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The $18.2 million Flower Mound Hospital physician shares settlement covered allegations that the hospital used referral business to decide who could buy physician ownership shares and how many they received. For someone inside the hospital, the revealing comparison is the share offer beside the referral report: who sent the business, who got the investment opportunity, and how much ownership came with it.
Flower Mound Hospital Partners LLC, operating as Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital Flower Mound, was a partially physician-owned hospital in Flower Mound, Texas. The Department of Justice announced the agreement on December 2, 2021, after a physician who owned a stake in the hospital brought the case. The complaint describes an ownership system in which the amount of surgical business a doctor brought mattered well beyond the operating room.
Flower Mound’s share buybacks allegedly targeted older physician owners, aged 63 or above. The government alleged that the hospital repurchased those shares and offered them to younger physicians, taking referral volume or value into account both when selecting buyers and when deciding how many shares each would receive.
The physician owner’s complaint describes the business reason for recycling existing shares. It alleges that a board member explained the proposed change this way:
In approximately April 2019, a member of the Flower Mound Hospital board of directors told [the physician owner] that the proposed amendment was made to allow Flower Mound Hospital to use the repurchased shares to attract younger, high-volume physicians (mostly surgeons) without having to issue new share classes, so as not to diminish the existing share values.
Whistleblower’s complaint, United States ex rel. Jennings v. Flower Mound Hospital Partners, LLC, et al., paragraph 91, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas
In that account, buying back shares served a recruitment purpose. Existing equity could draw in surgeons with more business while preserving the value of the shares already held. That is why the explanation behind a share offer matters as much as the offer’s terms.
To keep their shares, physician owners allegedly had to meet minimum patient contacts, and the hospital counted only surgical procedures. The physician owner alleged that executives narrowed the contact definition and forced lower-volume physicians to sell their shares for redistribution to higher-volume physicians.
For a surgeon, the complaint said maintaining active staff privileges meant performing 24 surgical procedures per year. Notices allegedly told each physician investor how many qualifying contacts they had accumulated and when they had to reach the requirement.
The alleged notices tied each physician’s surgical activity to a deadline. Read alongside the buybacks and proposed redistribution, they show how an ownership policy could put continuing pressure on referral decisions.
A physician referral brings the hospital business beyond the physician’s own fee. Admissions, imaging, laboratory services and surgery generate hospital revenue. That downstream business helps explain why hospitals seek closer financial ties with physicians, and why a surgeon’s volume can matter when the hospital offers ownership.
The payment structure reinforces the incentive. Medicare pays a facility fee and a reduced professional fee for services in a hospital outpatient department, while an office service carries a single professional fee. Hospital employment can also capture referrals for imaging, laboratory work and surgery. The financial relationship reaches the services that follow the office visit.
Hospital manipulations in the DRG system: a systematic scoping review, published in Asian Biomedicine in 2013, identifies physician equity ownership as a management incentive. At Flower Mound, the alleged incentive began with who could hold shares and what activity counted toward keeping them.
The Flower Mound settlement addressed claims to Medicare, Medicaid and TRICARE arising from the alleged referral arrangements. Approximately $500,000 was allocated to Texas for its portion of the Medicaid claims. The ownership decisions reached public health care payments through the hospital services billed for referred patients.
These hospital kickback and physician self-referral allegations involved both the Stark Law and the Anti-Kickback Statute. The allegation was that an ownership offer rewarded the doctor who sent the business, while taxpayers paid the resulting hospital bills.
Flower Mound also agreed to five years of oversight under a corporate integrity agreement. The Justice Department said the agreement required an independent review organization to examine arrangements and key executives to certify compliance. The Inspector General’s agreement summary identifies arrangement review as its focus.
Medicare Billing Risk Perceptions of Hospitals Operating Under Corporate Integrity Agreements, published in the Journal of Forensic & Investigative Accounting in 2009, found that surveyed healthcare managers at hospitals under these agreements rated billing schemes as riskier than managers at hospitals with voluntary compliance programs.
The physician owner who brought the Flower Mound case was to receive approximately $3 million from the settlement, according to the Justice Department. His qui tam case connected an insider’s knowledge of hospital ownership to claims paid by government programs.
A whistleblower case under the False Claims Act can pay 15% to 30% of what the government recovers. Here, the person who challenged the arrangement held an investment in the hospital himself.
Two former physician owners brought a qui tam case against Texas Heart Hospital over its owner contact requirement. The hospital agreed to a $48 million settlement, announced December 18, 2020, over allegations that physicians had to satisfy a yearly 48-patient-contact requirement to retain their ownership.
The Texas Heart complaint alleged that only admissions counted, with one contact allowed per admission. It also alleged that the requirement gave the hospital leverage to press specialist surgeons to move more of their procedures to its hospitals. The definition of a contact was part of the financial incentive.
That comparison sharpens the Flower Mound story. The Texas Heart settlement concerned the condition for keeping an investment. The Flower Mound settlement concerned who could buy repurchased shares and how many they received, while its complaint also described pressure on existing owners through contact requirements. An ownership policy can influence both the doctors entering the investment and those trying to retain it.
OASIS Hospital allegedly made interest payments on convertible bonds issued to a physician group that referred patients. A different investment, the same question about what the hospital gave the referring physician.
At Pacific Alliance Medical Center, the physician office rent allegations concerned payments above fair market value. Trinity Hospital’s settlement likewise concerned rental payments to two referring physicians that the government alleged exceeded fair market value.
Catholic Medical Center allegedly supplied free call coverage for a referring cardiologist.
Dunes Surgical Hospital allegedly funded athletic trainers through a physician group’s nonprofit affiliate, generating referrals to the group and hospital.
The Fresno Community Health System settlement concerned alleged physician lounge amenities, including wine, liquor, cigars and meals for referring doctors.
A referral report can explain why a particular physician received an offer or a larger allocation. Flower Mound’s alleged selection process makes the relationship between the offer and the report central to understanding the transaction.
The complaint adds the qualifying-contact notices, the changed definition of a contact and the explanation for the proposed ownership amendment. That account explains what counted, whose activity fell short and why the hospital wanted to redistribute the shares. A physician involved in the offers, or someone who handled the contact counts, may recognize the connection before an outsider sees it.
If you know how referral counts shaped a physician’s share offer or buyback, you may hold the connection between the investment and the hospital’s claims. Our experts stay with you through the case and bring in hospital fraud whistleblower lawyers who understand physician ownership arrangements. Speak with our whistleblower experts about building your strongest hospital ownership whistleblower case.