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How Medicare pays hospice providers starts with a set payment for each enrolled day, with the amount tied to the level of care. Routine home care keeps paying on days without a visit. The hospice carries the cost of the care the patient needs. That puts a financial consequence behind decisions a healthcare insider sees every day: whom to admit, how much care to provide, which level to bill and when to discharge. The payment system helps explain why hospice fraud so often begins with pressure on the patient record.
Medicare Part A pays the hospice for a package of care related to the terminal illness and related conditions. That includes nursing, drugs, equipment, supplies, aides, therapy, counseling and qualifying inpatient care. The hospice receives the payment and must arrange the covered care, whether it provides the services itself or pays someone else to do so.
The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission’s March 2026 report explains that the provider receives payment for every enrolled day, regardless of whether staff visit that day. A day’s routine payment supports the whole care obligation, including services and supplies beyond the visit. When more of that obligation can be met at lower cost, the hospice keeps more of the payment.
The patient must have Part A coverage, elect comfort-focused hospice care and have a physician certify a prognosis of six months or less if the illness runs its normal course. Medicare’s coverage manual describes two 90-day benefit periods followed by unlimited 60-day periods, with a new certification for each. Before the third benefit period and every period after it, a hospice physician or nurse practitioner must conduct a face-to-face encounter to support recertification. Continued payment therefore depends on continued clinical support for enrollment. That is the pressure point behind false admissions and recertifications.
Original Medicare pays for the hospice benefit when a patient belongs to Medicare Advantage, too. The revenue question for the hospice is overwhelmingly what Medicare pays.
The four hospice care levels pay for different needs. Routine home care accounted for 98.8% of Medicare hospice days in 2024. The other levels put a different price on the smaller part of the business that requires more intensive support.
That distinction matters to hospice billing fraud. The record has to support both the hospice enrollment and the level being billed. A routine day and an inpatient day generate very different payments.
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ fiscal year 2027 payment schedule sets the national base rate for general inpatient care at approximately $1,232 per day, effective October 1, 2026. Routine home care pays approximately $236 during the first 60 days and $186 thereafter. Continuous home care pays approximately $72 per hour, and inpatient respite care approximately $546 per day. These rates apply before local wage adjustment to hospices meeting quality-reporting requirements.
The agency’s payment rule sets the framework. A higher-level claim changes the payment attached to the patient, so the condition and care behind that claim matter as much as the billing code.
Hospice costs follow a U-shaped pattern: more care around admission, less in the middle and more again near death. A long stretch of lower-cost days keeps generating revenue between the expensive ends of the stay.
The 2019 report Hospice Medicare Margins, prepared by Milliman for the National Partnership for Hospice Innovation, found that pattern in its Medicare claims analysis for both nonprofit and for-profit hospices. It also explains why a hospice with shorter stays can have more visits per day: more of its days fall in the demanding periods around admission and death.
Medicare changed the payment structure in January 2016 to recognize that uneven workload. Routine home care moved to a higher early rate and a lower later rate. The service intensity add-on pays extra for direct care by a registered nurse or social worker during qualifying routine home care days in the last seven days of life, up to four hours per day, at the continuous home care hourly rate.
The two-tier rate reduces the reward for accumulating long stays. The add-on puts extra payment against care actually delivered near death. For a biller or clinical manager, the ordinary daily payment and the added hours answer different questions. The add-on depends on the qualifying visit and time.
Daily payment can produce very different returns for hospices delivering different amounts of care. In its June 2026 analysis, the Government Accountability Office found that the lowest-visit group of selected hospices averaged 2.5 visits per beneficiary per week in 2024, compared with 5.5 in the highest-visit group. The daily rates meant Medicare effectively paid the low-visit hospices twice as much per visit, on average. Patients got fewer visits without a matching reduction in what Medicare paid.
GAO also compared selected routine home care claims from 2022 through 2024 with home-health rates for comparable visits. It estimated that the alternative payment would have been $7.6 billion lower. Hospice and home health have different cost structures, including costs beyond visits.
Quality adds another incentive. A March 2026 working paper, Quality, Reputation, and Reimbursement Design in the Hospice Industry, from Kansas State University, models hospice competition using data from 39 California counties during 2002 through 2018. It measures quality through visits per patient day and finds that reputation helps attract patients. In that model:
Reducing Medicare’s hospice reimbursement rates worsens hospice quality.
Quality, Reputation, and Reimbursement Design in the Hospice Industry, Kansas State University, 2026
The paper’s modeled combination of daily and per-visit payment maintained quality while reducing Medicare spending. The business faces competing pressures: spending on visits costs money, but better care can bring future referrals. Payment design changes the return on both choices.
