Contents
Contents
A retail forex fraud whistleblower can expose the hidden relationship between a broker, the market maker trading against its customers and the money flowing back to the broker. You may work on the execution desk that routes the orders, in finance where the rebates arrive, or in compliance where the customer disclosures are reviewed. The sales pitch promises neutral execution. The trading records and payment agreements can tell a different story.
In the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s action against Forex Capital Markets, known as FXCM, the alleged deception sat inside a platform promoted as having no dealing desk. FXCM told customers their trading profits and losses did not affect its bottom line. The Commission alleged that the broker shared in the profits of its principal market maker, a business created inside FXCM itself.
FXCM stood on the other side of its retail customers’ trades, then entered offsetting trades with a market maker. Its settlement order describes the firm’s execution model and the promise it made to customers: banks and other independent liquidity providers supplied prices, while FXCM earned markups and commissions based on trading volume. Independence was part of what customers were buying.
An introducing broker handles a different part of the relationship: soliciting or accepting orders without taking the trading collateral. For an insider, the useful questions are who made the pitch, who took the other side of the trade and who had a financial interest in the result.
FXCM promoted no dealing desk execution while, the Commission alleged, sharing profits with the market maker taking the largest share of its retail trading volume. According to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s account in the settlement order, FXCM hired a high-frequency trader to build an algorithm that could trade against its retail customers. Its compliance department raised concerns that doing so would contradict the firm’s marketing. FXCM then arranged for the trader to operate through a separate company, called HFT Co in the order.
The Commission alleged that the change preserved the economics. The trader left his executive job, but the arrangement still aimed to leave FXCM with 70 percent of the algorithm’s trading profits. The services agreements expressed the payments as fees tied to trading volume. Inside the business, FXCM calculated preliminary profit and loss using the market maker’s trading results.
The connection extended well beyond an invoice. According to the order, FXCM supplied an interest-free startup loan, access to its prime broker and free office space. HFT Co used an algorithm that belonged to FXCM, along with its servers and email systems. FXCM employees helped the market maker and received supplemental bonuses reimbursed by it.
We see the problem in the distance between those arrangements and the sales pitch. Customers were offered independent pricing. The Commission’s account describes a market maker funded, equipped and supported by the broker, with much of the trading profit returning to that broker. A separate company name did a great deal of work.
The Commission alleged that FXCM favored HFT Co when routing retail orders in exchange for the payments. The market maker won ties with other liquidity providers, could see their price quotations in real time and received smaller markups on its prices.
The order also describes a hold timer that let HFT Co choose execution at the beginning or end of a period, whichever favored it. Later, HFT Co used the price at the end of the timer to decide whether to accept or reject a trade. For someone working on execution systems, that is a specific connection between a platform setting and the counterparty benefiting from it.
The Commission put the rebates from HFT Co to FXCM at approximately $77 million during 2010 through 2014. Its Division of Enforcement investigated the arrangement. The February 2017 settlement required FXCM, its parent and two founding partners to pay a joint $7 million civil penalty. We see a penalty dwarfed by the revenue from the arrangement it punished. The order also required FXCM to withdraw its CFTC registrations and stop accepting new customer accounts.
The Commission alleged that FXCM concealed the same relationship in customer communications and responses to the National Futures Association, the industry’s self-regulatory organization. In the order’s account, the internal records described how the market maker was built while the outward explanations obscured that history.
According to the settlement order, a public diagram of liquidity providers identified major banks but placed HFT Co, the largest provider by volume, inside a catchall category. When someone questioned the relationship on an online forum, FXCM invoked nondisclosure agreements as a reason it did not normally name liquidity providers. The Commission said there was no such agreement between FXCM and HFT Co.
The order quotes a compliance officer responding to an internal concern about HFT Co’s handling of orders:
Given the sensitivity of the counter party involved we would prefer the events don’t happen so that we do not draw unwanted attention.
CFTC: FXCM settlement order, quoting a compliance officer, February 6, 2017
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission alleged that the broker had an undisclosed financial interest in the counterparty. That gives the sensitivity a commercial explanation. The employee who understands that connection can explain why an execution problem drew that response.
During the National Futures Association examination, the Commission alleged, FXCM’s chief executive and compliance staff gave misleading accounts of the relationship. Compliance responses denied relevant interests or affiliations with retail liquidity providers. A later response described the market maker’s founder as a former consultant doing software coding. The Commission said he had been an FXCM executive developing the algorithm used to trade against its customers.
Those exchanges show why the compliance file belongs beside the trading file. The employment agreement, technology arrangements and payment records supply the history against which the outward statements can be read.
