdity in the allegation: the physicians got the interpretations free, then billed taxpayers for doing the work.
The whistleblower’s amended complaint described a workflow in which an Alliance-contracted neurologist prepared the interpretation, and the ordering physician added a sentence agreeing with it. The complaint also alleged that some reports bypassed the neurologist altogether:
Indeed, in order to speed up the billing process, Alliance technologists were instructed to copy language from an earlier report completed by the Alliance neurologist, sign the neurologist’s name on the report using the neurologist’s electronic signature, and then provide the report to the ordering physician so that Alliance could bill for the technical component of the test.
A separate arrangement alleged in that complaint involved neurology practices billing both the technical and professional components. Alliance allegedly supplied the equipment and technologists through a lease for which the practice paid nothing. The practices performed the professional work, while Alliance performed the technical work. They allegedly billed as though both had been performed by the practice and listed the office as the service location even when testing occurred in the patient’s home.
That puts the report, the worker, the equipment and the claim in the same picture. A technologist may know who created the report; a biller may know whose service the claim represented. We connect those accounts to the payment arrangement. The alleged benefit becomes visible when the free work and the resulting bill are read together.
The North Carolina laboratory settlements show several alleged payment disguises within one referral business. The Justice Department’s announcement described a marketer and three physician groups resolving separate allegations involving tests billed to Medicare and TRICARE. The groups’ roles and payments differed:
| Settling Group | Alleged Referral Payment |
|---|---|
| South Ventures and its marketer | Offered office rent and phlebotomy payments to induce laboratory orders; received laboratory commissions tied to referrals arranged or recommended. |
| Ballantyne Medical Associates and its physician | Received purported rent and phlebotomy payments in exchange for ordering tests. |
| Another Charlotte physician and his practice | Received purported rent and phlebotomy payments in exchange for ordering tests. |
| Joint and Muscle Medical Care and its physician | Received payments labeled as purchases of used laboratory equipment, office rent and phlebotomy services in exchange for ordering tests. |
The added equipment purchase matters because the value allegedly reached the practice through an asset sale as well as recurring expense payments. We examine what the laboratory bought, what the practice supplied and how the payments connected to the laboratory orders. The marketer’s commissions belong alongside those practice payments because the government alleged that they rewarded arranging the same stream of testing business.
The useful evidence connects the agreement to actual work or space, then connects the payment to referrals and government claims. A contract describes what the parties agreed to buy. The schedules, reports and payment history show what they actually supplied and what kept the money coming.
For rent, we compare the premises and hours described in the agreement with the space actually made available and the payments made for it. The valuation’s assumptions about size, access and use belong beside that comparison. We also examine who could change the rent and what happened when referrals rose or fell. That brings the payment decision into view, beyond the amount printed on the lease.
For supervision, we compare the promised duties with schedules, time records, scan logs and the work performed during the paid hours. The practical question is what capacity the physician actually committed. If the valuation assumed that supervising displaced other patient care, the physician’s ordinary appointment schedule becomes relevant to the price as well as the work.
For free staff, reports or equipment, we examine who employed or paid the worker, who prepared and signed the report, what the practice paid for the resources and whose service appeared on the claim. Those records can sit with different people inside the same arrangement. You can speak with us about your part of the workflow even if you do not have every agreement or report. That inside knowledge gives us a place to begin connecting them.
A valuation depends on the facts fed into it. Proposed Stark Regulations: Small Step in the Right Direction, a 2020 discussion of proposed reforms in the Physician Leadership Journal, called for evidence supporting both the calculation and its assumptions. For a practice insider, those assumptions may describe work that never happened.
We examine what the number assumes about the room, the physician’s time and the practice’s resources. The Cardiac Imaging allegations show why that work matters: a valuation of a fully occupied physician describes a different purchase from availability while the physician continues treating other patients. We assess the fee against the actual arrangement, rather than treating a rate from another settlement as a national price list.
Yes. The Anti-Kickback Statute prohibits deliberately paying or accepting money or other benefits to buy referrals or orders involving federal health care programs. In its advisory opinion on a sleep-testing arrangement, the Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of Inspector General explained that the law reaches an arrangement when obtaining referrals is one purpose of the payment. A lease can pay for a real room and still buy referrals.
Stark’s restrictions on physician self-referrals separately address financial relationships with entities receiving referrals for designated services, including laboratory testing and certain imaging, unless an exception applies. The Anti-Kickback Statute reaches cash and in-kind benefits offered or received for federally payable business. We examine the financial relationship, the work and the resulting claims when assessing a physician practice whistleblower case.
A whistleblower case under the False Claims Act can pay 15% to 30% of what the government recovers. A lease, supervision agreement or free-support arrangement gives us a concrete starting point for that assessment when you know how it operated and where the referrals went.
If you handled the rent, scheduled the supervision or supplied the free work, speak with our whistleblower experts about what the practice was really being paid for. We work beside you to connect that inside knowledge to the referral business and build your strongest whistleblower case. We bring in healthcare fraud whistleblower lawyers who understand physician compensation and stay with you through the process.