FCPA Cases and Settlements: What the Payment Bought and the Books Concealed

FCPA cases and settlements show how foreign bribery under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act can run through the ordinary business of selling software, shipping grain, supplying hospitals and winning contracts. A discount funds an official’s payment. A consulting invoice conceals work nobody performed. If you know who approved the payment or why an intermediary was involved, you may recognize the business behind the settlement.

The examples below follow the payment and the record that disguised it. We see the same commercial absurdity across very different businesses: a company pays a consultant for work nobody can show, while the official deciding its business gets the benefit.

Inspection Fees, Store Permits and Legislative Votes

Scoular, 2026. Under its July deferred prosecution agreement, the agricultural company admitted bribing officials through customs brokers to pass Mexican inspections despite dirt and other impurities in shipments. Broker invoices called the payments reinspection fees. The Justice Department reported more than $400,000 in bribes and more than $6.5 million in avoided fees and costs: the payment bought a cheaper passage for the goods.

Walmart, 2019. In its non-prosecution agreement, Walmart admitted failures in its accounting controls involving improper permitting payments. Mexican intermediaries obtained permits while invoices described legal services and store budgets carried external-service costs. Walmart also assigned the remaining internal investigation to subsidiary personnel after failing to follow investigators’ proposed steps, a reason the history of an internal report can matter alongside the invoices.

TIGO Guatemala, 2025. The telecommunications company admitted in its deferred prosecution agreement that cash payments bought legislators’ support for favorable legislation and spectrum arrangements. Cash initially arrived in duffel bags by helicopter, and later arrangements used narcotrafficking proceeds to generate cash.

Trading Commissions That Bought the Other Side

Glencore, 2022. In its guilty plea, Glencore admitted foreign bribery involving sham consulting contracts, inflated invoices and cash desks. Its West African and Brazilian trading arrangements show how an intermediary’s service fee could conceal payments benefiting officials.

Gunvor, 2024. Its guilty plea admitted bribery for Petroecuador business in Ecuador, using consultants, fictitious invoices and transfers through offshore entities. Payments continued despite missing support and intermediaries failing to attend a compliance meeting.

Vitol, 2020. Under its deferred prosecution agreement, Vitol admitted using sham consulting and market-intelligence invoices to buy trading information and a last look at competing bids. Its Brazil conduct involved more than $8 million in bribes and at least $33 million in resulting profits. We see bribes treated as a business expense, with profits that dwarf the outlay. A competitor pricing a bid honestly was competing against access to the answer.

Trafigura, 2024. In the statement of facts accompanying its guilty plea, Trafigura admitted agreeing oil-trading prices and bribes with a Petrobras official before instructing traders to negotiate. The company also linked bribes to particular trade references so commissions could appear as legitimate transactions.

We see a negotiation staged after the result had already been bought. Someone on the trading desk could explain the gap between the apparent bargaining and the instructions that preceded it.

Petrobras, 2018. In its own non-prosecution agreement, Petrobras admitted a different route: executives and political recipients took kickbacks from inflated contracts. The company capitalized inflated costs, overstating assets. The concealment reached the balance sheet as well as the payment record.

Public Contracts and Services Nobody Supplied

Alstom, 2014. The company’s guilty plea covered false books and failed accounting controls, with admitted schemes involving consultants on an Indonesian project, payments to a foundation associated with a Saudi decision-maker and hospitality for Egyptian officials. The correspondence connected benefits to unresolved commercial decisions.

Rolls-Royce, 2017. The deferred prosecution agreement announced that January admitted bribery through advisers and commissions for energy business in countries including Thailand, Brazil and Kazakhstan. Officials supplied information and contracts in exchange for the benefits.

Embraer, 2016. Its deferred prosecution agreement admitted intermediary transactions involving the Dominican Republic, Saudi Arabia, Mozambique and India. Payments in the Saudi and Mozambican transactions required no proof of work, and Mozambique subsidiary commissions were consolidated as selling expenses. Incorporation papers stood where evidence of actual services should have been.

Airbus, 2020. Under its deferred prosecution agreement, Airbus admitted arrangements involving contracts and invoices for services never supplied, split business-partner compensation and leisure benefits for Chinese airline officials. Internal spreadsheets tracked commitments, giving insiders a record beside the formal contract.

