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Contents
An EHR whistleblower can be a vendor employee, a clinician using the software or a customer who can connect the product’s behavior to false claims for government payment. You may know why the test build passed, why a clinical summary count is wrong, or what a paid reference was told to leave out. Those details connect the software to the decisions behind it. They are the starting point for a conversation with our whistleblower experts.
Yes. Electronic health records fraud cases have come from people inside software companies and people who encountered the product as customers. The person who sees the problem may work far from the department that received the money.
The whistleblower behind the eClinicalWorks case was a software technician at a New York City health agency that used its product. The case against NextGen began with health care professionals at a customer facility. A former vice president of product management brought the case against Modernizing Medicine.
The athenahealth cases included a competitor’s business development and sales employee and operators of a home-healthcare service that was an athenahealth customer. A competitor can know how an EHR is sold. A customer can know what was promised and what arrived. Each can bring facts that the other never sees.
A vendor’s software can cause a provider’s false claim under the False Claims Act. We assess how the conduct you saw connects to government payment and what the people involved knew.
In the historical Medicare and Medicaid EHR incentive programs, providers attested to meaningful use of certified technology. The vendor’s certification and the measures its software calculated supplied facts behind those payment claims. A product team could control a crucial part of the claim before the provider ever saw the attestation screen.
Medicare’s Promoting Interoperability program for hospitals and the Promoting Interoperability performance category for clinicians still tie payment adjustments to certified EHR technology.
Certification test scripts and data are published in advance. We compare the applicable requirement, the build tested and the version customers actually used.
For an engineer, that may mean a test-only feature. For a clinician, it may mean a function missing from the deployed product. For compliance staff, it may mean a measure reported to the government that conflicts with what the organization knew. We connect those accounts to the particular payment claim.
Engineering and product records can show how a company obtained certification, what it shipped and what it learned afterward. The differences can be very specific: a hardcoded value, a temporary module, a disabled export or a calculation error left unresolved.
The Department of Justice alleged that eClinicalWorks typed the 16 drug codes needed for certification testing directly into its software instead of enabling retrieval from a complete standardized database. A developer familiar with that code could explain exactly why the test succeeded.
In the Greenway case, the government alleged that the company modified its test-run software to make its certifier believe Prime Suite could use the required clinical vocabulary. The test build and the customer build become the comparison.
NextGen allegedly used an auxiliary product designed to perform certification scripts while the product released to customers lacked required functions, including recording vital signs and producing complete clinical summaries. The government’s account identifies temporary functionality in NextGen’s separate Knowledge Based Model product. Product staff may know which component supplied a capability during testing and whether customers received it.
We see the absurdity in these allegations: the software could demonstrate a capability to the tester that it could not deliver to the clinician. Passing the test became the product milestone.
An internal discussion can connect a wrong percentage to knowledge inside the company. In its complaint against eClinicalWorks, the government quoted an employee describing the clinical-summary calculation:
We’ve known for a long time Visit Summaries is supposed to count all encounters on the denominator but the MAQ Dashboard only counts unique patient visits. I’m not sure how to justify our numbers on this one.
That passage identifies both the calculation and the company’s awareness of it. An engineer who knows the denominator can explain why the displayed percentage differs from the activity it is meant to measure.
Greenway faced a similar allegation involving clinical-summary percentages. The government alleged that the company knew an earlier Prime Suite version calculated the measure incorrectly and left the error unfixed so users would continue to qualify for incentive payments. A defect ticket and the decision about whether to fix it can belong to the same payment story.
The civil allegations against Practice Fusion included disabling access to a patient-data export feature after certification. According to the Justice Department, users then had to contact the vendor separately to obtain their exports.
A product manager or implementation specialist may know when the capability changed, which release customers received and what explanation support gave them. That sequence connects a certification representation to the product in use.
Clinicians and customer staff can connect the software’s output to the work actually performed. The care encounter, the note, the order and the resulting bill each show a different part of that work.
The eClinicalWorks allegations reached beyond drug codes. The government alleged inaccurate recording of user actions in audit logs and unreliable recording of diagnostic imaging orders in some situations. The technician’s customer-side perspective belonged in a case that produced a $155 million settlement and an approximately $30 million whistleblower reward.
The NextGen whistleblowers were a registered nurse and a nurse practitioner using its EHR within the South Carolina Department of Corrections, according to the government’s complaint. NextGen agreed to a $31 million settlement, and the settlement agreement provided a shared $5.58 million reward. They encountered the product in clinical work, on the customer side of the certification promises.
For an EHR upcoding concern, we compare the service performed with the text supporting the charge. The Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of Inspector General report on EHR vulnerabilities describes how copy-paste can introduce inaccurate information and how templates can populate false or irrelevant documentation supporting higher charges.
