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The Gramercy Cardiac settlement required the cardiac imaging company and its physician owner to pay $6.5 million to the United States and New York over referral payments disguised as rent and supervision fees. Both admitted that referral volume shaped the rental arrangements and that, in many cases, contracted cardiologists received payments for scans they did not administer and supervise. If you handled the leases, scheduled the cardiologists or calculated the payments, the important detail is familiar: what kept the money coming was the patient referral.
The Justice Department announced the settlement on September 18, 2023. Gramercy Cardiac Diagnostic Services provided echocardiograms, PET scans and SPECT scans, and had operated four New York City offices. Its owner directed the arrangements and took part in negotiating and signing the rental and cardiologist contracts. The admissions describe a business organized around getting patients from other practices into Gramercy’s testing locations.
Kickbacks in health care are payments or other benefits offered in exchange for patient referrals. In the Gramercy case, the government alleged that inflated office rent and per-test fees bought referrals for care billed to Medicare and Medicaid, violating the Anti-Kickback Statute and the Stark Law. Primary care and other practices received rent, while contracted cardiologists received per-test payments.
The settlement’s admissions describe agreements with more than 130 physicians and practices from 2010 through 2021. Gramercy usually rented one or two exam rooms for specified days or hours each month and contracted with more than 50 cardiologists or their practices. Those cardiologists saw patients at the rented offices, then referred patients onward to Gramercy for testing. Gramercy admitted submitting claims for care provided to referred Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries.
The government alleged that the leases included a telephone, a computer and front-desk scheduling help, often for thousands of dollars a month despite use of the exam room only once or twice a month. It also alleged that the rental practices sent tens of thousands of patients to the contracted cardiologists, who referred more than 23,000 patients for PET and SPECT scans at Gramercy. It described a significant proportion as Medicare or Medicaid beneficiaries. Gramercy billed Medicare and Medicaid for tests at the end of a healthcare referral chain that rewarded both the practice supplying patients and the cardiologist sending them for scans.
Gramercy admitted paying more than $11 million to the rental practices, more than the company and its owner agreed to pay the federal and state governments combined. The company calculated how many hours of space to rent according to the expected volume of patient referrals. It also admitted that at least some rental fees exceeded fair market value.
The company’s internal name for the return on each rental agreement was “efficiency.” Gramercy compared revenue generated by a practice’s referrals with the rent it paid that practice. Its Physician Liaisons were expected to evaluate contracts for profitability and meet minimum returns. Separately, the government’s complaint alleged that the owner insisted on a return on investment of at least 300%.
The admitted response to disappointing referrals was concrete. At the owner’s direction, Gramercy often withheld rent when the return fell below its threshold. Liaisons told practices that rent would fall, or the agreement would end, unless referrals increased. Gramercy terminated some agreements for that reason and used expected or historic referral returns when negotiating rent.
The whistleblower’s complaint described the same bargain from the sales side. It alleged that rent for a few hours of space and equipment was set according to what would make referrals financially attractive, without an analysis of the space’s actual fair market value. We call that paying for patients: the company’s own calculation measured the referrals’ value, and it withheld rent when the return fell short.
Gramercy admitted paying many contracted cardiologists a flat fee for each referred test or procedure completed at a Gramercy location. Those per-procedure fees were their only compensation from Gramercy. Some contracts described the paid service as administering and supervising PET and SPECT scans, yet Gramercy admitted that in many cases they did not administer and supervise the scans and still received payment based solely on the number of tests referred.
The whistleblower’s complaint alleged what sales representatives said the supervision contract actually required. Its account puts the promised work beside the pitch used to recruit physicians:
The Independent Contractor Agreements provide that the contracting physician supervises the referred tests, but as Defendants sales representatives made clear, the only service required of the physician is to “comfort” the patient.
The complaint alleged payments of $200 or $225 per test for those comforting services, which it valued at $0. It also alleged that a physician who referred more patients received more money even when the time spent comforting patients was the same. The government’s complaint separately alleged that Gramercy paid larger fees for tests carrying larger reimbursements. Each account connects the payment to the testing business the physician brought in.
Cardiac Imaging supplies a close parallel. In its separate settlement announcement, the Justice Department alleged that referring cardiologists received $500 or more per hour for purported PET supervision and additional services they did not provide, including time away from the scanning unit. Gramercy’s admissions expose a different calculation, payment by the referred procedure, but the same question runs through both cases: what work did the supervision payment buy?
Imaging payments distinguish the work of producing an image from the physician’s interpretation and report. That distinction helps explain why a referral can generate revenue beyond the referring physician’s own clinical time. The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s 2008 synthesis, Physician Self-Referral and Physician-Owned Specialty Facilities, describes the incentive to share in technical imaging revenue or facility profits that require little additional physician time.
Gramercy’s admissions show how the company connected the referring practice to the testing business: the rented room brought the patient to a contracted cardiologist, and the cardiologist brought the patient to the imaging company. For an insider, the lease and the scan invoice describe connected parts of the business, even when different employees handle them.
The settlement required Gramercy and its owner to pay $4,510,678 to the United States and $1,989,362 to New York. The amount reflected the government’s assessment of their ability to pay.
The owner also agreed to relinquish ownership and control by the end of 2023 and to direct a portion of any practice-sale proceeds to the United States. The civil resolution indefinitely barred him from working for any entity that bills federal healthcare programs, and he agreed to a five-year exclusion from Medicare, Medicaid and other federal healthcare programs.
The executed agreement set a $64,417,515 consent judgment, enforceable if the defendants failed to comply with the settlement. The government agreed to accept the much smaller federal settlement payment to satisfy that judgment if the defendants complied with the agreement.
The whistleblower’s federal agreement provided a 21% share of the federal recovery, while the state agreement specified a 22% share of the state settlement. More generally, a whistleblower case under the False Claims Act can pay 15% to 30% of what the government recovers.
The physician who brought the case alleged that sales representatives repeatedly solicited participation and described the arrangements, even though the physician declined. The complaint also alleged that representatives urged physicians to refer every patient with diabetes, hyperlipidemia or a smoking history because of the money they could make. That account shows why someone who heard the offer could have knowledge of the payment arrangement before ever seeing Gramercy’s claims.
The government joined the private False Claims Act whistleblower case. The Justice Department credited the investigation to the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General, with extensive collaboration from the New York Attorney General’s Medicaid Fraud Control Unit.
Someone who scheduled the rented room may know how little space Gramercy actually used. Someone who calculated rent or cardiologist payments may know that referrals drove the amount. We connect that knowledge with contracts, referral calculations, scan records and claims to understand what the practice paid for and what Medicare or Medicaid funded.
If your practice’s rent depended on referrals, or supervision fees went to referring cardiologists who did not perform the contracted work, speak with our whistleblower experts. We build the case with you around the contracts, the actual work and the government-paid scans, and bring in physician kickback whistleblower lawyers who understand cardiac imaging arrangements. We stay beside you through the case, with your knowledge of the business at its center.