Contents
Contents
Bank Leumi admitted in its 2014 tax evasion settlement that it helped U.S. taxpayers hide income and assets offshore and prepare false tax returns. The deferred prosecution agreement with the Justice Department described services that worked together: a different name on the account, correspondence kept away from the customer, and a U.S. loan secured by the customer’s hidden foreign assets. If you worked on account ownership, private banking or lending, you may recognize how ordinary bank records can connect those pieces.
This page follows Bank Leumi’s admitted conduct and the roles of the banks within its group. Our offshore tax evasion page follows the broader pattern of concealed ownership, income and reporting across institutions.
Bank Leumi admitted helping U.S. clients conceal offshore assets from at least 2000 through early 2011. The Justice Department’s December 22, 2014 announcement describes the bank’s criminal admissions under the deferred prosecution agreement.
The agreement involved five entities, with different places in the banking relationship. The parent was based in Israel. The group also included a trust company, foreign private banking operations and a U.S. commercial bank:
| Entity | Place in the Group |
|---|---|
| Bank Leumi le-Israel, B.M. | Israeli parent bank |
| The Bank Leumi le-Israel Trust Company Ltd. | Israeli trust company used as a nominee account holder |
| Leumi Private Bank S.A. | Switzerland-based subsidiary |
| Bank Leumi (Luxembourg) S.A. | Luxembourg-based subsidiary |
| Bank Leumi USA | U.S. commercial bank with offices in California, Florida, Illinois and New York |
In the statement of facts, the trust company supplied the name on an Israeli account, while Bank Leumi USA supplied loans backed by offshore assets. IRS Criminal Investigation investigated the case, and the Justice Department’s Tax Division prosecuted it with assistance from the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Central District of California.
Under the deferred prosecution agreement, Bank Leumi admitted assisting clients with nominee corporate entities created in Belize and other foreign jurisdictions to conceal the true owners of undeclared accounts. It also used its own trust company as the named holder of accounts in Israel. Assumed names and numbered accounts provided other ways to conceal the U.S. client behind the balance.
The nominee account arrangement separates the name shown on paper from the person whose money the bank holds. In Leumi’s admitted scheme, that separation was part of the service the bank supplied. For someone who handled the account, the important connection is between the nominal holder and the U.S. customer behind it.
Credit Suisse’s 2014 guilty plea described a related concealment pattern involving sham beneficial owners and false IRS forms. Leumi’s trust-company arrangement gave the disguise an institution’s own name.
Bank Leumi’s filed statement of facts described hold mail as a service that kept correspondence and other account information from going directly to U.S. clients. Its stated purpose was to make the client harder to connect to the secret offshore account.
The same criminal account described private bankers traveling from Israel and elsewhere to meet U.S. clients secretly in hotels, parks and coffee shops. They discussed the clients’ offshore account activity in person. For a bank insider, instructions about where statements went and how the customer met the banker can explain how the relationship continued while the paper trail stayed out of the mailbox.
A back-to-back loan made hidden offshore funds usable in the United States while keeping the foreign account concealed for tax purposes. In Bank Leumi’s filed statement of facts, Bank Leumi USA extended loans to U.S. clients secured by assets in those clients’ offshore accounts. The clients could obtain and use capital in the United States while keeping the foreign accounts secret from the U.S. government.
The loan and its collateral tell the story together. A U.S. lending file shows the credit extended to the customer. The offshore account supplies the assets backing it. An employee who understood both sides could explain why the domestic borrowing depended on money the customer was concealing abroad.
We see the absurdity in the bank’s own admission: the foreign assets were solid enough to support a U.S. loan, while the arrangement kept the accounts hidden from the U.S. government. If you handled lending or collateral records, you may know how that connection appeared inside the bank. The money qualified as security. Visibility was another matter.
Bank Leumi admitted opening and maintaining accounts for U.S. taxpayers who left UBS and other Swiss banks after their tax investigations became public. According to Leumi’s statement of facts, those customers moved in an effort to continue avoiding detection by the U.S. government. The investigation changed where they banked. It did not change why.
An IEB Report review of offshore tax evasion research, Tax Evasion Through Offshore Accounts: a Review of the Empirical Evidence and Questions for Future Research, describes a wider pattern of responses to enforcement. The studies it reviews found that some early measures prompted tax evaders to use anonymous holding companies or move assets to tax havens that did not cooperate with information exchange.
Leumi’s own admission supplies the case-specific connection: the group accepted customers leaving banks under investigation to preserve their secrecy. For an employee handling incoming accounts, the customer’s previous bank and the ownership arrangement at the new one can belong to the same tax story.
Under its deferred prosecution agreement with the Justice Department, Bank Leumi provided the government with the names of more than 1,500 U.S. account holders. It also agreed to continue disclosing information about its cross-border business and to provide testimony and information for other investigations.
The agreement also provided that Bank Leumi Luxembourg and Leumi Private Bank would stop providing banking and investment services for accounts held or beneficially owned by U.S. taxpayers. That ownership language reached beyond the name printed on an account. It addressed the person behind the arrangement, the same connection the nominee services had concealed.
Account-owner records and transaction histories show a different part of the relationship from the tax return. Banks hold those records alongside information-reporting records. In a Leumi-style arrangement, the useful tax fraud evidence connects the owner, the account, the loan and the reporting of the income or assets.
The IRS’s foreign-account reporting guidance distinguishes the taxpayer’s foreign-asset reporting on Form 8938 from foreign-account reporting on the FBAR. Financial institutions have a separate reporting role under FATCA. For someone familiar with those reporting records, the comparison is between what the bank knew about the customer and what each reporting channel received.
Information about concealed offshore income and account-reporting violations can support an IRS whistleblower award claim. Your knowledge of the owner, the transactions and the bank’s instructions can connect the concealment to a specific tax issue. Speak to our whistleblower experts about building your offshore tax whistleblower case.
A whistleblower case under the False Claims Act can pay 15% to 30% of what the government recovers. Federal tax cases use the separate IRS whistleblower program, which can pay a share of what the IRS collects.
If you saw how a nominee account, hold-mail instruction or offshore pledge supported a customer’s U.S. borrowing, tell our whistleblower experts what happened inside the bank. We build the case with you, bring in tax fraud whistleblower lawyers who understand offshore banking, and stay beside you throughout your case.