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EHR fraud settlements have resolved allegations that vendors of electronic health records software misrepresented product capabilities, paid for customer recommendations and accepted drug-company money to influence prescribing. The cases connect what passed a certification test, what customers actually used and what the government paid for. If you build, sell, implement or use these systems, you may recognize the gap long before it becomes a settlement announcement.
Government complaints and settlement agreements explain EHR fraud settlements, including these eight vendor matters announced from 2017 through 2023. The amounts below are announced civil settlements. The eClinicalWorks figure covers the company and employees together.
| Vendor Matter | Announced | Civil Settlement | Conduct Addressed |
|---|---|---|---|
| eClinicalWorks and employees | 2017 | $155 million | Alleged false certification, deficient functions and payments for promotion |
| Greenway Health | 2019 | $57.25 million | Alleged test-software manipulation, an uncorrected measure error and referral payments |
| Practice Fusion | 2020 | Approximately $118.6 million | Opioid-alert kickbacks admitted in the criminal agreement; additional civil alert and certification allegations |
| Viztek / Konica Minolta Healthcare Americas | 2020 | $500,000 | Alleged false certification of EXA EHR |
| athenahealth | 2021 | $18.25 million | Alleged entertainment, lead-generation and customer-conversion kickbacks |
| CareCloud | 2021 | $3,806,967 | Alleged paid recommendations under contracts barring negative information |
| Modernizing Medicine | 2022 | $45 million | Alleged lab steering, improper EHR donations, paid referrals and certification defects |
| NextGen Healthcare | 2023 | $31 million | Alleged temporary test functionality and payments for recommendations |
The mechanism matters more than the ranking. A sales payment, a test-only feature and a sponsored clinical alert reach the patient record through different decisions inside the business.
A certified electronic health record system has passed testing of required features by an authorized independent organization. In the historical Medicare and Medicaid Electronic Health Records Incentive Programs, providers needed certified technology and had to meet requirements for its use to receive incentive payments. That connection put the vendor’s product claims behind the provider’s request for public money.
Developers demonstrated their products to authorized private testing and certification organizations. The certification cases concern what the vendor showed those organizations and what it supplied to customers afterward. The government alleged that a vendor’s false representations caused providers to claim incentive payments for software that did not meet the requirements.
Inside a practice, the clinical record and billing functions often arrive as one system. They still do different work: the record documents care, while billing uses that information to generate a charge. The cases below follow the particular test, attestation, recommendation or claim that turned a software decision into a payment issue.
The Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of Inspector General’s report on electronic health records and billing describes how cloned notes can carry inaccurate information into a patient record and lead to inappropriate charges. Auto-populated templates can also create the appearance of support for higher-level services. For a billing insider, that is the connection between the software and upcoding.
Certification test scripts and their data were published in advance. The Justice Department alleged that eClinicalWorks typed the 16 drug codes needed for certification testing directly into its software instead of providing the ability to retrieve codes from a complete database. Its complaint also described inaccurate audit logs, unreliable imaging orders and drug-interaction checks, and failures to meet data-portability requirements. These are functions a clinician or implementation specialist would encounter in ordinary work.
Greenway’s Prime Suite allegedly passed testing after the company altered its test software to appear to support the required clinical vocabulary. An earlier version presented a different problem: the government said it miscalculated the percentage of office visits followed by a clinical summary. Greenway allegedly knew about that error and left it in place so users would receive incentive payments. The number on the dashboard mattered because customers relied on it when attesting to their use of the system.
NextGen allegedly put required functionality into a temporary version of its separate Knowledge Based Model product for the certification test. The government said the customer software lacked required capabilities involving standardized clinical terms, patient summaries and vital signs. Its complaint quoted a manager’s assessment:
It was always hacked to pass.
That is the distinction we care about: building the capability the customer needs, or building something that gets through the test. Viztek’s settlement agreement describes the same alleged shortcut in EXA EHR, hardcoding the test software while knowing the product released to customers would not satisfy all the criteria. The agreement names Viztek and Konica Minolta as the settling companies. The engineering allegations concern Viztek.
Electronic health records cases include payments to customers for recommending software, payments to vendors for steering laboratory orders, and pharmaceutical payments for clinical alerts. The direction of the money explains whose decision the payment was intended to influence.
The government alleged that athenahealth used all-expense-paid sporting and entertainment events, a lead-generation program paying up to $3,000 for each physician who signed up, and deals with competitors leaving the market. Those competitors allegedly received payments based on the value and volume of practices converted to athenahealth. The recommendation could come from a satisfied-looking customer or the vendor whose product a practice was already leaving.
CareCloud’s Champions Program allegedly paid existing clients through credits, cash bonuses and percentage-based success payments. Participants signed agreements barring negative information about the product, and prospective buyers were not told about either the payment or the restriction. We would call that a remarkably convenient customer reference: pay for the recommendation, then contract away the criticism. The inspector general investigated the matter, and CareCloud discontinued the version of the program covered by the settlement.
Modernizing Medicine’s alleged arrangements connected the software sale to pathology orders. The government said it accepted payments from Miraca Life Sciences to recommend the laboratory, worked with the lab to donate electronic health record systems to providers, and paid customers and other influential sources to recommend its own product. The same arrangement could add a software customer and generate laboratory business. Its settlement also covered allegations that the software did not always support required drug and clinical vocabularies.
