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EHR certification fraud occurs when a vendor knowingly misrepresents its electronic health record software’s required capabilities and causes customers to claim government payments on that false foundation. The test passes. The product in the doctor’s office cannot do what the vendor said it could. If you worked on certification, product development or implementation, you may know exactly where those paths separated: a hardcoded answer, a temporary build, a missing dependency, or a feature customers could no longer use.
Whistleblowers brought the eClinicalWorks and NextGen cases, which the Justice Department joined. The government filed the Greenway case. Together, they describe that gap in practical terms. The alleged shortcuts reached beyond a demonstration to the software clinicians used and the certifications they relied on when requesting federal money.
A certified electronic health record system has passed testing and received certification for specified capabilities under the applicable federal criteria. The applicable criteria, the product version and any supporting software define what the certification covers.
The Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology oversees the certification framework. An ONC-Authorized Testing Laboratory tests the technology, and an ONC-Authorized Certification Body decides whether to certify it. Developers submit their products for testing and certification and pay the organizations performing that work. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services administers the payment requirements that make certified technology valuable to providers.
The testing laboratory and certification body have different jobs. As the government’s NextGen complaint explains, the laboratory uses the approved test methods for the requested criteria. The certification body relies on those results and the developer’s representations. The developer must identify external software needed to perform the certified functions.
Published test scripts give vendors the steps they will be asked to perform. Testing samples capabilities through those scenarios. The developer’s representation reaches the full capability. That is the opening the government alleged vendors exploited: prepare the demonstration to succeed, then represent that success as functionality customers could use.
Certification also continues beyond the test. ONC describes ongoing oversight by certification bodies, including surveillance and publication of product information and surveillance results on the Certified Health IT Product List. The government complaints describe the obligation to deliver certified capabilities accurately, reliably and safely in the field. A passing demonstration is only one part of that promise.
The certification cases expose several ways to manufacture a passing result or conceal a missing capability. Each leaves a different trail inside the vendor.
In its complaint against eClinicalWorks, the government alleged that the company reviewed the published prescribing tests and typed the 16 required RxNorm drug codes directly into its software. It had represented that it implemented the standardized drug vocabulary, but allegedly supplied the answers needed for the demonstration instead of the capability to retrieve codes across the database.
RxNorm identifies drugs, formulations and dosages so that prescribing systems, pharmacies and other health information systems can communicate accurately. The point of implementing the vocabulary is to handle the prescription the clinician actually writes.
The complaint alleged that employees acknowledged after certification that the software did not transmit RxNorm codes for electronic prescriptions. It also alleged that when surveillance testing followed in 2015, the certifier reused the same test codes. The government’s account ends with this:
As a result, despite still failing to transmit RxNorm codes, ECW passed this surveillance testing.
United States ex rel. Delaney v. eClinicalWorks LLC, government complaint, paragraph 47
We see the absurdity in that allegation: the supposed check on the product repeated the test it had already been built to fool. Same answers. Another pass.
In 2017, eClinicalWorks and certain employees agreed to pay $155 million to resolve certification and kickback allegations. The technical allegation was as specific as a handful of drug codes. The government also alleged that the software failed to record user actions accurately in its audit log and, in some situations, failed to perform drug interaction checks.
Greenway’s Prime Suite allegedly lacked standardized clinical terminology needed for accurate electronic prescriptions and the exchange of patient information. In its 2019 settlement announcement, the Justice Department said Greenway modified its test-run software to make the certifying company believe Prime Suite could use the required vocabulary.
That allegation concerned certification to the 2014 Edition criteria. The useful comparison is the software shown to the tester against the product delivered to users: which vocabulary worked, in which build, under which conditions?
Greenway agreed to pay $57.25 million to resolve allegations about its software representations and payments to users who recommended the product. The government’s account puts the deceptive demonstration at the beginning of a chain that ended with customer claims for incentive payments.
NextGen allegedly put functions needed for certification into a temporary version of its Knowledge Based Model, a separate collection of templates known as the KBM. The government’s complaint alleged that the company used this test-only software to obtain certification for its EHR, while omitting the dependency from a questionnaire asking about additional software used in testing.
The complaint describes pressure to reach certification before competitors and concerns that delay would hurt sales. It quotes a manager’s description of the product:
It was always hacked to pass.
The alleged concealment carried into customer communications. The complaint says users needed a later KBM version to perform functions missing from the certified EHR, but NextGen falsely told them the EHR itself had the capabilities of a complete product. The Justice Department alleged missing functions involving vital signs, standardized medical vocabularies and complete clinical summaries.
The government also alleged that later versions inherited certification without testing after NextGen represented that it had made no changes adversely affecting certified capabilities. Those versions allegedly shared the missing functions. For an engineer, that makes release history part of the story: the original test and the later certification statements belong together. NextGen agreed to pay $31 million in 2023 to resolve the certification allegations and allegations of payments to customers for referrals.
Greenway’s earlier Prime Suite version, certified to the 2011 Edition criteria, illustrates another route. The government alleged that it miscalculated the percentage of office visits followed by a clinical summary. Greenway allegedly knew about the error and refrained from correcting it so users would receive incentive payments.
Here, the misleading result was in a measure customers used to attest to their own performance. The vendor’s calculation could make the practice appear to have met a payment requirement.
