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In the MasterCard MasterMoney antitrust settlement, MasterCard agreed to pay $1.025 billion to resolve merchants’ allegations that its Honor All Cards rule tied debit-card acceptance to credit-card acceptance. A merchant that wanted to take the network’s credit cards allegedly had to accept its debit product too. Merchants said they were paying to accept a product they had never been free to refuse.
The court-approved settlement paired MasterCard’s agreement with a separate Visa agreement in 2003. Both involved the challenged acceptance rules. Each company had its own cash obligation.
The Honor All Cards allegation concerned the condition attached to accepting credit cards: merchants said that acceptance required them to take the network’s debit products as well.
The alleged leverage came from the credit-card business the merchant wanted. The debit acceptance condition traveled with it, along with the cost of accepting those transactions.
MasterMoney was the debit product at the center of MasterCard’s side of the dispute. The merchants’ objection was to making that product part of the price of accepting credit cards. They wanted the credit-card business without having the network make their debit-card acceptance decision for them.
Interchange sits inside the merchant’s cost of accepting a card. A court opinion in the later payment-card litigation explains the transaction: the merchant’s bank sends the card information through the network to the bank that issued the customer’s card. The issuing bank approves the transaction and sends the funds back through the network, keeping the interchange fee.
Before any funds move, the issuing bank checks whether the customer has enough credit or funds for the purchase. Its approval travels back through the network and the merchant’s bank to the point of sale. The merchant deals with its own bank, but the cardholder’s bank makes that approval decision.
The merchant’s bank then pays the merchant and charges a merchant discount fee. That charge covers interchange and an additional amount for processing. The court also explained that Visa and MasterCard set default interchange fees when the banks had not agreed on a different fee, and that the default varied with factors including the type of card.
The bank that issued the card keeps the interchange fee; the merchant’s bank charges the merchant for accepting the transaction. The network sets the default between the banks. That division explains why a dispute over network rules reaches a charge on a merchant’s bill, even though the network does not perform every step itself.
MasterCard’s $1.025 billion obligation contributed to the $3.05 billion cash fund, while the settlement comparison separates that cash from valued fee relief.
The settlement addressed the challenged card-acceptance rules as well as temporary interchange rates. For merchants, the practical issues were the condition attached to taking a card and the price paid when a transaction went through.
The cash commitment addressed the merchants’ claims for compensation. Changes to acceptance rules and fees addressed the terms on which they would keep doing business.
The later Visa and MasterCard interchange-fee litigation began in 2005. It challenged interchange pricing and associated network rules in a separate merchant case. The court’s account described an Honor All Cards rule requiring acceptance of all credit cards within a brand, despite differences in interchange fees. The earlier MasterMoney allegation concerned the tie between credit and debit acceptance.
The later opinion also described rules against steering customers toward cheaper payment methods. Those included restrictions on surcharges and discounts, which prevented merchants from charging different prices at the register according to how a customer paid. A merchant could face different acceptance costs while being restricted from reflecting those differences in the price.
A separate government case addressed what merchants could tell customers at the register. In October 2010 remarks announcing that lawsuit, the Justice Department alleged that Visa, MasterCard and American Express restricted merchants from offering discounts for less expensive payment methods. It announced a proposed settlement with Visa and MasterCard that would allow incentives for lower-cost cards and information about which cards cost merchants less.
The merchant paid for the customer’s choice of card, while the challenged rules restricted its ability to influence that choice. The proposed relief addressed what happened after the merchant had agreed to accept the card.
The Justice Department gave concrete examples of what its proposed settlement would permit: an airline could offer extra miles for a preferred, lower-cost card, or a merchant could offer a rebate. Merchants could also tell customers which cards cost the business less to accept. The proposal put the merchant’s cost into a decision the customer could actually see at checkout.
The MasterMoney settlement resolved merchants’ private antitrust claims. An insider considering a whistleblower case brings a different question: what the information reveals, whose money was affected and which kind of case the evidence can support. Our whistleblower experts work through that assessment with you. Government purchasing is one place antitrust conduct and false claims can meet: bid rigging on a government contract can accompany knowingly false payment claims. We assess that connection against the business records and your knowledge of how the charges arose.
A whistleblower case under the False Claims Act can pay 15% to 30% of what the government recovers.
If MasterCard’s credit-card acceptance terms required taking MasterMoney too, explain the merchant decision to our whistleblower experts.