Panasonic Avionics, 2018. Its deferred prosecution agreement recorded admitted conduct involving consulting for an airline official, contract amendments and payments through sales intermediaries. An internal audit report circulated in a version that omitted its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act warning and its recommendation to involve procurement. The agreement also described $126,900,000 in parent-company repayment of profits to the Securities and Exchange Commission for overlapping conduct.

Odebrecht, 2016. In its guilty plea, Odebrecht admitted operating a Division of Structured Operations with a shadow budget. MyWebDay handled payment requests and accounting, while Drousys carried coded communications. This was an organized payment operation outside the ordinary balance sheet.

Telecom Rights Hidden in Investments and Consulting

Telia and VimpelCom. In its 2017 deferred prosecution agreement, Telia admitted buying entry into Uzbekistan and spectrum through consulting, equity and asset arrangements with official-owned entities. VimpelCom’s 2016 deferred prosecution agreement admitted an Uzbekistan scheme using equity transactions, loan descriptions and consulting contracts that bought no work. Backdated service-acceptance certificates supplied the appearance of a completed job.

Mobile TeleSystems, 2019. Its deferred prosecution agreement admitted Uzbekistan payments through options, equity, spectrum and charitable arrangements. Managers withheld an official’s ownership of counterparties from outside advisers. Knowing who controlled the recipient could change the meaning of an otherwise ordinary transaction.

Ericsson, 2019. In its deferred prosecution agreement, Ericsson admitted schemes including Djibouti bribes, Chinese service-provider payments for unperformed work and a sham Kuwait consulting payment connected to tender information. The documents exposed both omitted ownership information and money kept outside the books. Its later 2023 guilty-plea agreement followed failures to disclose evidence. Ericsson pleaded guilty to the previously deferred charges.

Magyar Telekom, 2011. Its deferred prosecution agreement admitted false consulting and marketing arrangements intended to benefit Macedonian officials. A report available for approximately £500 supported a €450,000 payment. We would want to hear from the person who knew what that report actually cost.

Prescriptions and Hospital Purchasing

Novartis Hellas, 2020. Under its deferred prosecution agreement, the Greek subsidiary admitted sponsoring congress attendance for public-sector ophthalmologists in exchange for increased Lucentis prescriptions. It also repurposed an epidemiological study to increase prescribing. Both routes entered advertising or promotional accounts.

Fresenius Medical Care, 2019. In its non-prosecution agreement, the dialysis company admitted schemes including cash delivered to government doctors after employees cashed checks to themselves, sham consulting and payments to a doctor-linked charity. The separate Securities and Exchange Commission order required $135 million in disgorgement, repayment of profits from the conduct. The healthcare purchasing relationship could put the same doctor near both the product decision and the payment.

The 2022 Journal of Forensic and Investigative Accounting paper Fresenius Medical Care: A Case Study on the FCPA examines how those arrangements changed across the business. Its analysis connects public-hospital procurement, distributors and joint ventures, including shares supplied to Turkish public doctors in exchange for patient referrals. It describes internal audit flags followed by continued payments in Angola. For an insider, the earlier warning and the later approval can explain more than either document alone.

The paper describes a business that supplies dialysis treatment and sells products to hospitals, treatment centers and independent distributors. That gives the payment several places to hide: the product order, the distributor’s bill or the arrangement bringing patients into a clinic.

Olympus Latin America, 2016. Its deferred prosecution agreement admitted benefits to professionals influencing government healthcare purchasing in Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia and Colombia. Mexican payments were recorded as public-bid administrative or advisory services that were neither performed nor required. The entry described work; the payment bought influence.

Investment Mandates and Jobs for Referrals

Goldman Sachs, 2020. Under its deferred prosecution agreement, the parent admitted a conspiracy involving the 1MDB bond offerings. Bankers concealed a fixer’s involvement after the bank’s earlier diligence had rejected him as a client. Transaction approvals and internal warnings connected the financing to the concealed intermediary.

Och-Ziff, 2016. Its deferred prosecution agreement admitted a promised finder’s fee to secure a Libyan Investment Authority investment, knowing that some or all would pay officials. The consultant had no employees or relevant expertise. The admitted account also described equity and loan transactions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo despite corruption warnings.

JPMorgan Securities Asia Pacific, 2016. In its non-prosecution agreement, the company admitted hiring referred relatives and friends of officials outside normal recruitment processes to obtain banking business. Spreadsheets connected hires, referring clients and revenue. Here the benefit appeared in recruitment records and payroll, alongside misleading compliance answers.