The eClinicalWorks complaint describes a closely related denominator problem. Following a customer audit, an employee allegedly acknowledged that the dashboard counted unique patient visits where it should have counted all encounters. The complaint quotes the internal email:
We’ve known for a long time Visit Summaries is supposed to count all encounters on the denominator but the MAQ Dashboard only counts unique patient visits. I’m not sure how to justify our numbers on this one.
That is the kind of message that connects a software calculation to knowledge inside the company. It identifies the measure, the error and awareness of the problem in the employee’s own words.
Practice Fusion’s certification allegations concerned the ability to create standardized export summaries for all patients. The Justice Department’s civil allegations said several software versions failed that 2014 Edition requirement when certified. The company then allegedly disabled access to the feature altogether and required users to contact it separately to request an export.
The distinction matters to anyone implementing or supporting the product. A vendor performing an export after a customer asks for help is a different workflow from the customer creating the required summaries through the certified software. The alleged change occurred after the test, so the release and support history matter alongside the original demonstration.
The Justice Department alleged that the certification misrepresentations caused false Medicare incentive attestations for reporting periods from 2014 through 2016 and Medicaid attestations from 2014 through 2017. Practice Fusion agreed to pay approximately $118.6 million in civil settlements covering both software-capability and pharmaceutical kickback allegations.
The historical Medicare and Medicaid EHR Incentive Programs paid eligible health care providers for adopting and demonstrating meaningful use of certified technology. The HITECH Act established the framework for that certification and adoption effort. The certification cases concern the vendor’s role in causing claims for those payments.
The chain ran through separate decisions. The vendor represented its software’s capabilities to the testing and certification organizations. The customer relied on the resulting certification. The provider then attested to using certified technology and meeting the applicable program requirements when requesting payment.
In the eClinicalWorks complaint, the government alleged that customers unknowingly submitted false attestations because they relied on the vendor’s certification representations. That places the software maker’s decisions upstream of the provider’s payment request. The federal claim could be submitted by a customer who never saw the test build or the internal warning.
The money also explains the commercial pressure to get certified. A Panacea or a Problem? Electronic Health Records and the Complicated Politics of Its Stakeholder Network, a 2022 Vassar College senior thesis, analyzes how financial incentives accelerated adoption while meaningful integration and usefulness lagged. The thesis puts the gap plainly:
Access to a record system does not necessarily mean access to a useful record system.
For a product team, that creates a revealing question: was the deadline organized around delivering the required capability or obtaining the certificate? The NextGen complaint’s account of sales pressure and unfinished software puts that question inside a real business.
Medicaid’s program ended on December 31, 2021. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ program history distinguishes it from hospital Promoting Interoperability and the clinician requirements incorporated into the Merit-based Incentive Payment System. Certified electronic health record technology still underpins payment requirements for hospitals and clinicians in these successor programs.
In these EHR certification cases, the government alleged that vendors knowingly misrepresented required capabilities and caused claims for federal payments. The investigation connects the representation, the product, the company’s knowledge and the customer’s claim.
We work with technical staff to connect the certification criterion, the test build and its dependencies to what customers received. NextGen’s allegedly undisclosed KBM shows why the certification questionnaire can matter as much as the software itself.
Release history and customer-facing statements can reveal where the certified promise and deployed functionality separated. Practice Fusion’s alleged withdrawal of export access makes later changes relevant, too. We examine those changes with the people who understand what the software was supposed to do.
Knowledge has its own evidence. The eClinicalWorks complaint describes internal acknowledgments, customer warnings and failures to review bugs or service tickets for their effect on certified capabilities. Greenway’s alleged decision to preserve a favorable calculation gives the error a business purpose. NextGen’s alleged pressure to certify before competitors supplies another connection between engineering decisions and sales.
At the customer end, the attestation, reporting period and incentive payment connect that technical history to the government claim. We work with insiders to bring those pieces together: what was promised, what was available, who knew the difference and how the representation reached payment.
Modernizing Medicine agreed to pay $45 million in 2022 to resolve allegations involving kickbacks and false incentive-payment claims. The government alleged that ModMed knew its software did not always let physicians record information using required RxNorm and SNOMED CT vocabularies. That allegedly caused some users to submit false incentive claims. The vocabulary requirement reached the ordinary act of entering a medical record.
Konica Minolta Healthcare Americas agreed to pay $500,000 in 2020 to resolve allegations concerning its former subsidiary Viztek’s EXA EHR. The whistleblower’s complaint described switching between a test workflow and a preconfigured result in separate computer tabs. It also alleged that testing pauses allowed developers to work across different builds and substitute whichever one could complete the test.
Those are the whistleblower’s allegations. They add a distinct comparison for someone who was in the room: the screen the tester saw, the software running behind it and the changes made while testing paused.
Yes. Vendor employees and people working with the software at customer organizations have brought EHR fraud cases. The eClinicalWorks case began with a software technician at a municipal health agency. The ModMed whistleblower was a former vice president of product management. The NextGen whistleblowers were healthcare professionals at a facility using its software.
A whistleblower case under the False Claims Act, also called a qui tam case, can pay 15% to 30% of what the government recovers. Your role may give you a view of the test, the product or the payment that the other participants never had. Our whistleblower experts work beside you to turn that knowledge into a case and stay with you through it.
If you know how a certification demonstration concealed a missing capability, speak with our whistleblower experts about the product and the decisions behind it. We work beside you to build your strongest EHR certification fraud case and bring in healthcare technology whistleblower lawyers who understand software representations and federal payment claims. From the first technical conversation through the case, we stay on your side.