A clinician can explain whether an examination, counseling session or other documented service occurred. A biller can explain how that documentation reached the claim. Audit activity can help establish how the supporting record was created, alongside the clinical text and the account of the people who used it.
The payment rule matters too. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ May 2026 evaluation and management guidance says documentation volume does not determine the service level to bill. We examine the encounter and its applicable payment rule with you, including what the software counted and what the provider submitted.
A 2022 Vassar College senior thesis, A Panacea or a Problem? Electronic Health Records and the Complicated Politics of Its Stakeholder Network, describes nursing informatics staff translating between technical limitations and clinical workflow. Its interviews show why someone who understands both can explain a problem that a closed support ticket leaves unresolved.
The thesis also argues that switching costs weaken pressure on vendors to respond to dissatisfied users:
Strict contracts and costly ramifications for switching vendors reduce the incentive for EHR vendors to consider or address users’ frustrations.
For our work, that makes the customer account worth hearing closely: what failed, what staff reported and what response followed. The person who kept explaining the workflow may be the person who can explain the case.
Commercial staff can connect money to a recommendation, a clinical prompt or an interface. The agreement behind the feature may explain why the feature exists.
The Justice Department alleged that CareCloud’s Champions Program used credits, cash bonuses and success payments to reward customer recommendations. The government also alleged that agreements in an earlier version of the program barred participants from giving prospects negative information. Prospects allegedly knew neither that the reference was paid nor that criticism was contractually restricted.
A sales employee can know the reference agreement and the payment. The prospective customer can know how the recommendation was presented. Together those accounts explain the alleged omission. We would hardly call a customer reference candid when the contract forbids the customer from being candid.
Under its deferred prosecution agreement, Practice Fusion admitted soliciting and receiving kickbacks from an opioid company to influence prescribing through its EHR. According to the Justice Department’s account of that criminal conduct, the opioid company’s marketing department financed the alert and helped design it. Practice Fusion pitched the expected return in terms of more opioid prescriptions.
A commercial employee may know the pitch, and a product employee may know the alert design. Together, those records can explain how a sales objective reached the point of care. We connect the sponsor’s intended return to the intervention the clinician encountered.
The government alleged that Modernizing Medicine accepted payments from Miraca Life Sciences for recommending its pathology services and providing an exclusive enhanced interface. It also alleged that the companies arranged improper EHR donations to increase laboratory orders and add software customers. Modernizing Medicine agreed to pay $45 million to resolve the allegations. The former product-management executive’s announced reward was approximately $9 million.
The interface, the laboratory agreement and the subsidy arrangement each explain a part of that alleged exchange. For someone working in product partnerships, a preferred integration can be the visible result of a commercial decision made elsewhere.
Compliance staff can connect what an organization told the government to the work supporting that statement. The relevant records include the attestation period, the reported measure, the underlying review and who knew its results.
The Coffey Health System settlement addressed allegations that the hospital falsely attested to conducting or reviewing security risk analyses for the 2012 and 2013 reporting periods. The question for someone involved in that work is concrete: what analysis was performed or reviewed, and what did the attestation say?
That differs from Greenway’s alleged miscalculation, where the vendor controlled the percentage customers relied on. One account concerns the provider’s work and representation while the other concerns the software producing the number. The person who submitted the attestation and the person who understood its inputs may have different knowledge. We work through both.
We look with you at how the product or transaction connects to what the government was told, the payment and what the people involved knew. Your firsthand account gives those records their meaning.
For certification, that can be the test configuration, released version and development history. For a paid recommendation, it can be the agreement, compensation and customer communication. For an incentive attestation, it can be the measure calculation and the work claimed for the reporting period. In a billing case, it can be the actual service, the clinical record and the resulting claim.
We start with what you observed. We handle patient privacy, access restrictions and confidentiality with you and EHR fraud whistleblower counsel. The first conversation can begin with your account of the problem.
Speak with our whistleblower experts about the purchase, software decision or payment you know. We assess the connection to a qui tam case under the False Claims Act with you, whether your knowledge comes from engineering, patient care, sales or a customer organization.
A whistleblower case under the False Claims Act can pay 15% to 30% of what the government recovers. Questions about confidentiality or your own part in the work belong in that conversation too. We handle those questions with you as part of building the case.
If you can explain the test build, the clinical workflow or the deal behind a recommendation, talk with our whistleblower experts about the EHR conduct you have seen. We build your case around that knowledge and bring in EHR fraud whistleblower lawyers who understand software certification, healthcare payments and the commercial arrangements behind them. We stay beside you through the process, pursuing the government’s recovery and your whistleblower share.