Contents
Contents
A business commits state income allocation tax fraud when it hides taxable income by falsely reporting where it earned it. The investment team works in Manhattan, but the tax return puts the income in Alabama. An office opens in Florida while the business keeps paying for its New York operations. If you work in fund accounting, finance or operations, you may know both the geography used for taxes and the work that contradicts it.
This page follows business income through the services, fees, offices and internal decisions behind its state allocation. Our page on false residency tax fraud follows an individual’s claimed home. Here, the question is where the business earned the income and what its people told the taxing authorities about that work.
An income allocation investigation compares the location reported for taxable income with the business activity that produced it. Residence, business presence and the source of service income answer different questions. A manager can live abroad while an investment business continues operating in New York, as New York authorities alleged in the Sandell Asset Management case.
For an investment manager, the comparison starts with what earned the fee. Who chose the investments, who directed the trades and where did that work happen? The management agreement identifies the services the business undertook to provide. The operating records show who performed them, while the allocation schedules show where the income went for tax purposes.
The decisions inside the business matter alongside those records. In the New York cases below, the allegations reach warnings about the allocation, documents changed during an audit and a tax preparer replaced after objecting. We build the assessment around those connections with you.
Harbinger Capital Partners Offshore Manager managed hedge-fund investments from New York while allocating its incentive-fee income to Alabama, according to the New York Attorney General and New York City Corporation Counsel’s superseding complaint. The complaint alleged that the investment decisions and trading took place in Manhattan. Alabama supplied limited accounting, legal and risk-management functions, while carrying the income for tax purposes.
The fee arrangement explains why the investment work mattered. The authorities alleged that Offshore Manager earned incentive fees equal to 20% of the offshore feeder fund’s net profits. Its management agreement gave it authority to make the investment decisions and trades. The senior managing director decided what to buy and when to trade, with a New York team of traders and investment professionals reporting to him.
The complaint also described an organizational detail a fund accountant would recognize. Offshore Manager had no employees of its own, and the New York investment team was technically employed by another entity associated with the funds. The authorities alleged that those people acted for Offshore Manager when investing the funds’ capital. The employer’s name on the payroll and the business receiving the investment services were different parts of the same operation.
According to the complaint, an outside accounting firm advised that the incentive fees carried New York tax obligations. Offshore Manager’s chief administrative officer compared possible state allocations and described assigning all the income to Alabama as “unsupportable.” The company nevertheless signed a return allocating none to New York. For someone who saw the comparison being prepared, the useful evidence includes both the calculation and the decision made after it.
The authorities alleged that Offshore Manager changed its operating agreement during an audit to replace its New York principal-office address with Birmingham, Alabama. According to the complaint, the controller arranged the response to the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance, and an outside accounting-firm partner sent the cover letter. The response supplied the amended agreement without disclosing that it had identified New York throughout the period being examined. The complaint puts the next exchange plainly:
When DTF asked for agreements from the audit period, Offshore Manager simply did not respond.
The complaint alleged that earlier agreements placed the principal office in New York and the investment team continued working there. We see an office relocated for the auditor while its investment work stayed put. The office moved on paper.
Offshore Manager’s later settlement agreement contains admissions about the work inside that office. The company admitted findings describing an audit letter that said its New York premises were used only for receiving mail. It also admitted that the premises were actually used to invest and reinvest capital, generating incentive-fee income.
The company admitted that it was obligated to allocate income to New York State but allocated none there for tax years 2004 through 2009. It also admitted failing to file New York City unincorporated business tax returns and pay that tax for 2004 through 2007. Those admissions belong to Offshore Manager. They give an insider a specific comparison between the office described to tax officials and the investment business operating inside it.
The Harbert and Harbinger agreements resolved separate parts of the New York investigation. Harbert Management Corporation was the Alabama investment management company that sponsored and organized the principal hedge fund managed by Offshore Manager. Its settlement and Offshore Manager’s later agreement each assigned a share to the whistleblower who brought the case.
The Harbert agreement required a collective payment of $40,073,823 from its settling parties to resolve the state’s tax-sourcing allegations. That amount included about $8.8 million for the whistleblower. The allegations concerned income generated through New York business activity but allocated elsewhere.
