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United Shore Financial Services LLC agreed to pay $48 million in the United Shore mortgage fraud case, resolving allegations that it obtained Federal Housing Administration insurance for mortgages that did not meet the program’s requirements. The company admitted tying underwriter compensation to approvals and closings, falsely certifying personal appraisal review, and failing to give senior management meaningful information about serious quality-control findings. For an insider who saw a loan pushed through, the case connects the pressure to approve with the promise made to the government.
The Justice Department announced the resolution on December 28, 2016, covering conduct from January 1, 2006 through December 31, 2011. This page follows United Shore’s approval incentives, appraisal certifications and reporting failures. Our page on mortgage underwriting defects and false claims examines the broader connection between a loan file, a lender’s knowledge and government payment.
United Shore admitted improperly pressuring underwriters to approve FHA mortgages and using a compensation formula expressly tied to the percentage of loans they approved and the company closed. The approval decision affected the underwriter’s pay. Someone reviewing whether a loan qualified for federal insurance had a financial incentive to get it approved and closed.
That decision carried weight because United Shore participated as a direct endorsement lender. The Federal Housing Administration gave these lenders authority to originate, underwrite and endorse mortgages for insurance without reviewing each loan for compliance before endorsement. The lender’s own underwriting and certifications stood between the application and federal insurance.
The ordinary FHA mortgage process moves from application and verification through underwriting, closing, certification and endorsement, with servicing and a possible insurance claim later. Those are separate decisions in the mortgage insurance process. The compensation formula operated at the approval end, before a default could bring a bill to the Department of Housing and Urban Development.
We see the absurdity in the arrangement United Shore admitted: the person expected to scrutinize a loan’s eligibility was paid according to how often loans won approval and closed. If you worked in underwriting or compensation, you may know the plan behind those approvals. The formula favored yes.
United Shore admitted falsely certifying that its direct endorsement underwriters had personally reviewed appraisal reports before the company approved and endorsed mortgages for FHA insurance. The certification told the government that a particular review had happened before the loan received its backing.
The appraisal report and the certification answered different questions. One supplied the property assessment used in underwriting. The other said that the underwriter had personally reviewed it before approval and endorsement. A file could contain the report while the certification still falsely described what the underwriter had done.
For an appraisal or underwriting insider, that distinction gives the account somewhere specific to start. We examine the appraisal available at the time, the evidence of review, the approval and the certification attached to that loan. The timing matters because the promise concerned review before approval and endorsement, when the lender was deciding whether the mortgage belonged in the FHA program.
United Shore admitted that its internal quality-control reviews identified hundreds of materially deficient FHA-insured loans during the covered period, but it reported only three to the Department of Housing and Urban Development. It also admitted routinely failing to give senior management meaningful information about its quality-control findings, even though those reviews showed severe problems. The reviews found trouble inside the business while the reporting process kept much of it there.
The Justice Department described quality control as part of the responsibility that came with direct endorsement authority. Lenders had to maintain a program that could prevent and correct underwriting deficiencies and report deficient loans identified through that program. United Shore’s admissions concerned both the information going up to management and the information going out to the agency insuring the loans.
That makes the review history valuable to someone who worked in quality control. We compare what the review found, who received the findings, what response followed and what reached HUD. A completed review and a completed report to the agency are different events, and the people handling them may see different parts of the same loan’s history.
The Justice Department reported that Franklin American Mortgage admitted using unqualified junior underwriters, production quotas backed by discipline, and underwriting bonuses. Management also received serious post-closing findings, many of which were not reported to HUD.
Other lenders’ admissions show why the original file and the later quality-control account need to be read together. Regions Bank admitted using documents unavailable to the original underwriter to cure some later findings, understating the defect rate communicated to management. Branch Banking & Trust admitted review caps that prevented required sampling while loan volume grew without corresponding quality-control staffing.
In the Finance of America Mortgage resolution concerning Gateway Funding, Gateway admitted missed early-default audits, disregard of compliance warnings and self-reporting failures. Each account points to a different place where review broke down: the underwriting assignment, the documents considered, the review population or the reporting decision.
The evidence connects the original underwriting decision and certification to the later review, reporting decision and insurance claim for the same loan. In United Shore’s case, the admissions identify the questions we would pursue with an insider: how compensation affected approvals, whether the promised appraisal review happened, and where serious findings stopped moving toward management or HUD.
Our mortgage fraud evidence work follows the file as it existed when each decision was made. The original underwriting documents show what was available at approval. The dated review and management communications show what the company learned later. The self-report and claim records connect those internal decisions to what the agency was told and what it paid.
Different employees may know different parts of that history. An underwriter may know the approval pressure and the appraisal review, while a quality-control employee may know the findings and their recipients. Someone working with insurance claims may know which loan later generated a request for payment. We work with that knowledge to connect the decisions across the business.
The holder of a defaulted FHA-insured loan can submit an insurance claim to HUD for the resulting losses. The lender that originally approved and endorsed the mortgage made an earlier decision on which that insurance depended. We trace both ends: what the originating lender represented and which insured loan later produced the claim. That keeps the underwriting account connected to the federal payment, even when the person explaining the approval was not involved in the later claim.
According to the Justice Department’s account of United Shore’s admissions, its conduct caused HUD to insure loans that were ineligible and that the agency otherwise would not have insured. HUD subsequently incurred substantial losses paying insurance claims on those loans. The approval, certification and reporting failures reached public money when the insurance claims came due.
A whistleblower case under the False Claims Act can pay 15% to 30% of what the government recovers. If you know how an approval incentive, a false review certification or an unreported finding affected FHA loans, our whistleblower experts can assess that connection with you.
If you saw an appraisal certified without personal review or serious FHA defects disappear from the reporting process, speak to one of our whistleblower experts about how the loan got through. We build the case with you around the loan decisions and government claims, bringing in FHA mortgage fraud whistleblower lawyers who understand underwriting and quality control. We stay beside you as we turn what you know into your strongest FHA whistleblower case.