In a concealed-counterparty case, the useful evidence connects what customers were promised with who received their trades, how execution worked and who benefited financially. Marketing, order records and compensation agreements each answer a different part of that question.
The FXCM order brings those records together. The customer-facing explanation described independent price competition. Routing preferences showed how the connected market maker could receive orders. The services agreements and rebate invoices showed money returning to the broker. Internal profit calculations showed how the business understood those payments.
For a trading or operations employee, order and fill data can connect the customer’s trade to the liquidity provider. For finance staff, the agreement, invoice and payment connect that activity to the revenue. For compliance staff, internal questions and responses to regulators show what the business said when the relationship came under scrutiny. We work with those connections, including the people who can explain why the records were created and how the systems operated.
Trading data needs someone who understands the market to explain it. The Exercise of Anti-Spoofing Authority in U.S. Futures Markets: Policy and Compliance Consequences, published in Futures & Derivatives Law Report in 2016, makes that point about futures spoofing. The paper describes expert interpretation of order submissions, modifications, cancellations and executions. In the forex example, the comparable task is to connect execution data to the commercial relationship that shaped the routing. An insider can explain the purpose behind a setting that otherwise appears as another field in a trading system.
For a forex introducing broker, excessive trading commissions can be examined through the trading recommendations, customer statements and compensation those trades generated. A useful options-trading parallel is Long Leaf Trading Group’s Time Means Money program.
In its complaint against Long Leaf, the Commission alleged that four monthly recommendations, each consisting of four option trades, generated at least sixteen commissions per customer each month. The complaint put commissions at $4.4 million against customer losses of $6.1 million. It alleged that commissions commonly turned winning trades into net losses for customers.
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission also alleged that sales staff highlighted individual winning trades while leaving out losses on the others, and that management received daily account statements showing widespread losses. That is a comparison an insider can recognize: the sales call, the whole account and the compensation ledger.
The options parallel’s relevance to a forex introducing broker is the incentive visible in repeated recommendations and fees. We examine what customers were told about performance alongside the cost of the trading that produced it.
Invented forex-pool returns sell customers a false performance story and can conceal where their investment went. That mechanism puts the fund’s accounts and use of money at the center of the case.
In the Revelation Forex Fund action, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s account of its civil resolution described allegations of invented experience and performance, approximately $7.4 million solicited and approximately $1.7 million diverted. The civil defendants included RFF GP and KGW Capital Management. The fund was named as a recipient of assets in the case.
ForexnPower supplies a further connection between performance claims and account records. The Commission alleged that Safety Capital Management and GNS Capital, operating under that name, promoted a secret trading method and profits without losses. Its complaint described a particular email about managed accounts:
In yet another false solicitation, in an email dated January 11, 2013, Defendants Safety and GNS, using the d/b/a FOREXNPOWER, by and through their officers, employees or agents, represented to customers that during the entire month of December 2012, all their managed forex trading accounts had made a profit of 10% on average. On the contrary, during this period, the majority of FOREXNPOWER’S managed retail forex customer accounts lost money.
The claimed performance and the account results covered the same month. That is the value of matching the sales message to the accounts it describes. The FXCM allegations turn on concealed execution economics. These pool and managed-account allegations turn on false performance and the handling of investor money.
Employees, customers, investors and market observers can qualify as CFTC whistleblowers. U.S. citizenship is not required. We work with you to show how your information contributes to enforcement. For a forex insider, that contribution may be explaining the undisclosed agreement behind a stream of trades and payments.
A whistleblower case under the False Claims Act can pay 15% to 30% of what the government recovers. Potential whistleblower awards connected to these retail forex actions are governed by the CFTC Whistleblower Program and its award rules. Under the CFTC award law, qualifying whistleblowers collectively can receive 10% to 30% of monetary sanctions collected in a qualifying enforcement action.
Awards come from the Customer Protection Fund, funded by qualifying sanctions not otherwise distributed to victims. The reward comes from that separate fund, not from the customer’s recovery.
The Commission published a Notice of Covered Action for FXCM. That notice invited award claims connected to the enforcement action. We work through the whole program with you, including potential awards from related actions by other authorities. If your concerns involve anonymity or information learned in a compliance or internal-audit role, bring those questions to us along with the trading facts.
If you work in forex execution, dealing, operations, finance or compliance and know how the customer promise diverges from the firm’s arrangements, speak with our whistleblower experts about the relationship behind the trades. We connect your market knowledge to the execution and payment evidence, build the case with you and bring in commodities fraud whistleblower lawyers who understand broker and counterparty conflicts. We stay beside you from that first conversation through the whistleblower process.