Offshore Manager’s agreement required a separate $30 million payment, including $6.6 million for the whistleblower. The settlement divided the remaining money between New York State and New York City.
The New York authorities’ case involving Sandell Asset Management Corporation concerned deferred management and performance fees from investment services performed in New York City. In their settlement announcement, the Attorney General and New York City Corporation Counsel alleged that the hedge fund manager claimed no New York tax was due on those fees after moving to London and opening an office in Florida. They alleged that the investment business continued operating in New York.
The authorities said a 2008 change in income-recognition rules required the manager to recognize the deferred fee income in 2017. The investment services generating those fees, they said, had been performed exclusively in New York City.
According to the authorities, the Boca Raton office had three back-office employees and was presented as the firm’s sole U.S. operation. They alleged that payroll and property expenses passed through another entity owned by the manager, even though Sandell Asset Management had incurred the expenses, remained responsible for them and continued paying them. Someone processing those payments could see the continuing New York business behind the Florida description.
The authorities also described conflicting accounts to different regulators. They alleged that the firm represented Florida as its sole U.S. operation even after agreeing to a Securities and Exchange Commission finding that its principal place of business remained in New York City. According to the announcement, multiple advisers raised concerns, and the longtime tax preparer pointed to that finding when explaining why the manager could not claim that no New York tax was due. The manager replaced the preparer with another accounting firm and claimed no New York tax on the deferred fees.
The allegations concerned approximately $450 million in deferred fee income, and the manager paid $105 million in back taxes and damages to resolve them. The settlement agreement allocated $22.05 million of that amount to the whistleblower. The recovery followed the state’s and city’s investigation of a whistleblower case connecting the fees to the New York services, continuing expenses and internal advice.
The useful records connect the fee, the people performing the work, the place they performed it and the state allocation reported for it. Your knowledge of how the business operates can supply the links between those records. A return shows the chosen tax treatment, while the underlying tax fraud evidence can explain how that treatment was selected.
Management agreements and fee calculations identify what the business earned money for. Investment decisions and trading activity identify the work behind an incentive fee. The fee’s recognition in a particular year and the performance of the underlying services are separate events in the Sandell allegations. We examine both with you, connecting the income entry to the work that produced it and the tax position used when it was reported.
Office records, payroll and property expenses can explain where the business continued to operate. A person who handled those arrangements may know why a cost appears under one company while supporting another company’s work. We connect that knowledge to the services, location and allocation, alongside the name appearing in the ledger.
Versions of an operating agreement can show what the business said about its location before an audit and what it presented during the audit. Internal allocation analyses and tax advice supply another comparison: the position considered inside the business and the one it reported to the state. If you know who selected the allocation or supplied the revised document, you can explain the decision behind the final return.
The Villanova Law Review’s 2014 paper, Not Just Whistling Dixie: The Case for Tax Whistleblowers in the States, argues that insiders can close an information gap for state tax agencies. It describes how taxpayers and their advisers control the information reaching officials, and how whistleblowers can expose hidden tax positions for investigation. Its assessment of the imbalance is blunt:
Tax agencies are totally outgunned.
Not Just Whistling Dixie: The Case for Tax Whistleblowers in the States, Villanova Law Review, 2014
The Harbinger complaint alleges a concrete version of that information problem: the auditor received the changed agreement while the earlier business records told a different story. An insider may know which version changed, why it changed and who chose to supply it. That knowledge can turn an address discrepancy into an account of how state tax went unpaid.
A state income allocation whistleblower case depends on the tax owed and the law of the state owed it. The New York cases here began with whistleblowers bringing a state tax False Claims Act case. A whistleblower case under the False Claims Act can pay 15% to 30% of what the government recovers.
Federal tax underpayments use the separate IRS whistleblower award program. We assess the state allocation, unpaid tax and available whistleblower route with you.
If you know why income was assigned to a state that did not match the investment work, speak with our Whistleblower Experts about the allocation and the decisions behind it. We work beside you to build the case around the fees, the business’s actual operations and the people who chose its tax position. We bring in state tax fraud whistleblower lawyers who understand investment-management income and stay with you as the case develops.