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Off-label promotion, kickbacks and concealed device defects can turn a manufacturer’s sale into a provider’s false claim, the connection a medical device fraud whistleblower helps expose. You may know the sales instruction, the failed test or the software setting that changed a patient’s treatment. The person who submitted the bill may work somewhere else entirely. Our job is to connect your knowledge to that claim and build the case with you.
Device cases have begun with sales representatives, reimbursement staff, a quality analyst, an engineer, a hospital physician and a customer organization. Their contribution came from knowing how a particular part of the business worked.
Your role determines which decisions you can explain: what the customer was told, what the company knew about the product, why a procedure happened or how the provider billed it. The useful starting point is the conduct you know firsthand.
A device sales representative may know the indication promoted to surgeons, the training used to sell it and the reimbursement promise that helped close the account. Clinical specialists may know what happened when that instruction reached the operating room.
This is unusually close contact between a supplier and the use of its product. A Senate Finance Committee staff report described representatives supplying implants, stocking and restocking inventory, delivering instrumentation and assisting surgeons in the operating room. The commercial relationship can continue through the procedure itself.
The operating-room record can help place that contact. The Association of periOperative Registered Nurses’ position statement on industry representatives calls for documenting the representative’s name, company and time in the room. Those entries can connect a particular procedure with the person who supplied technical support. Your account can explain what that person said and which product was used.
NuVasive sold a spine-surgery system. In its settlement announcement, the Justice Department alleged that NuVasive promoted its CoRoent System for unapproved spine-surgery uses and caused physicians and hospitals to bill federal health care programs for surgeries ineligible for reimbursement. It also alleged kickbacks through speaker fees, honoraria and expenses associated with the Society of Lateral Access Surgery, a group the company allegedly created, funded and operated despite its appearance of independence. A former sales representative brought the case.
For someone in sales, the connection is concrete: the training, the physician’s participation, the product used and the resulting surgery. The representative’s account can explain what the marketing material was intended to make the customer do.
A quality analyst can connect customer complaints to the company’s response. An engineer can explain the difference between the product tested and the product described to a regulator or customer.
The Justice Department alleged that Alere knowingly sold unreliable Triage rapid diagnostic devices used in emergency departments, including tests aiding diagnosis of heart failure and acute coronary syndromes. Customer complaints allegedly alerted the company to erroneous results capable of producing false positives and false negatives, yet appropriate corrective action did not follow until Food and Drug Administration inspections prompted a recall. Alere agreed to a $33.2 million settlement over allegations that those sales caused hospitals to submit false claims to Medicare, Medicaid and other federal healthcare programs.
For emergency patients, an unreliable result could change an urgent treatment decision. Taxpayers allegedly paid for the testing anyway. A former senior quality control analyst brought the case. The warning and the bill sat in different businesses.
Advanced Bionics made cochlear implant processors. The government alleged that the company shielded components during radio-frequency emissions testing and failed to use the required worst-case configurations, then represented that its processors met the standard. It allegedly sought government-program reimbursement for those devices. A former engineer brought the case.
An engineer familiar with the setup could explain what the shielding changed. The test result and the product sold were supposed to tell the same story.
Reimbursement staff may see the coding advice, admission strategy or coverage representation that turns a sales pitch into a provider’s claim. Their work can put them in contact with both the field sales force and the customer’s billing operation.
Kyphon’s whistleblowers included a regional sales manager and a reimbursement manager. Their original complaint described responsibilities spanning surgeon education, hospital accounts, coding questions and efforts to improve coverage and reimbursement. Those roles reached across the transaction: one helped sell the procedure, while the other helped customers get paid for it.
That is why we ask about the reimbursement conversation as well as the device. Who supplied the instruction, which customer received it and what claim followed can be central to the case.
Hospital physicians can see whether the decision to perform a procedure followed the requirements for payment. Customers can see how a manufacturer’s product works in practice, including software settings that steer subsequent care.
Cape Cod Hospital’s heart-valve case concerned how it decided to perform procedures billed to Medicare. The government’s settlement announcement concerned transcatheter aortic valve replacement claims and the required independent examinations, documentation and sharing of clinical judgments. The hospital admitted failing to adhere to applicable Medicare requirements. A physician formerly employed by the hospital brought the case.
A customer organization, Community Health Programs, brought the PenRad software case discussed below. The buyer’s experience supplied a different view of what the seller’s product was doing. Device whistleblowing can begin on either side of the sale.
Medicare usually pays for an implanted device within the hospital’s procedure or inpatient stay. The device’s cost is ordinarily built into that payment.
This matters to the evidence. The hospital’s bill can carry device codes and charges even when the implant’s cost is included in the procedure payment. An insider may therefore recognize the product in purchasing or operating-room records while the payment story turns on the admission, the covered procedure or the coding used for the stay.
The purchase itself can happen at implantation. Under documented consignment arrangements, a manufacturer keeps ownership of inventory held at a hospital until the product is used. The hospital’s use report can trigger the manufacturer’s sale. The shelf, the operating room and the accounts are connected, but they record different moments.
The surgeon also may make or strongly influence the choice of implant brand and type, while the hospital buys it. The Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of Inspector General describes that purchasing structure in its alert on physician-owned entities. It explains why a payment to the person choosing the product can matter to the institution’s eventual claim.
Food and Drug Administration authorization, the use promoted to physicians, Medicare coverage, the billing code and the amount paid each answer a different question. We connect those records around the same device and procedure.
