Contents
Contents
Physician-owned laboratory self-referral means a doctor directs patients’ tests to a laboratory in which the doctor has a financial interest. The person choosing the laboratory also has a stake in its business. For someone inside the practice or laboratory, the important connections run from the patient’s order to the tests performed, the claim submitted and the money returning to the referral source. An ownership agreement shows the stake. The requisitions, laboratory reports and payment records show what the business did with it.
The cases below show laboratory fraud allegations involving ownership stakes, per-claim billing fees and benefits paid to referring clinics.
The physician self-referral law began with clinical laboratory services. Congress enacted the original Stark law in 1989, and its referral prohibition took effect in 1992. The 1993 expansion brought other health services under the law.
The original prohibition addressed both sides of the transaction: a physician’s prohibited referral and the laboratory’s claim for the resulting service. That connection remains central to a laboratory case. The claim can accurately describe a test that the laboratory performed while the financial relationship behind the referral creates a separate payment problem.
Ownership and investment are part of that relationship. Compensation is another part. A physician may benefit through an interest in the testing business, through payments from that business, or through another company the physician owns. The government’s Wilkesboro settlement account alleged a financial connection through a physician-owned company that billed Medicare for the laboratory.
The financial relationship can also run through an immediate family member. The name on the laboratory door supplies only part of that picture.
Yes. Physician practices can provide urine drug testing in the office. The in-office ancillary services exception turns on who performs or supervises the work, where it happens and who bills for it. Our experts can help connect those arrangements to the referrals and claims you see.
Federal laboratory certification requirements depend on the complexity of the tests performed. Certification concerns the testing operation, medical necessity concerns the patient’s need, and self-referral concerns the financial relationship.
The test selected for the patient, the test actually performed and the test billed need to match. Ownership can give the ordering side a financial interest in that sequence.
Under Medicare’s ordering and documentation rule, the treating physician uses the results to manage the patient’s medical problem. The physician maintains the medical-necessity documentation. The laboratory submitting the claim maintains the information it receives and documentation showing that its claim accurately reflects that information. The clinical explanation and the billing record can therefore sit in different offices.
That division matters when a requisition becomes a broad panel. A physician’s selection can trigger several tests, each with its own place in the laboratory’s billing. The question is what the physician selected for this patient and how that selection became the work performed. A routine panel applied across patients and an order for a particular patient’s scheduled testing tell different stories about the decision.
Model Plan Helps Laboratories Fight Fraud, published in Laboratory Medicine in 1997, described the importance of making a profile’s contents and billing visible to ordering physicians. Its account of the inspector general’s model plan included notices explaining the tests within a profile and how the laboratory would bill them. It also described monitoring standing orders for continued validity.
Reflex testing adds another connection. A physician’s order can call for an additional test when the first result meets a specified condition. The result triggering that next test, and the condition in the order, explain why the work expanded.
A physician’s ownership interest and a payment for referrals are different routes to the same commercial opportunity: the order. In healthcare billing, an ownership agreement identifies who holds an interest in the laboratory. A compensation agreement identifies who receives payment and how that payment is calculated. Both can matter under the self-referral framework.
Employee incentive compensation presents a different arrangement. The whistleblower complaint concerning Surgery Partners alleged that physician employment agreements tied incentive pay partly to profits from ancillary services, including Logan Labs. That allegation concerned how an employed physician was paid. The ownership comparison involves physicians who bought interests in the laboratory receiving their referrals, as in the SelfRefind case below.
Laboratory kickbacks can also take the form of services or expenses paid for the referring practice. Specimen processing fees, collection supplies and practice labor can put financial value into a referral relationship. The relevant connection is between the benefit, the recipient and the business sent to the laboratory. The work actually done and the payment formula explain what a processing fee bought.
The inspector general’s alert about specimen-processing payments also addressed arrangements limited to privately insured patients. Payments described as compensation for non-federal business could disguise benefits for federal-program referrals. That is the concern behind the Medicare carve-out question: what business was the payment really buying?
