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Synthes agreed to pay $138,000 in a civil settlement over allegations that false safety and efficacy claims about Norian bone cement drove spine procedures for 31 federal program beneficiaries. Four Synthes executives pleaded guilty to misdemeanor medical device offenses because their jobs made them responsible for preventing the violations. Inside the company, the story ran through surgeon training, safety warnings and decisions to keep a bone-cement test market moving.
Norian, a Synthes subsidiary, made the bone cements Norian SRS and Norian XR. The criminal case examined how the companies promoted and tested those products in spine surgery. The civil agreement addressed the resulting government claims and purchases.
Norian XR’s label expressly warned against treating vertebral compression fractures. The operations vice president’s criminal plea admitted that the companies nevertheless trained surgeons to use XR for those procedures and gathered clinical data without the required Food and Drug Administration approval. The Norian bone cement case covers the product and test-market history.
Each of the four officers pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor shipping offense as a responsible corporate officer. They held authority across North American leadership, the Spine Division, operations, and regulatory and clinical affairs. Their jobs carried responsibility to stop the violations.
Synthes’s corporate plea agreement covered a misdemeanor shipping offense. Norian’s covered a felony conspiracy and misdemeanor shipping offenses. The Justice Department’s October 2010 announcement described those separate agreements in the same bone-cement prosecution.
The government’s indictment announcement described the officers’ reporting relationships. The president of Synthes North America supervised the Spine Division’s president and the operations vice president. The Spine Division’s director of regulatory and clinical affairs reported first to the operations vice president and later to the North American president.
Public Citizen’s 2012 report, Pharmaceutical Industry Criminal and Civil Penalties: An Update, describes how executives can be held responsible for company misconduct even when they did not know about the specific unlawful acts.
The responsible-officer duty described in the case included seeking out and correcting violations and putting measures in place to prevent them. The officers’ misdemeanor offenses did not require proof of intent to defraud.
A 2014 Health and Human Services decision explains the operations vice president’s plea. He admitted that the companies illegally test marketed and promoted their cements, and acknowledged responsibility for preventing those violations.
His plea described company training that went beyond promoting an existing product. Surgeons were taught to mix Norian SRS with barium sulfate and use the resulting medical device in spine procedures. The mixture created a new medical device requiring approval for its intended use. The companies then trained surgeons to use Norian XR in vertebroplasty and gathered data from those procedures to assess its risks, despite their assurances to the Food and Drug Administration that they would not promote that use without approval.
The Health and Human Services decision describes the operations vice president receiving minutes of a meeting with the Food and Drug Administration. Those minutes recorded the agency’s concerns about spine use and Synthes’s promise not to promote vertebroplasty without the appropriate clearance. He also received a memorandum to the North American president describing physician training materials.
The decision recounts an email from the North American president to Spine Division employees, copied to the operations vice president, questioning shipments without proper protocols or surgeon sponsors. The president called a meeting to discuss the plan. The operations vice president later attended a management review meeting where participants decided to proceed with the test markets; the meeting included a presentation about the required warning against vertebroplasty.
The Health and Human Services decision describes a July 2003 safety meeting at which company personnel, including the operations vice president, considered postponing the test market or canceling it as too unsafe. They chose to proceed at more sites and use the larger experience to estimate the complication rate. The company’s meeting minutes put the decision in its own words:
This will help us to determine our associate level of risk and decide what level is too high.
Synthes safety meeting minutes, reproduced in the Health and Human Services decision of November 25, 2014
The civil settlement concerned allegedly false safety and efficacy representations that caused government claims or purchases for spine procedures covered by Medicare, TRICARE and the Department of Veterans Affairs. The agreement’s covered period ran from November 1, 2002, through January 1, 2004.
The government’s theory was that the Norian procedures were not reasonable and necessary for those patients, and that XR’s labeling warned against the use. The manufacturer allegedly helped create the demand through its representations about the cement. Providers then used it in procedures financed by federal health care programs.
The agreement made Synthes responsible for the payment and released the corporate parties from the specified civil claims. It expressly excluded all four officers from that release.
In the medical device business, a surgeon can strongly influence product choice while the hospital or surgery center purchases the product. Medicare usually includes an implanted medical device’s cost in the payment for the procedure or stay.
A whistleblower case under the False Claims Act can pay 15% to 30% of what the government recovers.
We work with medical device insiders to connect what the company knew and taught with the procedures performed and the claims or purchases that followed.
The Norian documents show why people in different jobs can see different parts of the same program. Regulatory staff dealt with the permitted use and the Food and Drug Administration’s warnings. The people preparing training materials knew what surgeons were being taught. Management received safety information and decided whether the program would proceed. Clinical staff saw the product used during surgery.
The broader medical device sales channel puts company personnel close to that last step. A Senate Finance Committee staff report on the implant supply chain describes manufacturer representatives helping with delivery, stocking, instruments and assistance to surgeons in the operating room. Product promotion can reach the procedure through practical help with using the medical device.
In Norian, the settlement linked the alleged safety representations to government-funded healthcare. Our work with a medical device insider follows that same connection: the product decision, the clinical use and the public payment.
If you know how a medical device company turned safety concerns into a sales plan, speak to one of our Whistleblower Experts about the decisions you saw. We build the case with you around the product decisions, the clinical use and the federal claims, and bring in medical device whistleblower lawyers who understand that chain. We stay beside you as your partners throughout the case.