Assisted-living residents can bring a hospice longer stays, while a shared location lets staff see multiple patients without traveling between homes. The facility also supplies everyday support. Those features change the cost of delivering hospice care and the value of access to its residents.
In its January 2015 assisted-living report, the HHS Office of Inspector General found a median hospice stay of 98 days among assisted-living beneficiaries, compared with 45 days among beneficiaries at home. For routine home care in assisted living in 2012, Medicare paid an average of $1,091 per week while hospices reported an average of 4.8 hours of visits. The daily payment also covered care planning, drugs, equipment and supplies.
Medicare pays for the resident’s hospice health care, but not the assisted-living facility’s meals, housekeeping or help with daily living.
Hospice referral kickbacks exploit the value of those admissions. A facility’s access to residents or a physician’s flow of referrals can become something a hospice pays to obtain. Knowingly buying federally reimbursed referrals can make the resulting claims false even when the patients qualify for hospice.
The aggregate cap limits a hospice’s annual Medicare payment by multiplying the annual cap amount by its allocated beneficiary count. For fiscal year 2027, the cap amount is approximately $36,175 per beneficiary. The cap applies separately to each Medicare billing number, with a patient’s share divided across hospices and cap years. It limits the provider’s payment. The patient’s continued benefit follows eligibility and recertification.
That denominator matters. Additional qualifying beneficiary shares can raise the payment ceiling. In a 2010 disclosure to investors, Chemed reported that new admissions at one program had been sufficient to eliminate its billing limitations. Admissions can change the cap calculation as well as the daily census.
The whistleblower complaint concerning AseraCare alleged a more troubling use of that incentive:
On information and belief, GGNSC directed the AseraCare centers to admit new patients that did not fit the pertinent standards for hospice care to avoid paying back all the funds in excess of the Medicare caps incurred from the U.S. Government.
United States v. AseraCare Inc., whistleblower complaint, paragraph 52
A separate AseraCare complaint alleged orders to discharge patients with stays longer than 180 days regardless of their condition or prognosis. A whistleblower complaint concerning Odyssey Healthcare alleged that long-stay patients were transferred from its acquired VistaCare program to an Odyssey program to change their patient-day averages. Admission and transfer decisions can carry the cap strategy inside the patient list.
The inpatient cap limits general inpatient and respite days to 20% of a hospice’s total Medicare hospice days for the cap period. When the provider exceeds that limit, Medicare recalculates allowable inpatient payment and reduces payment for excess days to the routine home care rate. This is a separate calculation from the aggregate cap, tied to the provider’s mix of care levels.
A false claim can begin with an unsupported admission, an inflated care level or a separate bill for care already included in the hospice payment. Each exploits a different part of the same arrangement: Medicare pays for the enrollment, pays more for specified intensive care and expects the hospice to cover related services.
Covenant Hospice agreed in 2015 to a $10,149,374 settlement over allegations that it billed general inpatient care when the records supported routine home care. Odyssey’s separate 2012 settlement was $25 million over allegations of continuous care that was unnecessary or failed Medicare’s requirements. Both show how the more expensive level can become the point of the claim.
An outside bill creates a different incentive. The hospice remains responsible for care related to the terminal illness and related conditions, while unrelated care can remain separately covered. Treating a related drug or service as unrelated can move its cost outside the daily payment. For hospice elections beginning on or after October 1, 2026, the hospice must give the patient an election statement addendum listing the conditions, items, services and drugs it considers unrelated. That written explanation and the outside bill show where the hospice moved the cost.
An insider can connect the revenue decision to what happened to the patient. Admission and recertification records show the basis for continued enrollment. Visit records, staffing assignments and care-level orders show the services behind the rate. Census reports, transfers and discharge lists show how the patient population changed as the cap approached.
The important connection is who directed the decision and what they knew. A clinical objection followed by continued billing, or an internal audit followed by instructions to keep admitting, can explain far more than the final claim. Nurses, intake staff, billers and finance employees see different parts of that sequence.
A whistleblower case under the False Claims Act can pay 15% to 30% of what the government recovers.
If you know how an admissions target, staffing decision or cap calculation changed patient care or Medicare billing, speak with our whistleblower experts about that decision. We help you build your strongest hospice fraud whistleblower case around the clinical facts, the money and the instructions inside the business. We bring in hospice fraud whistleblower lawyers who understand hospice eligibility and billing cases and stay beside you through the case.