For someone who handles accounts payable, practice operations or laboratory sales, the connection may be visible in records that never accompany the patient specimen. The laboratory receives the order. Another part of the business records the benefit that helped bring it there.
SelfRefind was a chain of addiction treatment clinics, and PremierTox performed urine testing. In December 2010, the clinic’s physician owners each purchased a 20% stake in the laboratory. According to the Department of Justice’s settlement announcement, SelfRefind then began referring comprehensive urine drug screens to PremierTox that the government alleged were unnecessary and many times more expensive than suitable alternatives.
The alleged conduct continued into the claim. The government said PremierTox submitted inflated Medicare and Medicaid claims that misidentified the class of drug being tested. It also alleged billing for SelfRefind referrals that violated the Stark law. The allegations concerned both the selection of testing and the financial relationship directing that testing to the laboratory.
The $15.75 million settlement in 2014 resolved allegations over the tests ordered, the inflated claims and the financial relationship behind the referrals. The alleged unnecessary testing put the cost on Medicare, Kentucky Medicaid and the taxpayers supporting them. The clinic owners had a stake in the laboratory receiving the work; the public programs received the bill.
The government’s civil settlement account described an alleged prohibited relationship through a physician-owned billing company. According to that account, the company submitted all of Wilkesboro Clinical Laboratory’s Medicare reimbursement claims and received payment per claim. Its physician owner also referred blood and tissue specimens to Wilkesboro for pathology testing.
The laboratory’s former owner agreed to a $300,000 civil settlement in 2013 over that financial relationship. The alleged benefit to the referring physician came through payments for processing claims, rather than an ownership share in the laboratory.
The same announcement describes a criminal case with a different defect in the testing chain. In his guilty plea to health care fraud, the laboratory’s former owner admitted billing Medicare for microbiology services that were never performed. According to the criminal court documents described in the announcement, Wilkesboro sent certain specimens to an outside laboratory because it could not perform that testing in-house. The outside laboratory tested for bacteria and, when infection was present, typically performed additional identification and antibiotic-susceptibility testing.
Wilkesboro billed for those additional tests even when they had not been performed and the initial test showed no pathogen. The outside laboratory’s work supplied a direct comparison with Wilkesboro’s claims. The civil case concerned the referring physician’s financial relationship. The criminal account showed billing that outran the testing itself.
Southern California Medical Center operated a network of clinics. Its founder and chief medical officer co-owned Universal Diagnostic Laboratories, as did the medical center’s chief executive. The government alleged that referrals from the medical center to the laboratory violated the self-referral prohibition.
The alleged referral business also extended beyond those clinics. Marketers allegedly received kickbacks to bring Medicare and Medi-Cal patients to the medical center. Other clinics allegedly received above-market rent, free or discounted services for clinic staff, and balance write-offs in exchange for laboratory referrals to Universal Diagnostic Laboratories. Those benefits reached the referring clinics through their expenses and accounts. The alleged arrangements reached both the patient entering the clinic and the specimen leaving it.
In its December 2024 announcement, the Department of Justice described a $15 million resolution. That included a $10 million settlement for the portion handled by the government and a separate $5 million settlement between the whistleblowers and defendants. Former employees or managers of the clinics and laboratory brought the qui tam case. Their knowledge came from inside the businesses connected by the referrals.
An ownership chart identifies interests. The order, result, claim and payment records explain how those interests connected to patient care and government billing. The cases above show why a useful account follows the whole transaction: an investment followed by allegedly unnecessary orders, payments through a referring physician’s billing company, and clinic benefits allegedly exchanged for laboratory work.
A whistleblower case under the False Claims Act can pay 15% to 30% of what the government recovers.
If you see patient orders feeding a laboratory in which the referring physician has a financial stake, speak with our whistleblower experts about the testing and the money behind it. We bring in laboratory fraud whistleblower lawyers who understand physician referral arrangements. From the first call onward, we stay beside you to pursue your strongest laboratory self-referral whistleblower case.