Discounts, Commissions and Expense Receipts

Microsoft Hungary, 2019. In its non-prosecution agreement, the subsidiary admitted falsely justifying large discounts for government sales. Resellers retained margins for improper payments instead of passing the discounts to customers. Comparing supplier pricing with what the government customer paid exposes the commercial gap.

SAP, 2024. Its deferred prosecution agreement admitted bribery involving South Africa and Indonesia. A Johannesburg sales commission passed onward to an entity associated with a city official. An employee deleted payment-confirmation language from an email before forwarding it with the signed agreement for internal processing.

RAE Systems, 2010. In its non-prosecution agreement, RAE admitted conduct involving Chinese joint ventures, salesperson cash advances and substituted receipts supporting false expenses. Management approval and reimbursement paperwork carried payments through the business. The person who knew what the expense really covered could explain what the approval concealed.

SEC Settlements Over False Records and Failed Controls

Oracle, 2022. The Securities and Exchange Commission’s settled order alleged that employees created channel-partner funds in India, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. The order alleged that employees split Turkish marketing orders below a $5,000 threshold that required no proof the marketing occurred. Oracle agreed to a $15 million civil penalty over the alleged scheme.

BHP Billiton, 2015. The Securities and Exchange Commission’s settled accounting order alleged inaccurate applications and inadequate review of Beijing Olympics hospitality for officials and state-enterprise employees. BHP agreed to a $25 million civil penalty. The order described approvals that stayed in place as guests’ business relationships changed.

Deere, 2024. The Securities and Exchange Commission’s settled order alleged that cash, sham consulting, travel and entertainment at Wirtgen Thailand were concealed through invoices and approvals. Deere agreed to a $4.5 million civil penalty over books, records and accounting controls. The acquisition and subsidiary payment records connected the local conduct to the parent.

Anheuser-Busch InBev, 2016. The SEC’s settled order alleged inflated promoter commissions funded improper payments in India. The order alleged that employees backdated due-diligence forms. The order describes how staff at the Indian operation handled the promoter’s answers:

The order also described an internal complaint that prompted an accelerated audit, which did not scrutinize the promoter’s activities or expenses. In that account, we see paperwork being improved while the underlying problem stayed put.

Company Declinations and Unresolved Charges

Liberty Mutual, 2025. In its August declination letter, the Justice Department declined to prosecute the company while describing evidence of bribery through its Indian subsidiary. According to the letter, officials at state-owned banks referred customers to the subsidiary’s insurance products in exchange for payments disguised as marketing expenses. The department credited the company’s voluntary disclosure, cooperation and corrective action.

Balt, 2026. The Justice Department’s March announcement distinguished a company declination from criminal charges against an executive and a consultant. The indictment alleged sham consulting fees and bonuses concealed payments to a French public-hospital physician to secure medical-device purchases.

Smartmatic, 2025. The October superseding indictment charged SGO Corporation, known as Smartmatic, with a Philippine election-contract bribery scheme. Prosecutors alleged that over-invoicing voting machines funded payments to an election official, concealed through coded communications, false contracts and sham loans.

What Money Determines the Reward?

For eligible whistleblowers, the Securities and Exchange Commission program provides awards of 10% to 30% of monetary sanctions collected in qualifying actions. We work through which money counts toward an FCPA whistleblower reward with you, connecting the payment scheme you recognize to the applicable award program. A whistleblower case under the False Claims Act can pay 15% to 30% of what the government recovers. That is a different system from the foreign-bribery whistleblower programs we assess with you.

The Records That Make the Connection

The cases connect a business decision, a benefit and the record that hid its purpose. An insider’s evidence can supply the missing connection: why the discount stopped at the reseller, what the consultant actually delivered or who approved the payment after the warning.

The strongest comparisons reach beyond the invoice to the work, the customer and the recipient. In the trading cases, volume-based commissions linked payments to particular cargoes. In the hiring case, spreadsheets connected recruitment to revenue. Knowing how the business actually operated gives those records their meaning.

You Know What the Payment Was For

If these cases resemble the discounts, invoices or approvals you have seen, speak with our FCPA whistleblower experts about the business behind them. We assess the scheme with you, build a case strategy and bring in foreign-bribery whistleblower lawyers who understand the transactions and the award programs. We stay beside you through the decisions that follow.