Contents
Contents
Bank Secrecy Act whistleblower retaliation is a concern to bring to our whistleblower experts alongside the money laundering conduct you know about. You may understand why the monitoring system missed transactions, why an escalation went nowhere, or why management kept a control that its own testing had exposed. If raising that problem has become a concern about your job, we work with you and anti-money laundering whistleblower lawyers on both the underlying case and your employment concerns.
For a bank employee, we review the AML whistleblower retaliation filing deadline with you and anti-money laundering whistleblower counsel, using your employment and reporting history.
Our review starts with the business that employed you, where you worked, your responsibilities and whom you told. The account you gave a supervisor, the response from compliance and any later contact with an agency belong in that discussion. We connect those events to the underlying anti-money laundering problem and bring in anti-money laundering whistleblower lawyers with experience in financial institution reporting and employment claims.
In an April 2023 opinion, a federal court in Pennsylvania held that a Bank Secrecy Act whistleblower retaliation claim must go to the Labor Department as a complaint before a federal court can hear it. Reading the law as the Supreme Court had read the nearly identical Sarbanes-Oxley Act provision, the court dismissed the claim of a company’s former chief legal counsel because it did not say a Labor Department complaint came first, though it left room for an amended claim. For an insider who goes straight to federal court, that reading makes the order of filings the first question, ahead of the retaliation itself. It is one trial court’s view, and the appeals court above it had not yet ruled on the question. Which agency heard your complaint first, and when, is part of the history we review with you.
An anti-money laundering insider can explain what the institution’s own tests revealed and what management did with the results. That is a much more specific account than saying a bank had weak compliance.
Bank of America‘s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network consent order describes how the bank kept an investigation threshold despite testing that exposed suspicious activity below it.
The distinction matters inside a compliance department. A dashboard can show how many alerts staff closed. Testing can show what those closures missed. The person who understands the test, the threshold and the response can explain why a reassuring production number concealed a control problem.
That knowledge can sit with an investigator, a monitoring engineer, an auditor or the manager responsible for staffing. We work through how the system behaved, who understood the results and which decisions kept the problem in place. Your role may give you a view of the failure that a transaction list alone cannot supply.
If you work at a crypto exchange and reported money laundering, we address your employment concerns alongside what you know about the transactions. The starting point is what the business actually did with customer money and what you could see from inside it.
Internal transfers between exchange customers need not appear individually on the public blockchain. That distinction matters when we examine the records behind a concern.
A transaction hash can show a transfer. The exchange’s customer ledger can identify whose account received the credit, while wallet-control records help explain who could move the assets. Screening decisions and escalation histories show what staff identified and how the business responded. Together, those records connect a visible transfer to decisions inside the company.
Someone reviewing transactions may know that the customer account and the wallet activity told different stories. Someone in operations may understand the internal ledger entry that completes the payment trail. We build the account around that specific knowledge.
The Anti-Money Laundering Act’s whistleblower provisions include information learned and reported as part of your job. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network describes that feature in its whistleblower rule proposal, which also addresses information from compliance, audit and management work. We assess how those rules apply to the work you performed.
The value of that work lies in understanding the controls. Investigators and auditors can see where the process lost the information needed to make a sound decision.
The Wharton Initiative on Financial Policy and Regulation’s paper Anti-Money Laundering: Opportunities for Improvement examines the difference between producing reports and producing useful intelligence:
Limited empirical evidence suggests that the volume may be counterproductive at this stage, but it is possible that technology could enable more effective analysis of soft signals, thus supporting more expansive reporting.
The paper also describes government findings that investigators use Bank Secrecy Act reports extensively. More reports do not settle whether the right activity reached an investigator. A compliance employee who can explain the customer, the activity and the failed decision brings context that a filing count cannot show.
Danske Bank’s guilty plea describes internal warnings followed by false assurances to the U.S. banks that supplied its dollar access. In the criminal plea’s factual attachment, the bank admitted that a whistleblower’s December 2013 warning and audits in early 2014 exposed problems internally. It nevertheless misrepresented its controls and customer risk to U.S. correspondent banks.
The same guilty plea described an executive board decision to cancel a centralized technology migration because of its cost. The control problem reached both the systems used inside the business and the assurances given outside it.
The internal warning mattered beyond the branch: the U.S. banks supplying dollar access received a different account of the risk. For an insider, the valuable knowledge is the connection between what the business knew and what it told the people keeping its payments moving.
The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s whistleblower program offers qualifying whistleblowers 10% to 30% of qualifying collected monetary sanctions. The program covers Bank Secrecy Act violations and certain sanctions violations, including those enforced by the Office of Foreign Assets Control. A qualifying enforcement action must result in monetary penalties exceeding $1,000,000. We assess the information you can contribute, the enforcement opportunity and your employment concerns together.
The agency’s program page identifies its April 2026 rule as proposed and says award processing and payment will begin after the regulation is finalized.
Securities, commodities and the Justice Department’s corporate whistleblower program also require their own assessment. Where the evidence concerns fraud involving government money, we examine the separate False Claims Act question. A whistleblower case under the False Claims Act can pay 15% to 30% of what the government recovers. We match the conduct to the program and bring in financial fraud whistleblower lawyers suited to the case.
We review whistleblower retaliation claims with you and AML whistleblower lawyers who handle employment claims. Your employer, the report you made and what followed give that review its substance. Whether you work at a bank, a credit union or a crypto business, bring us the underlying conduct and your concerns about your position so we can address them together.
If you know why a money laundering warning went unanswered and have concerns about your job, speak to one of our whistleblower experts about the control your employer kept after its own tests failed. We build your case around what the tests exposed and who knew, with anti-money laundering whistleblower lawyers who understand financial controls and employment claims. We stay beside you as your partners through the process.