NextGen allegedly offered customer credits for recommendations that generated sales, as well as sporting-event tickets and entertainment to promote its software. The government’s complaint against eClinicalWorks described payments for referrals and for hosting prospective customers on site visits. An insider in sales or customer success may know how a reference was selected, what the company paid and whether the prospect heard about that payment.
Under its deferred prosecution agreement in the criminal case, Practice Fusion admitted soliciting and receiving kickbacks from an opioid company to influence physicians’ prescribing through its electronic health records software. The criminal information described a payment of nearly $1 million to create an alert intended to increase extended-release opioid prescriptions. The drug company’s marketing department financed the payment and helped design the alert.
The commercial pitch was that more prescriptions would deliver a return on the sponsor’s investment. A marketing department had bought influence at the point where a physician was deciding what a patient needed. Inside the chart.
The civil settlement also resolved allegations involving thirteen other sponsored clinical-decision-support arrangements. The government alleged that sponsors could help choose the guidelines, determine when an alert appeared and sometimes write its language. Those allegations sit alongside the admitted opioid arrangement.
Separately, the government alleged that Practice Fusion falsely represented its ability to export standardized patient summaries, then disabled users’ access to the export feature after certification. Users had to contact the company to request an export. The prescribing prompt and the data-export restriction were different parts of the same civil resolution.
A whistleblower case under the False Claims Act can pay 15% to 30% of what the government recovers. NextGen’s agreement provided $5.58 million for the whistleblowers, and the eClinicalWorks announcement provided approximately $30 million.
The eClinicalWorks and Greenway settlements required changes affecting the software and its customers. Both companies entered five-year Corporate Integrity Agreements with the inspector general, including independent reviews of software controls and arrangements with providers. Both had to notify customers about patient-safety issues and maintain information about those issues on customer portals.
The eClinicalWorks agreement required free software updates and an option to transfer patient data to another vendor without penalties or service charges. Greenway had to offer free updates, migration to another Greenway product and an option to move to a competing vendor without transfer charges, while customers remained responsible for contractual amounts owed for goods or services already supplied.
The ability to leave has commercial weight. A Panacea or a Problem? Electronic Health Records and the Complicated Politics of Its Stakeholder Network, a Vassar College senior thesis from 2022, examines the conflicting interests behind electronic health records adoption and use. Its discussion of vendor incentives puts the problem plainly:
Strict contracts and costly ramifications for switching vendors reduce the incentive for EHR vendors to consider or address users’ frustrations.
That analysis helps explain why an exit option belongs beside a payment in these settlements. The eClinicalWorks agreement required an option to transfer patient data without penalties or service charges.
There was also enforcement after the original agreement. On July 18, 2018, eClinicalWorks paid a $132,500 stipulated penalty for failing to report patient-safety issues to the inspector general on time.
Provider cases follow the decision to claim incentive payments, while other software cases reach the medical services billed after a system produces its result. They show why an EHR settlement comparison needs more than a list of software makers.
21st Century Oncology agreed to a $26 million settlement in December 2017 covering its self-disclosed electronic health records attestations and separate physician-referral allegations. In its disclosure, the company reported false attestations, fabricated utilization reports and vendor logos superimposed on those reports to make them look legitimate. The $2 million whistleblower reward attached to the physician-referral allegations.
The criminal case against KPMD showed a vendor taking over the payment claim itself. The Justice Department’s account of its guilty plea describes a hospital assigning its incentive payments to the software company. KPMD then falsely attested that the emergency department met the requirements even as the hospital was closing. In a separate guilty plea involving Shelby Regional Medical Center, the hospital’s former chief financial officer admitted making a false meaningful-use statement.
PenRad Technologies’ December 2025 settlement was $529,069, and the company admitted the facts supporting it. Its breast-cancer risk calculator could account for competing mortality, the possibility of dying from another cause. PenRad knew the calculator’s documentation recommended enabling that setting for clinical use, but sometimes installed it disabled and did not consistently communicate the recommendation to customers.
At least one customer unknowingly used that configuration, producing elevated risk scores and medically unnecessary MRIs, some billed to Medicare and MassHealth. Here, a software setting connected directly to the care ordered and the claims submitted. The hospital attestation cases, the sponsored-alert case and this calculator case each locate the consequential decision somewhere different.
The people who brought these cases did not all work for vendors. The eClinicalWorks whistleblower was a software technician employed by a New York City health agency. The NextGen whistleblowers were a nurse practitioner and a registered nurse using the software in their work at the South Carolina Department of Corrections. Modernizing Medicine’s whistleblower had been its vice president of product management.
A developer may understand the temporary test build. A clinician may know the deployed product could not do what was promised. A sales employee may recognize a paid reference, and an implementation specialist may understand how a setting reached the customer’s system. Test materials, product specifications, customer communications, referral agreements and the patient record can each explain a different part of the same business decision. That is the connection we build with you.
If you recognize a test-only feature, a paid recommendation or a clinical setting that changed the bill, speak with our EHR fraud whistleblower experts. We stay beside you from the first call through the case, tracing how the software and sales arrangements worked and bringing in healthcare fraud whistleblower lawyers who understand certification and referral payments. Talk to us about building your strongest electronic health records whistleblower case.