Contents
Contents
The WG Trading and Westridge fraud recovery returned over $1 billion to investors in an alleged commodity-pool Ponzi scheme, according to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Behind that recovery was the agency’s allegation that investment money had financed personal spending and concealed trading losses, with promissory notes created afterward to make withdrawals look like loans. For a fund accountant or investment-operations employee, that is the telling gap: what investors were promised, what the books called an asset, and where the money actually went.
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission alleged that the pool operators misappropriated at least $553 million through businesses including Westridge Capital Management, WG Trading Investors and WGIA. Its February 2009 complaint described money taken for personal expenses and to hide trading losses. The money belonged to state retirement plans and university foundations serving people far outside the trading office.
A commodity pool operator brings participants’ money into a pool for commodity-interest trading. Here, the complaint identified WG Trading Company and Westridge Capital Management Enhancement Funds as the pools, while Westridge Capital Management served as the latter’s investment adviser. WG Trading Investors, based in Greenwich, Connecticut, sat in the money trail between investors and the trading pool. Westridge Capital Management operated from Santa Barbara, California.
According to the complaint, investors entered through limited partnership interests or promissory notes, but the promised destination was the same trading strategy. Westridge’s materials described futures exposure supported by cash and an equity index-arbitrage strategy at WG Trading Company. The complaint quoted a written representation to a client or participant:
the only business of WG Trading is index arbitrage and that WG Trading does not employ any other investment strategies
The subscription agreement quoted in the complaint promised to put 85% of the assets into WG Trading Company for that strategy. That promise gave an accountant something concrete to compare with transfers and balances. The question was where the money committed to trading had actually landed.
The Westridge pool’s audited financial statements also described unsecured notes issued by WG Trading Investors. According to the complaint, the interest on those notes tracked a hypothetical limited partnership interest in WG Trading Company. The note could therefore promise a return measured by the trading pool even though the investor held a different instrument issued by another business. For someone reconciling the accounts, that distinction makes the route of the cash as important as the return printed on the statement.
The commission alleged that money invested through Westridge or WGIA often moved to WG Trading Investors, where the operators siphoned it from the accounts. It alleged that new participants’ funds covered earlier losses and that over $160 million went to personal expenses, including rare books, horses, antique teddy bears and a residence for an operator’s former spouse.
The complaint described the paperwork that followed the withdrawals:
Following the misappropriation of pool participants’ funds through WG Trading Investors, [the pool operators] manufactured paperwork in the form of promissory notes in order to present the appearance that pool participants funds had been loaned to them.
A note receivable presents money owed to the business as an asset. Here, the commission alleged that investor money bought teddy bears and horses. Then an IOU from the buyers took its place on the books.
The notes themselves described balances representing a general partner’s share of losses, withdrawals and payments. The complaint said the operators had failed to disclose both the departure from the promised investment strategy and their use of participants’ money for personal purposes and concealed losses. A balance sheet could therefore carry a large asset figure while leaving investors unaware of what stood behind it.
The National Futures Association uncovered the alleged scheme through audits, according to the commission’s complaint. Its auditors began examining the operators at their Greenwich office in February 2009, including a loan from Westridge Capital Management Enhancement Funds to WG Trading Investors.
According to the complaint, WG Trading Investors’ financial records showed approximately $812 million in assets, but approximately $93.8 million invested in the WG Trading Company pool. The complaint described much of the asset side as receivables from the operators, investments in businesses they purportedly owned, and employee advances. An asset total concealed the more useful question of who held the money and could return it.
The auditors also found approximately $531.5 million in accounts receivable on WG Trading Company’s books. According to the complaint, those receivables had never appeared in the pool’s annual reports filed with the association. An amount owed to the trading pool corresponded to an unidentified payable in WG Trading Investors’ records. Reading either set of books alone would miss that connection.
Even the signatures needed checking. The complaint said a director whose signature purportedly appeared on notes issued to the Westridge pool denied executing them when the association asked. The paper said one thing. The person whose name was on it said another.
The association pursued the next question too: could the borrowers repay? The complaint says auditors sought documents about the operators’ financial resources because repayment to WG Trading Investors would, in turn, enable payment to its note holders. When asked where the Westridge money that had not reached the trading pool was located, one operator said he would get back to the auditors and ended the call.
A capital-account entry, an investor statement and a note receivable may all describe the same money differently. We examine those descriptions alongside transfers and confirmations, including who supplied the figures and who approved the account of the transaction.
The receiver took control of assets under orders in the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and Securities and Exchange Commission proceedings. The court’s later account of that authority describes possession and control of property and a plan for administering it. Recovering the money meant following property and payments beyond the trading accounts.
The commission’s October 17, 2022 account of the recovery describes over $88 million recovered from investors who had already redeemed their investments in full. It also lists a $14 million horse farm in North Salem, New York, and a collection of antique teddy bears sold at auction for over $3.7 million. The objects that made the alleged spending so striking had become assets the receiver could recover or sell.
The court approved a distribution plan recommended by both agencies and proposed by the receiver, allocating payments proportionally among investors. The initial distribution was approximately $792 million, mostly to institutions. Later distributions completed the recovery.
The receiver distributed 100% of allowed investor claims, the Southern District of New York stated in its September 19, 2022 order. Those were the claims accepted for payment in the receivership.
In a pool-diversion case, the evidence connects the investment promise, the destination of the money and the explanation given afterward. WG Trading and Westridge illustrate those connections through subscription agreements, transfers, receivables, promissory notes and audit inquiries. An insider’s knowledge can explain how the records fit together and why a reassuring balance deserves a closer look.
For a fund accountant, the revealing point may be how a withdrawal was posted or carried into a participant’s capital account. An investment-operations employee may know which transfers supported trading and which went elsewhere. An employee handling investor reports may know how the balances were described to customers. We work with the person who holds that view to connect it to the underlying money movement. The International Labour Office describes this access to operational and financial information in its 2019 paper on whistleblowers.
North Hills supplies a nearby example of the reporting problem. Its civil consent findings described misappropriated pool money concealed through false reports. In WG Trading and Westridge, the complaint follows the creation of apparent loans after the alleged diversion, and the later court order follows the completed investor recovery. The shared lesson is that the account investors receive can obscure the money trail an insider knows.
For someone considering reporting commodity-pool fraud, the starting point with us is that connection between the records and the conduct. We bring the accounting and the investment promise into the same conversation, so your knowledge of the business can shape the case.
Qualifying whistleblowers can receive an aggregate award of 10 to 30 percent of monetary sanctions collected through the CFTC whistleblower program. That is a different payment from investors receiving distributions on their claims. We assess how your information fits the program with you.
The False Claims Act is a separate program. A whistleblower case under the False Claims Act can pay 15% to 30% of what the government recovers. WG Trading and Westridge’s recovery described here came through the receivership.
If you saw personal transfers dressed as fund assets or investment statements that the underlying accounts could not support, speak to our Whistleblower Experts about what you saw inside the fund. We build the case around that knowledge, bring in commodity-pool whistleblower lawyers who understand fund accounting and diverted assets, and stay beside you through the case and award process.