Bechtel / URS / AECOM: The Nuclear-Quality Promise and the Lobbying Bill

Bechtel and URS agreed to a $125 million settlement over Hanford nuclear-quality and lobbying allegations. The government alleged that contractors billed for nuclear-quality compliance they had not delivered. It separately alleged that Bechtel used federal contract money to lobby for continued project funding.

The Justice Department announced the settlement on November 23, 2016. The work concerned the Department of Energy’s Waste Treatment Plant at the Hanford Site near Richland, Washington, intended to treat dangerous radioactive waste stored there. The department had paid the defendants billions of dollars to design and build the plant since 2002. Nuclear quality was part of what the government was buying.

The government’s district announcement dated the alleged claims from January 1, 2001 through June 30, 2013.

The settling companies were Bechtel National Inc., Bechtel Corp., URS Corp. and URS Energy and Construction Inc. The announcement identifies URS Corp. as the predecessor to AECOM Global II LLC, and URS Energy and Construction as AECOM Energy and Construction Inc.

What the Hanford Nuclear-Quality Allegations Were

The government alleged that the contractors charged for nuclear-quality materials, services and testing that failed the contract’s required standards. That is the payment connection behind this quality-compliance case.

The Justice Department described problems at different points in the work: the vendors supplying materials and services, the piping and waste vessels themselves, and the quality programs of the vendors doing the testing.

The Vendor’s Quality Controls

The United States alleged that contractors improperly billed for materials and services from vendors that did not meet quality-control requirements. A purchasing or quality professional who knows the vendor’s work can explain how its practices compared with the contract’s requirements.

What quality controls did the contract require, what did the vendor supply, and what did the contractor bill? That gap is what an insider can show.

The Piping and Waste Vessels

The government also alleged improper charges for piping and waste vessels that did not meet quality standards. Here the alleged shortfall concerned physical components of a plant meant to treat radioactive waste.

An engineer or vendor employee who knows the component can connect the specification to what was actually supplied. The same connection matters in cases involving goods below the contracted standard: the government charge has to be understood alongside the goods it purchased.

The Quality Program Behind the Test

The government alleged that contractors billed for testing performed by vendors without compliant quality programs.

A test result and the program under which the test was performed answer different questions. Someone inside the testing vendor can explain how that program operated. Taxpayers were buying the required quality controls along with the testing, for a plant intended to treat dangerous radioactive waste.

What the Lobbying Allegations Added

The United States alleged that Bechtel National and Bechtel Corp. used federal contract money for a comprehensive, multiyear lobbying campaign. According to the Justice Department, the campaign targeted Congress and other federal officials to secure continued funding for the Waste Treatment Plant.

The United States alleged that the Bechtel companies improperly claimed and received government funding for those activities in violation of the Byrd Amendment’s ban on federally funded lobbying and the contract’s requirements. The alleged cost mischarging concerned what federal money paid for outside the plant’s technical work. The quality allegations concerned what the government received for its money inside that work.

We find the alleged bargain absurd: taxpayers allegedly financed the project and the campaign to keep its funding coming. Lobbying for the next allocation, on the current allocation’s dime.

Both sets of allegations were resolved in the same settlement. An accountant who knows where the expense went may see a different part of this case from an engineer who knows the vessel.

The same funding problem appeared in the government’s separate lobbying case against Fluor Hanford. That settlement resolved allegations that Department of Energy funds paid for lobbying to increase funding for the HAMMER first-responder training center. The recurring allegation is specific: money for a federal project allegedly paid for efforts to obtain more federal money for it.

Who Brought the Hanford Case?

Three people who worked on the Waste Treatment Plant project brought the qui tam case under the False Claims Act. The government joined part of their case.

How Much Money Can a Whistleblower Get From a Qui Tam Lawsuit?

A whistleblower case under the False Claims Act can pay 15% to 30% of what the government recovers.

What Evidence Is Needed to Prove Fraud?

For the Hanford quality allegations, the central comparison connects the contract’s nuclear-quality requirements to the vendors, components and testing charged to the Department of Energy. Someone who knows why a quality program fell short may explain a charge that looks ordinary to a person reading only the invoice.

In a quality case, the billing evidence needs the technical account beside it: the requirement, the work supplied and the connection between that work and the charge.

Research on automated procurement screening illustrates why technical knowledge matters. The 2022 CEUR Workshop Proceedings paper Public Procurement Fraud Detection and Artificial Intelligence Techniques: a Literature Review describes studies using text analysis on Croatian procurement data. It reports poor prediction results for architecture, construction, engineering and inspection services because information about technical and professional abilities was missing.

For a quality case, we see a practical lesson: a procurement dataset can lack the technical information needed to interpret the purchase. A person who knows the vendor’s quality program or the required vessel standard can give the charge meaning. That is the connection we develop with an insider, bringing the technical work and the government’s payment into the same account.

Is This the Bechtel Hanford Idle-Time Case?

No. The nuclear-quality and lobbying settlement addressed different conduct from the separate Hanford idle-time case resolved in 2020. In that later matter, Bechtel and AECOM admitted overcharging the Department of Energy for craft workers’ excessive idle time.

The later settlement announcement concerned management leaving workers without enough assigned work and billing the resulting excessive idle time. That belongs with idle-time billing. The same plant, but a different charge: workers’ time instead of nuclear-quality work or lobbying expenses.

You Know What Nuclear Quality Required

If you know the gap between a nuclear-quality requirement and the material, testing or cost charged to the government, talk with our whistleblower experts about what you saw. We work with you to build your strongest case around that knowledge and bring in government procurement whistleblower lawyers who understand technical performance and contract billing. From the vendor’s quality program to the government’s bill, we stay beside you as your experts and partners.