The manufacturer’s decision can be upstream of the bill by several steps. Your knowledge of that decision may be the part the billing record cannot explain.
Medical device fraud evidence connects the company’s instruction or knowledge to the treatment, product use and government-payment claim. We work through those connections with you, including the records held by other parts of the business.
Training materials, reimbursement advice and customer communications show what the manufacturer wanted the provider to do. A surgeon’s order, the procedure record and the claim show what happened afterward.
The whistleblower complaint against NuVasive alleged that a marketing image promoted a use its small-print disclaimer disavowed:
The standard off-label marketing method used by NuVasive regarding Osteocel Plus in written marketing materials is to show a picture or x-ray of the CoRoent XL filled with Osteocel Plus allograft, and then to footnote in small print a disclaimer that states that the CoRoent XL is not approved to be used as shown in the picture or x-ray.
United States ex rel. Ryan v. NuVasive, Inc., whistleblower complaint, paragraph 111
The picture sells the use. The fine print retreats from it. We want to hear from the person who had to explain that pitch to the customer.
Complaint files and test records can explain when a company learned of a problem and what it did afterward.
Manufacturers must keep the records explaining why they decided to report, or not report, a device-related death, serious injury or malfunction to the government. For a quality or regulatory employee, that history can identify the concern, the people who considered it and the decision they reached.
The payment inquiry then follows the affected devices or services to the programs billed. Your account can explain why a warning mattered to the product that continued to reach patients.
Purchasing and inventory records can connect a product delivered to a hospital with the product used in a procedure. Consignment makes that distinction especially useful: stock on a shelf and a completed sale can occur at different times.
Replacement credits create another connection. A manufacturer may replace a failed device without charge or issue a warranty credit. Supply-chain staff may see the credit memo while revenue-cycle staff see the replacement claim. Comparing those records can reveal a credit that never reached the Medicare bill. We examine the replacement, the credit and the payment treatment together.
A 2020 paper in the Journal of Forensic and Investigative Accounting, A Forensic Accountant’s Guide to the Most Potent Federal Laws Used Against Healthcare Fraud, identifies two contributions whistleblower cases make: bringing inside information to the government and supplementing its stretched enforcement resources. In a device case, that knowledge can explain why a credit stayed in purchasing while the claim went out unchanged.
A qui tam case under the False Claims Act pursues false claims for government money through a case brought on the government’s behalf.
The Alere matter shows how a product warning can reach a payment case: customer complaints, FDA inspections and a recall appeared in the same account as allegations that hospitals billed government programs for unreliable testing devices. HHS-OIG, FDA’s Office of Criminal Investigations and the Department of Defense Criminal Investigative Services conducted the investigation.
We assess the case with you by working from what you observed, who made the decisions and how the conduct reached the claim. If you have already raised the concern internally, we want to understand the response and what happened afterward. Questions about confidentiality or your own role belong in that conversation with us and the medical device fraud whistleblower lawyers we bring in.
The connection to payment can sit in an admission strategy, a coding conversation or a software setting. These cases make each visible.
Medtronic Spine, Kyphon’s corporate successor, agreed to pay $75 million to resolve allegations that Kyphon caused false Medicare claims. The Justice Department alleged that its marketing encouraged hospitals to bill certain kyphoplasty procedures as inpatient care when less costly outpatient treatment was clinically appropriate.
Kyphoplasty treats compression fractures of the spine. The alleged financial advantage came from how hospitals admitted and billed patients for the procedure. The government’s account connected the manufacturer’s marketing to that choice and the higher Medicare payment. For a reimbursement employee or sales manager, the admission advice was part of what the business was selling.
The whistleblower’s complaint involving Semler Scientific alleged that the company told a provider which procedure codes to use for QuantaFlo testing. The next allegation was unusually revealing:
Semler told Vascular and Leg Center that this information could not be put in writing.
United States ex rel. Kane v. UnitedHealth Group, whistleblower complaint, paragraph 184
The complaint alleged that Semler refused to put the coding advice in writing. The customer who heard it may know how the billing advice reached the practice. We follow that account to the service performed and the claim submitted.
PenRad agreed to pay $529,069 over medically unnecessary breast-cancer screening claims. In the settlement announced by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Massachusetts, PenRad admitted and accepted responsibility for the supporting facts.
Its risk calculator had a competing-mortality setting that accounted for the possibility of a patient dying from something other than breast cancer. Documentation recommended enabling it in clinical use, and PenRad internally recommended doing so. Yet the company sometimes installed the calculator with that setting disabled and did not consistently tell customers to enable it.
At least one customer used the calculator without knowing the setting was disabled. Some patients received elevated risk scores and medically unnecessary MRIs, and providers billed some of those scans to Medicare and MassHealth. We expect customers to get the same advice the company gives its own employees.
The software’s installation and the manufacturer’s communication with its customer both belonged in that account. An employee on the product side might know the recommended configuration. A customer might know which configuration actually ran.
A whistleblower case under the False Claims Act can pay 15% to 30% of what the government recovers. In Kyphon, the Justice Department announced a combined $14.9 million share for the former employees who brought the case. In Alere, it announced approximately $5.6 million for the former quality analyst.
If you know the instruction, test result or customer experience behind a device claim, speak with our whistleblower experts about what happened. We build your strongest medical device fraud whistleblower case, bring in medical device fraud whistleblower lawyers who understand the product and payment issues, and stand beside you through the process.