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Bilfinger’s FCPA case showed how a pipeline bid, local cash payments and a loan between construction partners financed the same bribery arrangement. In its deferred prosecution agreement with the Justice Department, Bilfinger admitted agreeing to inflate the project’s bid price to cover payments to Nigerian officials. The paperwork carrying the money included project invoices and a written loan agreement.
The admitted account concerned the Eastern Gas Gathering System, a natural gas pipeline project in the Niger Delta. Bilfinger’s subsidiary and Willbros companies joined to bid for the work. For someone inside estimating, project finance or local operations, the case connects decisions that could look separate: what the bid included, how invoices were assembled and why cash left a company safe.
Bilfinger Berger Gas and Oil Services Nigeria formed the project consortium with Willbros West Africa and Willbros Nigeria. The admitted facts describe a base pipeline project, optional pipeline coating and another optional pipeline phase. Winning the initial work and keeping the optional work were connected commercial objectives.
The customer-side venture was majority owned by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, a government-owned company. Shell Petroleum Development Co. of Nigeria operated that venture. The government could block the award of contracts, and the national petroleum company’s investment-management subsidiary also had an approval role. Those relationships connected the government’s decisions to the work the consortium wanted.
Bilfinger admitted that the participants agreed to inflate the bid by 3% to cover bribes. The stated object was to obtain and retain contracts through promises and payments exceeding $6 million to Nigerian officials and others identified in the admitted facts. The cost was built into the commercial offer before it passed through the project’s billing arrangements.
For an estimator or project accountant, that puts the bid calculation near the beginning of the payment trail. A person who knows why a pricing component was added could explain its relationship to later disbursements. The admitted facts make that relationship explicit: the increased price was intended to cover payments for help obtaining and retaining the work.
The participants divided responsibility for the payments. Bilfinger and its oil and gas services subsidiary would handle payments to officials of the national petroleum company and its investment-management subsidiary. Willbros would handle payments to officials of the venture’s operator, according to Bilfinger’s admitted account.
Employees also used different labels for the same kind of expense. Bilfinger and subsidiary employees referred to landscaping payments, while Willbros employees and agents called them commitments. Those labels linked ordinary project language to money promised for official assistance. An employee who understood how those words were used could explain a record that looked routine to someone outside the project.
Bilfinger’s admitted facts also described the flow of invoices. Its subsidiary sent invoices for its work to Willbros West Africa, which combined them with its own invoices and submitted the package to the venture’s operator. The billed amounts included the increase intended to fund the bribes. The construction work and the hidden payment cost therefore traveled through the same customer billing process.
The cash route passed through Julius Berger Nigeria, a construction company whose daily operations and finances Bilfinger controlled. Its safe contained money mailed or flown from Germany for local expenses, including the payments described in the admitted facts. The source and use of cash connected company funding decisions with the payments made locally.
Bilfinger admitted a particular payment arrangement involving an official of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation. A Willbros executive had promised that official $150,000 for helping the consortium obtain and retain the contract. Bilfinger employees agreed to supply the payment from cash kept in the Julius Berger Nigeria managing director’s office, and a Bilfinger employee delivered the promised amount on separate occasions.
A former petroleum-company official also supplied a list of officials and suggested payment amounts. Officials then approached a Bilfinger employee about money they said had been promised for their assistance. The cash records, the list and the requests concerned the same project. For an insider, knowing who requested a withdrawal or what obligation it was supposed to satisfy could connect the money to the commercial decision behind it.
The admitted account described a problem when Willbros began an internal investigation and stopped paying its purported consultants. Nigerian officials were still demanding promised payments. Bilfinger employees were concerned that unpaid promises would interfere with the existing work and put the optional pipeline contract at risk.
The response involved discussions across the partner companies. A Bilfinger employee sought details of the promises already made, and another traveled from Houston to Boston to meet a former Willbros executive about the unpaid amounts and the optional contract. The immediate business question was how to satisfy commitments that had outlasted the original payment route.
Bilfinger admitted agreeing to have its subsidiary loan $1 million to the Willbros companies, with the understanding that the money would fund some of their promised bribes. A written loan agreement accompanied the transaction. The cash was delivered in a suitcase in Lagos to the Willbros manager described in the admitted facts.
The transaction continued to generate paperwork after the cash delivery. A Bilfinger employee later sought a repayment schedule for the loan. A senior member of Willbros’s legal department refused to establish that schedule because of the loan’s corrupt purpose, according to the admitted statement.
That sequence connects the agreement’s label to what the parties understood the money would fund. The written loan, the delivery of cash and the later repayment correspondence each reveal a different stage. An employee who handled only the loan documentation might not have seen the suitcase, while someone handling local cash might not have seen the legal department’s response.
Bilfinger accepted responsibility for the acts described in the statement attached to its deferred prosecution agreement. The criminal information sets out the charged conduct, and the agreement identifies the facts the company admitted. The case’s value for an insider lies in the connection between the project revenue, partner-company transactions and the officials the payments were meant to influence.
An FCPA tip to the SEC can earn 10% to 30% of sanctions over $1 million; where a government contract is involved, a False Claims Act case can pay 15% to 30% of what the government recovers. Our whistleblower experts help connect your knowledge of project decisions and payment records to the case those facts support.
If you know why a project price increased, what an agent’s payment funded or how a partner-company loan was used, speak with our whistleblower experts. We build your strongest case with you, bring in FCPA whistleblower lawyers who understand overseas projects and company accounting, and stay beside you as the case develops.